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Defendants' answers to Claimant's first set of interrogatories and RFPD
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Social Security Administration's 10/31111 fully favorable decision
Claimant's past denied medical expenses incurred from 12/18/09 date of injury to date of
5/17111 decision which have not been paid
Claimant's past denied medical expenses incurred after industrial commission's 5/17111
decision
Claimant's requests for reimbursement of mileage, per diem and lodging expenses
Claimant's requests for payment of W/C benefits to UPS
Claimant's correspondence to UPS regarding return to work
UPS's Gould & Lamb 2/08/11 WCMSA report
UPS 's answers to Claimant's first set of interrogatories and RFPDs and supplemental RFPDs
UPS' s answers to ISIF 's first set of interrogatories and RFPDs
ISIF's answers to Claimant's first set of interrogatories and RFPDs
ISIF's answers to UPS's first set of interrogatories and RFPDs
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LC. file for 9/19/00 injury
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LC. file for 7/06/04 injury
Selected personnel documents 6/30/94 - 8/10/09
Responses to Claimant's request for benefits 2/26/10 - 4/05112
Selected Social Security Administration documents 2114111 - 11/25/11
Report of Nancy J. Collins, Ph.D.
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Claimant's answers to ISIF's interrogatories
Surety/Employer's answers to ISIF's interrogatories
Claimant's answers to Employer/Surety discovery
Letter dated December 6, 2010 from Dr. Tyler Frizzell to Claimant's counsel
Letter dated June 27, 2011 from Dr. Tyler Frizzell to Claimant's counsel
Training documentation
Correspondence regarding discovery
Injury Prevention/Investigation reports
Claimant's job description
Claimant's deposition transcript of March 1, 2012
Deposition transcript of Preston Wilkinson

DEPOSITIONS:
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R. Tyler Frizzell, MD, taken June 4, 2012 and filed June 18, 2012

ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS:

1.
2.
3.
4.
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6.
7.

Claimant's Opening Brief for September 28, 2010 hearing, filed November 19, 2010
Defendant's Brief for September 28, 2010 hearing, filed December 17, 2010
Claimant's Reply Brief for September 28, 2010 hearing, filed December 28, 2010
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WORKER'S COMPENSATION COMPLAINT
l.C. No. 2010-000114

CLAIMANT'S NAME AND ADDRESS

CLAIMANT

-

Michael P. Vawter

's

ATIORNEY

's

NAME AND ADDRESS

Donnelly, Idaho 83615

Rick D. Kallas
ELLSWORTH, KALLAS, T ALBOY &
DEFRANCO, P.L.L.C.
1031 E. Park Blvd.
Boise, ID 83712

EMPLOYER 'S NAME AND ADDRESS

WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE

CARRIER'S

(NOT ADJUSTER) NAME AND ADDRESS

United Parcel Service, Inc.
270 s. ]1h
Payette, Idaho 83661

-

CLAIMANT

's

SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

Liberty Ins. Corp.
Clo T.P.A Gallagher Bassett Services, Inc.
720 E. Park Blvd., Ste. 125
Boise, Idaho 83712
CLAIMANT

's

BIRTHDA TE

DATE OF INJURY OR MANIFESTATION OF OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE

12/18/2009

S TATE AND COUNTY IN WHICH INJURY OCCURRED

WHEN INJURED, CLAIMANT WAS EARNING AN AVERAGE WEEKLY
WAGE OF:

Valley County, Idaho
$1,728.70, PURSUANT TO §72-419, IDAHOCODE
DESCRIBE HOW INJURY OR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE OCCURRED (WHAT HAPPENED):

On the date of his 12.18.09 low back injury, the Claimant started his UPS truck on his employer's facto premises located
at the Cascade, Idaho airport and then went inside the offices of Arnold Aviation to pick up his UPS electronic clipboard
(DAID). Before exiting the building, the Claimant sat down to tie his work snow boots and felt a_Qop in his low back which
was followed by shooting pain down both lower extremities.
0
c:

NATURE OF MEDICAL PROBLEMS ALLEGED AS A RESULT OF ACCIDENT OR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE:

?--2 :::o

>rr-1

Low Back Injury.

--C)

,

Pl

~<

er:

lJ

WHAT WORKERS' COMPENSATION BENEFITS ARE YOU CLAIMING AT THIS TIME:
(I

.4=

All workers' compensation benefits available under Idaho law including, but not limited to the fo!l§wing:.;::::(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

Medical Benefits;
Time Loss Benefits (TTD/TPD);
Permanent Physical Impairment (PPI) Benefits;
Disability in excess of impairment (PPD > PPI) benefits; and,
Attorney Fees.
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DA TE ON WHICH NOTICE OF INJURY WAS GIVEN TO EMPLOYER

December 24, 2009
December 28, 2009

HOW NOTICE WAS GIVEN:

TO WHOM YOU GAVE NOTICE

Jim Lovett
Jim Lovett, Dax ? and 800#

( X] ORAL

[] WRITTEN

[ ] OTHER, PLEASE SPECIFY

ISSUE OR ISSUES INVOLVED :

( 1)

(2)
(3)
(4)

(5)
(6)
(7)

(8)

Did the Claimant's 12.18.09 bending over to tie his work I snow boots accident arise out of and in the course of
his employment with UPS?
Did the Claimant's 12.18.09 industrial accident cause a new injury to his low back?
Did the Claimant's 12.18.09 industrial accident aggravate, accelerate, light-up, combine with or contribute to a
pre-existing back condition and result in the need for medical treatment?
Are the Defendants liable for medical benefits as required by the Claimant's attending physician or needed
immediately after the Claimant's 12.18.09 industrial accident I injury and a reasonable time thereafter pursuant to
Idaho Code § 72-432?
Are the Defendants liable for the payment of total temporary disability (TTD) and I or temporary partial disability
(TPD) benefits to the Claimant during his period of recovery?
Did the Claimant's 12.18.09 industrial accident cause the Claimant to suffer any permanent physical impairment
(PPI) and, if so, to what extent?
Did Claimant suffer any disability in excess of his physical impairment (PPD >PPI) as the result of his 12.18.09
industrial accident I injury, including whether the Claimant is totally and permanently disabled under the 100%
method or the odd-lot doctrine?
Are the Defendants liable for the payment of attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code §72-804?

DO YOU BELIEVfc THIS CLAIM PRESENTS A NEW QUESTION OF LAW OR A COMPLICATED SET OF FACTS? [ ] YES [
WHY:

NOTICE: COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND MUST BE FILED ON FORM J.C.

X]

NO IF SO, PLEASE STATE

1002

PHYSICIANS WHO TREATED CLAIMANT (NAME AND ADDRESS)

Scott S. Harris, M.D.
Payette Lakes Medical Clinic
211 Forest St.
P.O. Box 1047
McCall, Idaho 83638

R. Tyler Frizzell, M.D., Ph.D.
222 N. 2nd St., Ste. 307
Boise, Idaho 83702

St. Luke's RMC
190 E. Bannock St.
Boise, Idaho 83712
WHAT MEDICAL COSTS HAVE YOU INCURRED TO DATE?

UNDETERMINED AT THIS TIME.
WHAT MEDICAL COSTS HAS YOUR EMPLOYER PAID

J

IF ANY?

Unknown

WHAT MEDICAL COSTS HAVE YOU PAID, IF ANY?

UNDETERMINED AT THIS TIME.
I AM INTERESTED IN MEDIATING THIS CLAIM, IF THE OTHER PARTIES AGREE.
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[ ] NO
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DATE

SIGNATURE OF CLAIMANT OR ATTOR

'\

-13~.~
L

PLEASE ANSWER THE SET OF QUESTIONS IMMEDIATELY BELOW
ONLY IF CLAIMS IS MADE FOR DEATH BENEFITS
NAME OF DECEASED

WAS CLAIMANT DEPENDENT ON DECEASED?
[ ] YES

RELATION OF DECEASED TO CLAIMANT

DATE OF DEATH

DID CLAIMANT LIVE WITH DECEASED AT TIME OF ACCIDENT?
[ ] YES

[ ] NO

[ ] NO

CLAIMANT MUST COMPLETE, SIGN AND DA TE THE A TTACHED MEDICAL RELEASE FORM
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

hereby certify that on the 15th day of March, 2010, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Complaint upon:
EMPLOYER'S NAME AND ADDRESS

SURETY'S NAME AND ADDRESS

United Parcel Service, Inc.
270 S. ih
Payette, Idaho 83661

Liberty Ins. Corp.
Clo T.P.A. Gallagher Bassett Services, Inc.
720 E. Park Blvd., Ste. 125
Boise, Idaho 83712

r11

[
[

]
]

U.S. mail, postage prepaid
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile

['fl
[
[
[

]
]
]

U.S. mail, postage prepaid
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile

NOTICE! An Employer or Insurance Company served with a Complaint must file an Answer on Form l.C. 1003
with the Industrial Commission within 21 days of the date of service as specified on the certificate of mailing, to
avoid default. If no answer is filed, a Default Award may be entered!

Further information may be obtained from: Industrial Commission, Judicial Division, 317 Main Street, Boise,
Idaho 83720-6000 (208) 334-6000
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
P.O. BOX 83720
BOISE, ID 83720-0041

Patient Name: Michael P. Vawter
Birth Date:
Address:
Phone Number:
SSN or Case Number:
(Provider Use Only)

Medical Record Number _ _ _ _ _ _ __
D Pick up Copies
D Mail Copies
ID Confirmed b y : - - - - - - - - - - -

AUTHORIZATION FOR DISCLOSURE OF HEALTH INFORMATION
I hereby authorize _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _to disclose health information as specified:
Provider Name - must be specific for each provider

To:

--:----::---=-.,---------------------------------1n s u ran c e Company/Third Party Administrator/Self Insured Employer!ISIF, their attorneys or patient's attorney
Street Address

City

State

Zip Code

Purpose or need for date: Worker's Compensation Claim
(e.g. Worker's Compensation Claim)

Information to be disclosed:
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D

Date(s) of Hospitalization/Care:--------

Discharge Summary
History & Physical Exam
Consultation Reports
Operative Reports
Lab
Pathology
Radiology Reports
Entire Record
Other: Specify

I understand that the disclosure may include information relating to (check if applicable):
o
o
o

AIDS or HIV
Psychiatric or Mental Health Information
Drug/Alcohol Abuse Information

I understand that the information to be released may include material that is protected by Federal Law (45 CFR Part 164) and that the
information may be subject to redisclosure by the recipient and no longer be protected by the federal regulations. I understand that this
authorization may be revoked in writing at any time by notifying the privacy officer, except that revoking the authorization won't apply to
information already released in response to this authorization. I understand that the provider will not condition treatment, payment,
enrollment, or eligibility for benefits on my signing this authorization. Unless otherwise revoked, this authorization will expire upon
resolution of worker's compensation claim. Provider, its employees, officers, copy service contractor, and physicians are hereby
released from any legal responsibility or liability for disclosure of the above information to the extent indicated and authorized by me on
this form and as outlined in the Notice of Privacy. My signature below authorizes release of all information specified in this
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authorization. Any questions that I hav

garding disclosure may be directed to the priv

fficer of the Provider specified above.

Signature of P~tient

Date

Signature of Legal Representative & Relationship to Patient/Authority to Act

Date

s~J.1~
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Send Original To: Industrial Commission, J

Division, 317 Main Street, Boise, Idaho 83720-600

IC1003 (Rev. 11.91)

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT
l.C. NO. 2010-000114

ORIGINAL

CLAIMANT'S NAME AND ADDRESS

CLAIMANT'S ATTORNEY'S NAME AND ADDRESS

Michael P. Vawter
P.O. Box 168
Donnelly, ID 83615

Rick Kallas
Ellsworth, Kallas Talboy & DeFranco
1031 E. Park Blvd.
~nic::A

EMPLOYER'S NAME AND ADDRESS

1n

~':\71?

WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE CARRIER'S (NOT ADJUSTOR'S) NAME
AND ADDRESS

United Parcel Service, Inc.
270 s. ih
Payette, ID 83661

Liberty Insurance Corporation
C/O Gallagher Bassett
720 E. Park Blvd, Ste. 125
Boise, ID 83712

ATTORNEY REPRESENTING EMPLOYER/SURETY (NAME AND
ADDRESS)

ATTORNEY REPRESENTING INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND (NAME AND
ADDRESS)

SUSAN RVELTMAN
GARDNER & BREEN
P.O. BOX2528
BOISE, ID 83701

-

X The above-named employer or employer/surety responds to Claimant's Complaint by stating:

D

The Industrial Special Indemnity Fund responds to the Complaint against the ISIF by stating:

rg

IT IS: (Check One)
Admitted
Denied

x

::D;o
J>f"'l'l

N

g<

....c

:ti"".'

T

1. That the accident or occupational exposure alleged in the Complainfll&Cially 6ccurred on or about the
if,
r
~i me claimed.
Ir.I;

x

~. That the employer/employee relationship existed.

x

3. That the parties were subject to the provisions of the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act.

x
N/A

x

4. That the condition for which benefits are claimed was caused partly

0
7

D

entirely

D by an accident

a rising out of and in the course of Claimant's employment.
5. That, if an occupational disease is alleged, manifestation of such disease is or was due to the nature of
+h e employment in which the hazards of such disease actually exist, are characteristic of and peculiar to the
rade, occupation, process, or employment.

6. That the notice of the accident causing the injury, or notice of the occupational disease, was given to the
mployer as soon as practical but not later than 60 days after such accident or 70 days of the manifestation

NIA

"0 f such occupational disease.

7. That, if an occupational disease is alleged, notice of such was given to the employer within five months
after the employment had ceased in which it is claimed the disease was contracted.

x

8. That the rate of wages claimed is correct If denied, state the average weekly wage pursuant to Idaho

-ode, Section 72-419: $1,170.60 per Form 1

'V

x

9. That the alleged employer was insured or permissibly self-insured under the Idaho Workers'
Compensation Act.

10. What benefits, if any, do you concede are due Claimant?
None.

11.
1. _ Defendants deny all .allegations_ _ of the _ Complaint not admitted herein.
2.

3.
4.
5.
6.

Defendants dispute that Claimant's condition resulted from an accident arising out of his employment as a UPS driver.
Defendants dispute that Claimant was on the premises or de-facto premises of Employer at the time of the claimed injury.
Claimant's complete past medical records have not yet been received, but a diagnosis of "chronic low back pain"
approximately five months prior to the claimed injury indicates that causation and apportionment may be in dispute, in the
event Claimant establishes a compensable injury.
Entitlement to medical and income benefits (PPD/PTD, PPJ and PPD) are in dispute for the reasons stated above.
This is not an attorney fee case. Defendants' denial is based on a legal dispute that reflects a reasonable interpretation of
applicable statutes and case Jaw.

Under the Commission rules, you have twenty-one (21) days from the date of service of the Complaint to answer the Complaint. A copy
of your Answer must be mailed to the Commission and a copy must be served on all parties or their attorneys by regular U.S. mail or by
personal service of process. Unless you deny liability, you should pay immediately the compensation required by Jaw, and not cause
the claimant, as well as yourself, the expense of a hearing. All compensation which is concededly due and accrued should be paid.
Payments due should not be withheld because a Complaint has been filed. Rule llJ(D), Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure under
the Idaho Workers' Compensation Law, applies. Complaints against the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund must be filed on Form J.C.

1002.

I AM INTERESTED IN MEDIATING THIS CLAIM, IF THE OTHER PARTIES AGREE.

X YES,

but premature at this time.

ONO

DO YOU BELIEVE THIS CLAIM PRESENTS A NEW QUESTION OF LAW OR A COMPLICATED SET OF FACTS? IF SO, PLEASE STATE:
Possibly. Not complicated, but specific fact pattern not addressed in other "arising out of' cases in Idaho. Addressed in other states.

Amount of Compensation paid to date

Dated

PPD

no

Medical

$0

$0

$0

I

I

Signature of Defendant or Attorney

)1

PLEASE COMPLETE
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 29th day of March 2010, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Answer upon:
CLAIMANT/ATIORNEY
NAME AND ADDRESS

EMPLOYER/SURETY
NAME AND ADDRESS

Michael P. Vawter
C/O Rick Kallas
1031 E. Park Blvd.
Boise, ID 83712

United Parcel Service, Inc.
CIO Gallagher Bassett
720 E. Park Blvd., Ste. 125
Boise, ID 83712

via

D personal service of process
X regular U.S. mail

via

D personal service of process
X regular U.S. mail

Signature

Answer-Page 2 of 2

1

Rick D. Kallas
Ellsworth, Kallas, Talboy & Defranco, P.L.L.C.
1031 E. Park Blvd.
Boise, Idaho 83712
Telephone:
(208) 336-1843
Facsimile:
(208) 345-8945
Idaho State Bar No. 3872
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RECEIVED

!NOUS TR!f...L COMMISSION

Attorney for Claimant
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
MICHAEL P. VAWTER,
Claimant,
vs.
UPS,
Employer,
and
LIBERTY INSURANCE CORP.,
Surety,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

I.C. No. 2010-000114
CLAIMANT'S REQUEST FOR
CALENDARING

COMES NOW Claimant, Michael Vawter, and, pursuant to J.R.P. 8 (C), hereby requests
that the Commission calendar this claim for Hearing on the following grounds:
The requesting party hereby states:
(1)

Readiness For Hearing
The Claimant is ready for Hearing.

(2)

Disputed Issues To Be Heard and Decided
The following issues are before the Commission to be heard and decided:

Vawter I Claimant's 5.3.10 Request For Calendaring
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(a)

Did the Claimant's 12.18.09 bending over to tie his work I snow boots accident arise out
of and in the course of his employment with UPS?

(b)

Did the Claimant's 12.18.09 industrial accident either cause a new injury or aggravate,
accelerate, light-up, combine with or contribute to a pre-existing back condition and
result in the need for medical treatment?

(c)

Are the Defendants liable for medical benefits as required by the Claimant's attending
physician or needed immediately after the Claimant's 12.18.09 industrial accident I injury
and a reasonable time thereafter pursuant to Idaho Code§ 72-432?

(d)

Are the Defendants liable for the payment of total temporary disability (TTD) and I or
temporary partial disability (TPD) benefits to the Claimant during his period of recovery?

(e)

Did the Claimant's 12.18.09 industrial accident cause the Claimant to suffer any
permanent physical impairment (PPI) and, if so, to what extent?

(f)

Did the Claimant suffer any disability in excess of his physical impairment (PPD >PPI)
as the result of his 12.18.09 industrial accident I injury, including whether the Claimant is
totally and permanently disabled under the 100% method or the odd-lot doctrine?

(g)

Are the Defendants liable for the payment of attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code §72804?

(3)

Location of Hearing
The desired location of the Hearing is Boise, Idaho.

(4)

Claimant's Counsel's Unavailable Dates
At the present time, the Claimant's attorney is not available for Hearing on the following
dates:

5.6.10 - 5.7.10; 5.31.10; 6.11.10; 6.18.10; 7.2.10; 7.5.10; 7.29.10; 7.30.10,

8.12.10; 9.6.10; 11.19.10-11.29.10; 12.24.10-12.31.10.
( 5)

Length of Hearing
The estimated length of time to present the Claimant's case in chief is one ( 1) full day.

(6)

Full Commission Participation

This case does not present any unique, unusual or bizarre factual, legal or medical issues
that need to be heard by the full Commission.
(7)

Translation Services

Vawter I Claimant's 5.3.10 Request For Calendaring
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q

The Claimant does require translation services.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3rd day of May, 2010.

Ellsworth, Kallas, Talboy & Defiance, P.L.L.C.

Attorneys for Claimant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 3rd day of May, 2010, I served the Claimant's Request For
Calendaring on the Defendants by the method indicated below and addressed to the following:
Susan R. Veltman, Esq.
GARDNER & BREEN
1410 West Washington
Boise, Idaho 83702

Vawter I Claimant's 5.3.10 Request For Calendaring

[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile

Page 3

lO

ORIG/NA
SUSAN R. VELTMAN (ISB No. 7850)
GARDNER & BREEN
1410 W. Washington - 83702
Post Office Box 2528
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 387-0881
Facsimile: (208) 387-3501

Attorney for Defendants
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MICHAEL P. VAWTER,
Claimant,
v.

UNITED PARCEL SERVICE,
Employer,
and
LIBERTY INSURANCE CORP.
Surety,
Defendant.

I.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

LC. Case No. 2010-000114
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR
HEARING/MOTION TO
BIFURCATE

Statement of readiness for hearing and request to bifurcate issue of accident/injury:

Defendants assert that Claimant's request for a hearing on his stated issues, including PPI and
PPD, is premature. Claimant has not yet been certified at MMI and no physician has assigned a PPI
rating. Since Claimant has not yet been certified at MMI, it is premature to evaluate Claimant's
permanent restrictions and otherwise assess PPD. Additionally, once Claimant reaches MMI and

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR HEARING/MOTION TO BIFURCATE, P.

1

ll

receives a PPI rating, Defendants will likely need to obtain an expert opinion on the issue of
apportionment, based on Claimant's pre-existing back injuries and conditions. A vocational
assessment may also be necessary.
The primary dispute in this case is whether Claimant's bending over to tie his shoe
constitutes an accident arising out of employment as a UPS driver. Defendants are ready to proceed
to hearing on this issue. Defendants agree that issues regarding medical treatment and temporary
disability could also be heard at a bifurcated hearing. At the request of Claimant, the issue of attorney
fees could also be litigated. If the Referee agrees to bifurcation of the issues, Defendants do not
object to scheduling the hearing anytime after June 15, 2010. If the Referee concludes that all issues
should be adjudicated at the same time, Defendants object to scheduling the hearing prior to
November 2010, since Claimant's date ofMMI is currently uncertain and additional preparation will
be necessary once a certification is issued. In the event that Defendants prevail on the primary
dispute, all other issues will be moot. In the event that Claimant prevails on the primary dispute,
informal resolution of the other issues is possible.

II.
Issues- Defendants request that the issues be bifurcated and that only the following
issues be set for hearing at this time:
1. Whether Claimant's injury was the result of an accident arising out of and in the
course of employment;
2.
Whether Claimant's condition is due in whole or in part to a pre-existing injury
or disease or cause not work-related;
3.
Whether Claimant is entitled to reasonable and necessary medical care as
provided for by Idaho Code § 72-432, and the extent thereof;

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR HEARING/MOTION TO BIFURCATE, P.

2

4. Whether Claimant is entitled to temporary partial and/or temporary total disability
(TPD/TTD) benefits, and the extent thereof; and
5. Whether Claimant is entitled to attorney fees due to Employer/Surety's
unreasonable denial of compensation as provided for by Idaho Code § 72-804.
III.

Location of hearing: Boise, Idaho

IV.

Desired dates of hearing:

Defendants anticipate being ready for hearing by September 1,

2010 and request a hearing on or after that date.

v.

Unavailable dates of counsel:

June 1, 2,3, 11, 14, 16, 17, 18, 29;
July 7, 8, 9, 12;
August 4, 5, 6, 10, 12, 19, 20;
September 3.

VI.

Estimated length of hearing: One-half day.

VII.

Settlement Negotiations: Have not occurred, based on the nature of the primary dispute.

VIII.

Full Commission Participation: Not required.

IX.

Special Services: None requested.

1

DATED this ?' \day of May, 2010.

Susan R. Veltman - of the firm
GARDNER & BREEN
Attorney for Defendants

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR HEARING/MOTION TO BIFURCATE, P.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
of the foregoing to be served upon:

day of May, 2010, I caused a true and correct copy

Rick Kallas
Ellsworth, Kallas, Talboy & Defranco
1031 E. Park Blvd.
Boise, ID 83712
by depositing the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the above-named,
the last known address as set forth above.

SUSAN R. VELTMAN

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR HEARING/MOTION TO BIFURCATE, P.

4

Rick D. Kallas
Ellsworth, Kallas, Talboy & Defranco, P.L.L.C.
1031 E. Park Blvd.
Boise, Idaho 83712
Telephone:
(208) 336-1843
Facsimile:
(208) 345-8945
Idaho State Bar No. 3872
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RECEIVED
TR!;,.l COMMISSION

Attorney for Claimant

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
MICHAEL P. VAWTER,
Claimant,
vs.
UPS,
Employer,
and
LIBERTY INSURANCE CORP.,
Surety,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

LC. No. 2010-000114
CLAIMANT'S RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
BIFURCATE

COMES NOW Claimant, Michael Vawter, and, pursuant to J.R.P. 8 (C), hereby files his
Response to the Defendants' Motion To Bifurcate and asserts the following Objections to the
Defendants' Motion To Bifurcate:
1.

The Claimant is scheduled to be evaluated by his neurological surgeon on 5.27.10. Based
on comments made by the Claimant's neurosurgeon to the Claimant at their last clinical
visit, the Claimant's neurological surgeon will probably declare the Claimant medically
stable and issue him a permanent physical impairment rating (PPI) and permanent

Vawter I Claimant's 5.13.10 Response to Defendants' Motion to Bifurcate
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restrictions at the 5 .27 .10 appointment. Depending on the Claimant's permanent physical
restrictions, the Claimant may return to his pre-injury job with U.P.S. If he does return to
his pre-injury job as a package truck driver for UPS, the Claimant will withdraw the issue
of PPD > PPI and proceed to hearing on the remaining disputed issues. If the Claimant's
permanent physical restrictions preclude him from returning to his pre-injury position, the
Claimant and the Defendants will both need to retain vocational experts to evaluate the
nature and extent of the Claimant's PPD >PPL
2.

On page 2 of their Motion To Bifurcate, the Defendants indicated that they could not be
prepared to litigate the issues of PPI and PPD > PPI until November of 2010. However,
in , (III) on page 3 of their Motion, the Defendants indicated that they would be ready to
proceed to hearing by September 1, 2010. The Claimant respectfully requests that the
Referee set this matter for final hearing of all disputed issues listed in the Claimant's
5.3.10 Request For Calendaring in September of 2010. That hearing date would give
both parties approximately 90 days to retain vocational experts to complete their
vocational evaluation.

3.

The Defendants have conceded that all of the issues in the Claimant's Request For
Calendaring except for PPI and PPD > PPI are ripe for determination at this time. The
issue of PPI will probably be ripe after the Claimant's 5.27.10 consultation with his
neurosurgeon. Both parties can be prepared to address the PPD > PPI issue within 90
days of receiving a PPI rating and permanent physical restrictions.

Therefore, all

disputed issues in this case will be ripe for determination in September of 2010.
4.

The state of Idaho has not recovered from the severe recession of 2009. State budgets
have been slashed to the bare bones and it would constitute an inefficient waste of scarce

Vawter I Claimant's 5.13.10 Response to Defendants' Motion to Bifurcate
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I&

administrative and adjudicative resources for the Industrial Commission to conduct 2
independent hearings in this case when all disputed issues in this case can be efficiently
decided at a single hearing.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 13th day of May, 2010.

Ellsworth, Kallas, Talboy & Defiance, P.L.L.C.

-oftheFi
Attorneys for Claimant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 13th day of May, 2010, I served the Claimant's Response to
Defendants' Motion To Bifurcate on the Defendants by the method indicated below and addressed to the
following:

Susan R. Veltman, Esq.
GARDNER & BREEN
1410 West Washington
Boise, Idaho 83702

[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

Vawter I Claimant's 5.13.10 Response to Defendants' Motion to Bifurcate

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MICHAEL P. VAWTER,

)
)

Claimant,

)
)
v.
)
)
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE,
)
)
Employer,
)
)
and
)
)
LIBERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION, )
)
Surety,
)
)
Defendants.
)

IC 2010-000114
NOTICE OF HEARING

Pursuant to the telephone conference conducted by Referee Michael E. Powers with the
parties on September 28, 2010,
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that a hearing will be held in the above-entitled matter on
September 28, 2010, at 9:00 a.m., for one-half day, in the Industrial Commission hearing room,

700 S. Clearwater Lane, City of Boise, County of Ada, State ofldaho, on the following issues:
1.

Whether Claimant suffered a personal injury arising out of and in the course of

employment;
2.

Whether Claimant's injury was the result of an accident arising out of and in the

course of employment;
3.

Whether Claimant is entitled to reasonable and necessary medical care as provided

for by Idaho Code § 72-432, and the extent thereof;

NOTICE OF HEARING - 1

4.

Whether Claimant is entitled to temporary partial and/or temporary total disability

(TPD/TTD) benefits, and the extent thereof;
5.

Whether Claimant is entitled to attorney fees due to Employer/Surety's

unreasonable denial of compensation as provided for by Idaho Code § 72-804.

~
DATED this C)O- day of July, 2010.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

1-lti

I hereby certify that on the ac:i-- day of July, 2010 a true and correct copy of the NOTICE
OF HEARING was served by United States Certified Mail upon each of the following:
RICK D KALLAS
1031 E PARK BLVD
BOISE ID 83712
SUSAN R VELTMAN
POBOX2528
BOISE ID 83701

E-mailed to Dean Willis

ge
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MICHAEL P. VAWTER,

)
)
)
)

Claimant,
v.

)
)

UNITED PARCEL SERVICES, INC.,

)
)

IC 2010-000114

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LA \V,
AND RECOMMENDATION

Employer,

)
)
and
)
)
LIBERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION,)
)
Surety,
)
)
Defendants.
)
~~~~~~~~~~)

INTRODUCTION
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-506, the Idaho Industrial Commission assigned the aboveentitled matter to Referee Michael

Powers, who conducted a hearing in Boise on September

28, 2010. Claimant was present and represented by Rick D. Kallas of Boise. Susan R. Veltman,
also of Boise, represented Employer, United Parcel Services, Inc., and its Surety, Liberty
Insurance Corporation.

Oral and documentary evidence was presented.

No post-hearing

depositions were taken. The parties submitted post-hearing briefs and this matter came under
advisement on January 3, 2011.
ISSUES
The issues to be decided as a result of the hearing are:
1.

·whether Claimant suffered an injury arising out of his employment;

1

1

Defendants concede that Claimant's accident occurred during the course of his
employment.
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2.

vVhether Claimant is entitled to total temporary disability (TTD) benefits and the

extent thereof;
3.

Whether Claimant is entitled to medical benefits and the extent thereof; and

4.

Whether Claimant is entitled to an award of attorney fees.
CONTENTION OF THE PA.RTIES

Claimant contends that he injured his low back while bending over to tie his boots at
Employer's satellite facility in Cascade.

He argues he is entitled to a Foust "premises"

presumption that his injury arose out of his employment because his accident happened on
Employer's premises and Employer has failed to rebut that presumption.

Claimant seeks

reimbursement for past medical treatment at the invoiced amounts, TTD benefits from the date
of his injury until released to return to work by his treating physician, and attorney fees due to
Surety's unreasonable denial of his claim without legal or factual support.
Defendants contend that the Foust premises presumption is not applicable because
Claimant's injury did not occur on Employer's "premises" in that Employer did not own, control,
or maintain the property where Claimant was injured.

Further, Claimant should have been

prepared for work before beginning his duties, including having his boots properly laced and
tied. The act of tying his boots was purely personal and occurred as the result of a risk Claimant
himself created versus a risk created by his employment. Moreover, Claimant was, at best, a
travelling employee who is not afforded the benefit of the Foust presumption. Also, Claimant
was engaged in no physical activity incidental to his work duties when he bent down to tie his
boot laces. Finally, because the primary issue presented herein is an issue of first impression in
Idaho, Defendants did not unreasonably deny this claim and attorney fees should not be awarded.
Defendants agree that they owe some TTD benefits if this claim is found to be compensable.
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EVIDENCE CONSIDERED

The record in this matter consists of the following:
1.

The testimony of Claimant and Employer's business manager Dax Wilkinson,

taken at the hearing;
2.

Claimant's Exhibits 1-20, admitted at the hearing;

3.

Defendants' Exhibits 1-8, admitted at the hearing; and

4.

The pre-hearing deposition of Mike McGuire, taken by Claimant and attended by

the Referee on September 16, 2010.
After having considered all the above evidence and the briefs of the parties, the Referee
submits the following findings of fact and conclusions oflaw for review by the Commission.
FINDINGS OF FACT

1.
years.

Claimant was 51 years of age and has resided in the McCall/Donnelly area for 40

He is a graduate of McCall/Donnelly High School and has had no further formal

education. He is a Marine Corps veteran.
2.

At the time of his industrial accident, Claimant had been employed as a package

driver for UPS for 26 years. For about 14 of those years, Claimant worked out of Employer's
McCall facilities; during the remaining 13 years he worked out of Employer's Cascade satellite
facility at Arnold Aviation (AA) located at the Cascade Airport.
3.

Claimant reported for work at the AA facility at the Cascade Airport at around

6:20 a.m. on December 18, 2009. The temperature was approximately 20 degrees below zero.
Claimant was required to travel from his home to AA in his private vehicle. Once at AA,
Claimant placed his gloves and thermos in UPS's familiar brown truck, started the vehicle to let
it warm up, then proceeded into the AA facilities where he kept his DIAD computer2 and other
2

The DIAD hand-held computer needed to be stored overnight inside the building
because its batteries would fail ifleft out in Claimant's delivery truck.
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work-related items. Once inside, Claimant clocked in, sat down on a couch and bent over to tie
his boot laces when he felt a pop and immediate pain in his low back.
4.

As it was the busy Christmas season for UPS, Claimant did not seek medical care

until December 28 1h. At that time, Claimant was diagnosed with a herniated disk and early cauda
equina symptoms. He was taken to surgery on January 19, 2010. Unfortunately, the surgery was
unsuccessful, and Claimant was again brought to surgery on July 21, 2010 for a recurrent disk
and a one level fusion at L4-5.
5.

Surety denied Claimant's claim on the ground that his injury did not arise out of

his employment.
DISCUSSION AND FURTHER FINDINGS

6.

There is no dispute that Claimant suffered an accident and injury on December

18, 2009, as those terms are defined in Idaho Code §§ 72-102(18)(a)(b) and (c), and that the
accident causing the injury occurred during the course of Claimant's employment. The question
is whether his accident and injury arose out of his employment.
The Foust presumption

7.

Claimant argues that because his accident and injury occurred at Employer's

designated workplace, he is entitled to a presumption that his accident and injury arose out of his
employment. He cites the Idaho Supreme Court case of Foust v. Birds Eye Division of General

Foods Corp., 91 Idaho 418, 422 P.2d 616 (1967). There, the claimant was walking to her
vehicle across a large parking lot maintained for employees adjacent to employer's plant when
she was struck by a vehicle driven by a co-worker. The Court presumed that the claimant's
injury arose in the course of and out of employment because the accident occurred on the
employer's premises. "In the case at bar there is nothing to indicate that respondent, while on
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the employer's premises, was engaged in any abnormal unforeseeable activity foreign to her
employment ... To the contrary, under the circumstances of respondent's employment, her
injury "can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the work and to have been
contemplated by a reasonable person familiar with the whole situation." Id., at p. 419.
8.

Defendants maintain that the Foust presumption does not apply here because

Claimant was not injured on Employer's "premises." For the following reasons, the Referee
disagrees. Claimant was required to report for work at AA and to end his day there and had done
so for 12 of his 26 year employment. 3 Employer had an oral agreement to let it occupy the AA
facilities to the mutual benefit of both parties. 4 AA flew Employer's packages on occasion to
back-country destinations, and UPS would handle deliveries for AA.

Employer saved time,

money, and mileage by having Claimant use the satellite location in Cascade. Employer further
benefitted by the arrangement in having a location to park its truck and transfer trailer and a
place to keep the DIAD computer warm on cold winter nights. Claimant and another UPS driver
had keys to AA and could use its bathroom, water, heater, etc. Finally, Claimant completed his
paperwork, telephoned Employer's McCall office with DIAD information, and clocked out from
the Cascade satellite work site, all at Employer's direction.
9.

There is no question that Claimant's normal workplace (other than in his truck)

was at Arnold's Aviation at the Cascade Airport in Cascade. Employer occupied the facility
based on an oral contract with its owners in order to advance its business interests. Claimant
performed duties for Employer there.

He was injured there.

Claimant is entitled to the

3

See, Colson v. Steele, 73 Idaho 348, 252 P.2d 1049 (1953) wherein the Court held that
an employer's "premises" may be where employee was required to work by employer.
4
That Claimant was friends with the owners of AA and initially made the arrangement
with them to let UPS use its facilities does not alter the fact that UPS eventually entered into a
verbal contract with AA and admittedly benefitted from the arrangement.
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presumption that his injury arose in the course of and out of his employment. Therefore, the
burden shifts to Employer to rebut that presumption by proving Claimant's accident and injury
did not arise out of his employment because it was an abnormal, unforeseeable activity that was
foreign to his employment. See, Foust Id.
10.

Defendants argue that Claimant should have had his shoes tied before he got to

his work site, citing Employer's safety policies requiring its employees to clock in ready to work.
Claimant testified that on December 18, 2009, he had his bootlaces shoved, untied, down the
inside of the top of his work boots:
Q. (By Ms. Veltman): Why didn't you have your boots tied when you
showed up for work on December 13th7
A.
Because those boots there - - your feet get hot in them if you - when you tie them up and it's a 30-minute drive from my house to the airport.
So, I can let out as much heat as I can. Keep my feet cooler. But when I start
work I tie them up, you know, so that there is no hanging down parts, they are tied
on my feet, good support and whatnot. But it's a - - my feet don't sweat so bad
that way with them loose like that.
Q.
Is there any reason you didn't tie them up before you started your
UPS vehicle?
A.
Yes. I was sitting in my little Toyota pickup. I don't have room to
tie them in the Toyota pickup.

Hearing Transcript, pp. 61-62.
11.

Claimant's reasoning behind waiting until he got inside his heated work area to tie

his boot laces makes sense; he could not lace them in his pickup and it was 20 degrees below
zero outside.

While it may be argued that such a decision and the actual act of tying his

bootlaces were purely personal to Claimant, it certainly benefitted Employer in that tied boot
laces minimized the risk of a slip and fall, or having the loose laces become entangled in
equipment or machinery or the accelerator/brake pedals of his truck with the potential of costing
Employer money in the event someone was killed or injured. Defendants similarly argue that
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Claimant violated company policy by not showing up for work ready to go. Again, that might be
the case; however, an ostensible violation of that policy is between Claimant and UPS and will
not serve to block his entitlement to workers' compensation benefits. (See, Gage supra).
12.

Defendants argue that Claimant's work boots were not compliant with

Employer's work boot policies in that they had a rubber upper as opposed to the recommended
leather uppers. The Referee is not persuaded that this slight departure from Employer's policy in
any way contributed to Claimant's accident and injury, and had more to do with aesthetics than
safety.

Again, a violation of Employer's policy will not preclude eligibility for workers'

compensation benefits.
12.

Further, even if Claimant's act of tying his boot laces was purely personal,

Defendants are nevertheless liable for benefits because the evidence establishes that Claimant
was injured while on the job at the AA office. This case is similar to the Idaho Supreme Court
case of Gage v. Express Personnel, 135 Idaho 250, 16 P.3d 926 (2000). There, the claimant
worked for a temporary job placement service and was sent to a location where she had worked
before. The claimant was instructed to report to a loading dock and wait for supplies. 5 The
claimant sat down on the dock and smoked a cigarette while she waited. When the claimant's
cigarette broke apart and fell to the ground, she jumped down to retrieve it. As she was climbing
back up on the loading dock she fell and injured her back. The Industrial Commission found the
claimant's injuries resulted from her smoking, which it deemed a purely personal activity. The
Commission further found that smoking violated employer's policies so she was not " . . .
furthering any employment duty or interest of her employer." Id., at p. 253. The Commission

5

Claimant testified that it was necessary to warm his truck up for at least 15 minutes
because UPS would not provide an engine block heater.
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concluded that the claimant's injuries did not arise out of or in the course of her employment and
denied her claim.
On appeal, the Court held:
In this case, the evidence mandates a finding that Gage suffered an injury
from a fall, within the period of her employment, in a place where she may
reasonably have been and while she was reasonably fulfilling the duties of her
employment. (Citations omitted).

Clearly, Gage's smoking while on the rail dock did not detract from the
benefit conferred upon the employer by Gage's being on site and prepared to
work, as she had been directed, awaiting the arrival of labels and product. We
hold that the Commission committed clear error when it concluded that Gage's
smoking was a wholly personal activity not in furtherance of any interest of her
employer.
An injury is considered to arise out of employment when a causal
connection exists between the circumstances under which the work must be
performed and the injury of which the claimant complains. (Citation omitted).
This prong of the compensability test examines the origin and cause of the
accident. Gage asserts she was injured as she was carrying out her job
responsibilities. She argues that her smokillg, which was in violation of company
policy, deals only with the manner of performance of her work and should not
foreclose her right to benefits for a work-related injury. The respondents maintain
that smoking was the cause of Gage's injury and that by prohibiting smoking in
the workplace, the employer removed injuries caused by smoking from the course
of employment, making them noncompensable.

A proscription against smoking on the job does not categorically compel
denial of an award of benefits to a worker injured while participating in the
prohibited activity. Although we have found no Idaho cases on the subject, other
courts have affirmed awards of worker's compensation benefits to injured
employees who had violated safety rules. (Citation omitted) (employee burned to
death while smoking in violation of no smoking rule held to be doing the task
assigned albeit in a forbidden manner); (Citation omitted) (mere violation of rule
regulating manner and method of performing work that employee was hired to do
did not constitute stepping away from employment so as to defeat employee's
right to worker's compensation; (Citation omitted) ( benefits awarded for hand
injury suffered when employee, contrary to work rule, reached into machine to
remove steel caught in die in press) (Citation omitted) (employee who was
assigned to work in grinding room where rule to wear goggles was posted was
injured because he violated the rule and failed to wear goggles but would still be
entitled to compensation). By smoking while she waited for the product she was
to label, Gage may be said to have done an authorized act in a forbidden manner,
but this slight deviation of the employer's rule regarding how the work was to be
performed is not enough to deny Gage's claim. Moreover, smoking was not the
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION - 8

cause of the injury. The injury could have as easily have resulted from Gage
jumping off the rail dock to reclaim an earring, necklace or other personal item
that had fallen to the ground.
This Court has repeatedly recognized that in determining whether an
accident arises out of and in the course of employment, each case must be decided
upon its own attendant facts and circumstances under a liberal construction of the
Worker's Compensation Act. (Citation omitted). We hold that the Commission
erred in concluding that Gage's injury did not arise out of and in the course of her
employment. Accordingly, we reverse the Commission's decision denying
worker's compensation benefits. Gage at p. 254.
13.

Gage instructs that a claimant need not be performing an actual job duty at the

time of an injury to be entitled to workers' compensation benefits. On December 18, 2009,
Claimant, like Gage, was where he was directed to report for work at Employer's designated
work area. Also like Gage waiting for product and labels, Claimant was waiting for his work
truck to warm up so he could begin his actual work duties. While he was waiting, he bent over
to lace his boots and was injured. Claimant was onsite and prepared to work, as directed by
Employer. Further, the act of lacing his boots certainly did not rise to the level of " ... any
abnormal unforeseeable activity foreign to [his] employment ... " See, Foust Id., at p. 419.
14.

When there is doubt about whether an accident arose out of employment, that

doubt shall be resolved in favor of the employee. Stevens-McAtee v. Potlatch Corp., 145 Idaho
325, 179 P.3d 288 (2008). The Referee finds that Defendants have failed to rebut the Foust
presumption that Claimant's low back injury of December 18, 2009 arose out of his employment.
TTD benefits

Idaho Code § 72-408 provides for income benefits for total and partial disability during
an injured worker's period ofrecovery.
15.

Claimant contends that he is entitled to an award ofTTD benefits from December

28, 2009 until he was declared medically stable on December 6, 2010 following his second
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surgery. There being no evidence to the contrary, the Referee finds that Claimant is entitled to
TTD benefits from December 28, 2009 through December 6, 2010.
Medical benefits

Idaho Code§ 72-432(1) obligates an employer to provide an injured employee reasonable
medical care as may be required by his or her physician immediately following an injury and for
a reasonable time thereafter. If the employer fails to provide the same, the injured worker may
do so at the expense of employer.
16.

Claimant has incurred medical expenses totaling $149,033.68. See, Claimant's

Exhibit 7. Pursuant to Neel v. Western Construction, 147 Idaho 146, 206 P.3d 852 (2009),
Defendants are liable for 100% of those invoiced medical expenses.
Attorney fees

Idaho Code § 72-804 provides for an award of attorney fees in the event an employer or
its surety unreasonably denies a claim or neglect or refused to pay an injured employee
compensation within a reasonable time.
17.

Claimant contends he is entitled to an award of attorney fees because the factual

evidence in this case establishes a clear causal connection between the safe work environment
and safety policies Claimant was required to follow and his act of tying his boots. Likewise,
Claimant asserts there is no legal basis for Defendants' denial because the evidence is
overwhelming that Claimant's injury occurred on Employer's satellite work premises, and
Defendants have produced no evidence to overcome the Foust presumption. Further, within
days of the denial, Claimant's counsel wrote Surety a five-page letter setting out Claimant's view
of the presumption raised, the absence of evidence necessary to rebut the presumption and the
liberal construction afforded to claimants in like cases. Surety did not even respond.
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18.

Defendants argue that Idaho case law is conflicting regarding "arising out of'

cases and that there are no Idaho cases regarding shoe tying. Further, Surety asserts that it
should not be found liable for attorney fees because it conducted an investigation and secured a
legal opinion prior to denying the claim.
19.

vVbile a close call, the Referee tends to side with Defendants on this point.

Because shoe tying is such a commonplace occurrence, at first blush it would seem that such an
act could not be related to employment unless changing or selling shoes was one's occupation.
Also, there is no definition of "premises" regarding the premises presumption. Moreover, there
is no bright line in Idaho case law regarding when an accident arises out of employment and
there are no cases involving boot lace tying. Further, cases cited by Defendants from other
jurisdictions are not uniform in treating the subject and one case cited denied compensation to a
UPS employee who was injured while re-tying his boot after it came untied while unloading
packages from his truck. See, United Parcel Service of America v. Fetterman, 336 S.E. 2d 892,
(1985). Finally, the mere fact that an injury occurred on Employer's premises is only one factor
to be considered. See, Dinius v. Loving Care & Afore, Inc., 133 Idaho 572, 990 P.2d7387.
(1999).
20.

The Referee finds that Claimant is not entitled to an award of attorney fees for

Surety's unreasonably denying his claim.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

Claimant suffered an accident arising in the course of and out of his employment

causing an injury on December 18, 2009.
2.

Claimant is awarded TTD benefits from December 28, 2009 through December 6,

2010.
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3.

Claimant is awarded medical benefits in the amount of$149,033.68.

4.

Claimant is not entitled to an award of attorney fees.
RECOMMENDATION

Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation,
the Referee recommends that the Commission adopt such findings and conclusions as its own
and issue an appropriate final order.
DATED this

'10-fl" day of

~

'2011.

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

Michael E. Powers, Referee

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the
day of
, 2011, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND
RECOMMENDATION was served by regular United States Mail upon each of the following:
RICK D KALLAS
1031 EPARKBLVD
BOISE ID 83712
SUSAN R VELTMAN
PO BOX 2528
BOISE ID 83701

ge
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MICHAEL P. VAWTER,
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UNITED PARCEL SERVICES, INC.,
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and
LIBERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION,
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FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND ORDER

E

INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-506, the Idaho Industrial Commission assigned the
above-entitled matter to Referee Michael E. Powers, who conducted a hearing in Boise on
September 28, 2010.

Claimant was present and represented by Rick D. Kallas of Boise.

Susan R. Veltman, also of Boise, represented Employer, United Parcel Services, Inc., and its
Surety, Liberty Insurance Corporation. Oral and documentary evidence was presented. No posthearing depositions were taken. The parties submitted post-hearing briefs and this matter came
under advisement on January 3, 2011. The undersigned Commissioners have chosen not to
adopt the Referee's recommendation and hereby issue their own findings of fact, conclusions of
law and order.
ISSUES

The issues to be decided as a result of the hearing are:
1.

Whether Claimant suffered an injury arising out of his employment; 1

1

Defendants concede that Claimant's accident occurred during the course of his
employment.
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2.

Whether Claimant is entitled to total temporary disability (TTD) benefits
and the extent thereof;

3.

Whether Claimant is entitled to medical benefits and the extent thereof;
and

4.

Whether Claimant is entitled to an award of attorney fees.
CONTENTION OF THE PARTIES

Claimant contends that he injured his low back while bending over to tie his boots at
Employer's satellite facility in Cascade.

He argues he is entitled to a Foust "premises"

presumption that his injury arose out of his employment because his accident happened on
Employer's premises and Employer has failed to rebut that presumption.

Claimant seeks

reimbursement for past medical treatment at the invoiced amounts, TTD benefits from the
date of his injury until released to return to work by his treating physician, and attorney fees
due to Surety's unreasonable denial of his claim without legal or factual support.
Defendants contend that the Foust premises presumption is not applicable because
Claimant's injury did not occur on Employer's "premises" in that Employer did not own, control,
or maintain the property where Claimant was injured.

Further, Claimant should have been

prepared for work before beginning his duties, including having his boots properly laced
and tied. The act of tying his boots was purely personal and occurred as the result of a risk
Claimant himself created versus a risk created by his employment. Moreover, Claimant was,
at best, a travelling employee who is not afforded the benefit of the Foust presumption. Also,
Claimant was engaged in no physical activity incidental to his work duties when he bent down
to tie his boot laces.

Finally, because the primary issue presented herein is an issue of

first impression in Idaho, Defendants did not umeasonably deny this claim and attorney
fees should not be awarded. Defendants agree that they owe some TTD benefits if this claim is
found to be compensable.
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EVIDENCE CONSIDERED

The record in this matter consists of the following:
1.

The testimony of Claimant and Employer's business manager
Dax Wilkinson, taken at the hearing;

2.

Claimant's Exhibits 1-20, admitted at the hearing;

3.

Defendants' Exhibits 1-8, admitted at the hearing; and

4.

The pre-hearing deposition of Mike McGuire, taken by Claimant
and attended by the Referee on September 16, 2010.
FINDINGS OF FACT

1.

Claimant was 51 years of age and has resided in the McCall/Donnelly area for

40 years. He is a graduate of McCall/Donnelly High School and has had no further formal
education. He is a Marine Corps veteran.
2.

At the time of his industrial accident, Claimant had been employed as a package

driver for UPS for 26 years. For about 14 of those years, Claimant worked out of Employer's
McCall facilities; during the remaining 13 years he worked out of Employer's Cascade satellite
facility at Arnold Aviation (AA) located at the Cascade Airport.
3.

Claimant reported for work at the AA facility at the Cascade Airport at around

6:20 a.m. on December 18, 2009. The temperature was approximately 20 degrees below zero.
Claimant was required to travel from his home to AA in his private vehicle. Once at AA,
Claimant placed his gloves and thermos in UPS' s familiar brown truck, started the vehicle to let
it warm up, then proceeded into the AA facilities where he kept his DIAD computer2 and
other work-related items. Once inside, Claimant clocked in, sat down on a couch and bent
over to tie his boot laces when he felt a pop and immediate pain in his low back.

2

The DIAD hand-held computer needed to be stored overnight inside the building
because its batteries would fail if left out in Claimant's delivery truck.
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4.

As it was the busy Christmas season for UPS, Claimant did not seek medical care

until December 28th. At that time, Claimant was diagnosed with a herniated disk and early
cauda equina symptoms. He was taken to surgery on January 19, 2010. Unfortunately, the
surgery was unsuccessful, and Claimant was again brought to surgery on July 21, 2010 for
a recurrent disk and a one level fusion at L4-5.
5.

Surety denied Claimant's claim on the ground that his injury did not arise out of

his employment.
DISCUSSION AND FURTHER FINDINGS

6.

There is no dispute that Claimant suffered an accident and injury on

December 18, 2009, as those terms are defined in Idaho Code §§ 72-102(18)(a)(b) and (c), and
that the accident causing the injury occurred during the course of Claimant's employment.
The question is whether his accident and injury arose out of his employment.
The Foust presumption

7.

Claimant argues that because his accident and injury occurred at Employer's

designated workplace, he is entitled to a presumption that his accident and injury arose out of
his employment. He cites the Idaho Supreme Court case of Foust v. Birds Eye Division of

General Foods Corp., 91 Idaho 418, 422 P.2d 616 (1967). There, the claimant was walking to
her vehicle across a large parking lot maintained for employees adjacent to employer's plant
when she was struck by a vehicle driven by a co-worker.

The Court presumed that the

claimant's injury arose in the course of and out of employment because the accident occurred on
the employer's premises. "In the case at bar there is nothing to indicate that respondent, while
on the employer's premises, was engaged in any abnormal unforeseeable activity foreign to her
employment ... To the contrary, under the circumstances of respondent's employment, her
injury "can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the work and to have been
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contemplated by a reasonable person familiar with the whole situation." Id., at p. 419.
8.

Defendants maintain that the Foust presumption does not apply here

because Claimant was not injured on Employer's "premises." For the following reasons, the
Commission disagrees. Claimant was required to report for work at AA and to end his day
there and had done so for 12 of his 26 year employment.3 Employer had an oral agreement to let
it occupy the AA facilities to the mutual benefit of both parties. 4 AA flew Employer's packages
on occasion to back-country destinations, and UPS would handle deliveries for AA. Employer
saved time, money, and mileage by having Claimant use the satellite location in Cascade.
Employer further benefitted by the arrangement in having a location to park its truck and
transfer trailer and a place to keep the DIAD computer warm on cold winter nights. Claimant
and another UPS driver had keys to AA and could use its bathroom, water, heater, etc. Finally,
Claimant completed his paperwork, telephoned Employer's McCall office with DIAD
information, and clocked out from the Cascade satellite work site, all at Employer's direction.
9.

There is no question that Claimant's normal workplace (other than in his truck)

was at Arnold's Aviation at the Cascade Airport in Cascade. We find that for purposes of
this matter, the subject accident occurred on Employer's premises.
10.

Having found that the accident occurred on employer's premises, it is next

necessary to consider the nature of the presumption created by that finding. In Foust, the fact
that the accident occurred on employer's premises was found to create a presumption that the
injury arises out of and in the course of the injured worker's employment. See also, Kessler on

3

See, Colson v. Steele, 73 Idaho 348, 252 P .2d 1049 (1953) wherein the Court held that
an employer's "premises" may be where employee was required to work by employer.
4
That Claimant was friends with the owners of AA and initially made the arrangement
with them to let UPS use its facilities does not alter the fact that UPS eventually entered into a
verbal contract with AA and admittedly benefitted from the arrangement.
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behalf of Kessler v. Payette County, 129 Idaho 855, 934 P.2d 28(1997). The Kessler Court
provided further guidance on the question of the type of proof that must be adduced to overcome
the presumption. In this regard, the Kessler Court referred to I.R.E. 301, which specifies:
Presumptions in General in Civil Actions and Proceedings. (a) Effect. In all civil
actions and proceedings, when not unless otherwise provided for by statute, by
Idaho appellate decisions or by these rules, a presumption imposes on the party
against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or
meet the presumption, but dces not shift to such party the burden of proof in the
sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the
party on whom it was originally cast. The burden of going forward is satisfied by
the introduction of evidence sufficient to permit reasonable minds to conclude
that the presumed fact does not exist. If the party against whom a presumption
operates fails to meet the burden of going forward, the presumed fact shall be
deemed proved. If the party meets the burden of going forward, no instruction on
the presumption shall be given, and the trier of fact shall determine the existence
or nonexistence of the presumed fact without regard to the presumption.
Therefore, in order to overcome the presumption that the accident is one arising out of
and in the course of employment, Defendant must come forward with proof sufficient to permit
reasonable minds to conclude that the accident is not one arising out of and in the course of
employment. If the opposing party does come forward with such evidence, then the Commission
must ascertain whether the facts are sufficient to demonstrate that the accident is one arising out
of and in the course of employment without the benefit of the presumption.
11.

Finally, one recent case casts some doubt on the continued validity of the Foust

rule. In Dinius v. Loving Care and More, Inc., 133 Idaho 572, 990 P.2d 738 (1999), Claimant
suffered severe lower extremity injuries when a vehicle operated by her boyfriend pinned her to
the wall of employer's building as Claimant was taking out the trash.

The Industrial

Commission made no specific finding concerning whether the accident occurred on employer's
premises. However, the Commission ruled that Claimant had failed to meet her burden of
proving that her accident was one arising out of and in the course of employment.
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12.

On appeal, Dinius argued that she was entitled to the Foust presumption.

Although the Court noted that the Industrial Commission had failed to make a specific finding on
the question of whether or not the accident occurred on employer's premises, it offered the
following comment on the Foust presumption:
Even so, the mere fact that an injury occurs on the employer's premises is not an
exclusive test for compensability, but rather is only one factor to be considered.
In re Malmquist, 78 Idaho 117, 300 P.2d 820 (1956). To establish that the
accident arose out of and in the course of employment, the fact that an injury
occurs on the employer's premises must be accompanied by a showing of a causal
connection between the conditions existing on the employer's premises and the
accident involved. Nichols v. Godfrey, 90 Idaho 345, 350, 411 P.2d 763, 765
(1966). See also Kessler, supra, 129 Idaho at 860, 934 P .2d at 31.

Foust creates a presumption that an accident occurring on employer's premises arises out of and

is in the course of employment. However, from the quoted language, the Dinius Court seems to
conclude that even if the injured worker demonstrates that the accident occurred on employer's
premises, he must also adduce evidence showing a causal connection between the conditions
existing on the employer's premises and the accident involved. Arguably, this undermines that
portion of the Foust rule creating the presumption that an accident occurring on the employer's
premises "arises" out of employment.
13.

Regardless, we think the question of the current status of the Foust presumption is

mooted in this case in view of our conclusion that Defendant's have come forward with evidence
sufficient to permit reasonable minds to conclude that the subject accident is not one arising out
of and in the course of Claimant's employment. Employer has a reasonable expectation that
Claimant will prepare himself such that when he arrives at the work site, he is ready to go to
work. Such pre-work preparations such as eating and dressing are not ordinarily part of the work
that a worker is paid to perform, and therefore, such activities are not in the "course" of
employment. That Claimant chooses, for reasons of personal convenience, to perform one of
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these preparatory activities at the work place, as opposed to his home, arguably does nothing to
bring this activity into the "course" of Claimant's employment, Defendants concession on the
course question notwithstanding. Similarly, the risk of injury to which Claimant was evidently
exposed is arguably a common risk, with no particular association to Claimant's employment.
We therefore conclude that Defendants have overcome the presumption, leaving the Commission
to consider whether the evidence supports a finding that Claimant has met his burden of proving
the occurrence of an accident arising out of and in the course of employment.
Arising out of and in the course of employment

14.

The term "accident" is a term of art under the Idaho Workers' Compensation law,

and is defined at LC.§ 72-102(18)(b) as follows:
"Accident" means an unexpected, undesigned, and unlooked for mishap, or
untoward event, connected with the industry in which it occurs, and which can be
reasonably located as to time when and place where it occurred, causing an injury.
Here, it is clear that the mishap described by Claimant is one that would qualify as an "accident"
under the statutory scheme. See Wynn v. JR. Simplot Company, 105 Idaho 102, 666 P.2d 629
(1983); Spivey v. Novartis Seed Inc., 137 Idaho 29, 43 P.3d 788 (2002); Page v. McCain Foods,
Inc., 141 Idaho 342, 109 P.3d 1084 (2005). Moreover, there is no dispute that Claimant's injuries
are causally related to the accident.
15.

The primary issue presented by this case is whether the accident that admittedly

occurred satisfies the requirements of LC.§ 72-102(18)(a). That subsection provides:
"Injury" means a personal injury caused by an accident arising out of and in the
course of any employment covered by the worker's compensation law.
Therefore, this subsection requires of the injured worker that he demonstrate that the subject
accident both "arises" out of the employment and occurs in the "course" of employment. This
statutory requirement is couched in terms very similar to the statutory language employed in
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER- 8

many other jurisdictions whose workers' compensation laws are derived from the original British
Compensation Act. As Professor Larson has noted, seldom has statutory language endured the
scrutiny that has been devoted to the phrase "arising out of and in the course of employment."
16.

In Idaho, the seminal case treating what it is the injured worker must prove in this

regard is Eriksen v. Nez Perce County, 72 Idaho 1, 235 P.2d 736 (1951). Although the Idaho
rule did not originate in Eriksen, the rule is given its most lucid expression in that case. Quoting

from the Oregon case, Larson v. State Industrial Accident Commission, 135 Oregon 137, 295 P.
195 (1931), the Eriksen court explained what it means for an accident to arise out of and occur in
the course of employment as follows:
It is sufficient to say that an injury is received 'in the course of the employment

when it comes while the workman is doing the duty which he is employed to
perform. It arises 'out of the employment, when there is apparent to the rational
mind upon consideration of all the circumstances, a causal connection between
the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting
injury. Under this test, if the injury can be seen to have followed as a natural
incident of the work and to have been contemplated by a reasonable person
familiar with the whole situation as a result of the exposure occasioned by the
nature of the employment, then it arises 'out of the employment. ..
Eriksen, supra, or the explanation it adopted, has been cited with approval in almost every

subsequent Idaho case in which "arising" and "course" issues are discussed.

See Colson v.

Steele, 73 Idaho 348, 252 P.2d 1049 (1953); Kiger v. Idaho Corporation, 85 Idaho 424, 380 P.2d

208 (1963); Wilder v. Redd, 111 Idaho 141, 721 P.2d 1240 (1986); O'Loughlin v. Circle A
Construction, 112 Idaho 1048, 739 P.2d 347 (1987); Evans v. Hara 's, Inc., 123 Idaho 473, 849

P.2d 934 (1993); Kessler on behalf of Kessler v. Payette County, 129 Idaho 855, 934 P.2d 28
(1997); Dinius v. Loving Care and More, Inc., 133 Idaho 572, 990 P.2d 738 (1999); Jensen v.
City ofPocatello, 135 Idaho 406, 18 P.3d 211 (2000).

11.

It ig t:ilear that in

ord~r

to prevail, Claimant must demonstrate both that the
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accident arose out of his employment, and that the accident occurred in the course of
employment. See Kessler on behalf of Kessler v. Payette County, supra. Here, the parties
concede that the subject accident is one which occurred in the "course" of employment. (See
Def. brief at pp. 19-20).

Indeed, from the record it appears that by the time the accident

occurred, Claimant had arrived at the worksite, started his truck, punched in, and was waiting for
the engine to warm up in the sub-zero temperature before starting his deliveries. Moreover, the
particular activity that Claimant was engaged in at the time of his injury (bending over to tie his
shoelaces) was an activity reasonably incidental to the work that he had been hired to perform,
such as to bring that activity within the "course" of his employment. See, Thompson v. Clear
Springs Food, Inc., 148 Idaho 697, 228 P. 3d 378 (2010). This conclusion also finds support in
the Court's treatment of the "course" issue in Gage v. Express Personnel, 135 Idaho 250, 16 P.3d
926 (2000). Gage's assignment, i.e. the task which she had been hired to perform, was to wait at
the rail dock until labeling supplies and product were delivered. Smoking was prohibited on
employer's premises. While doing as she had been directed, Gage smoked a cigarette, and
suffered an injury as she was attempting to extinguish the cigarette which she had inadvertently
dropped from the edge of the loading dock.

In overruling a Commission decision denying

benefits, the Court observed that at the time of her injury, Gage was performing exactly the task
she had been directed to perform (waiting for supplies and product), albeit in an unauthorized
fashion. This deviation, however, was not found sufficient to justify a denial of benefits. The
rationale of Gage applies even more strongly to the facts of the instant matter. At the time of the
accident, Claimant was waiting for his vehicle to warm up before beginning his deliveries, an
activity that was assuredly part of the work which he had been hired to perform. The fact that he
took this opportunity to tie his shoelaces does nothing to undermine the conclusion that at the
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time of the accident giving rise to his claim, he was engaged in the work of his employer.
18.

Although the "course" issue in this case is evidently not disputed, the fact that the

Clairmint's empfoyrnent is important to inforn1ing the
Commission's analysis of whether the accident is, as well, one which "arises" out of Claimant's
employment. If it is conceded that the accident occurred while Claimant was performing the
work he had been hired to perform, or some task reasonably incidental thereto, it makes it
somewhat easier to answer in the affirmative the question of whether a causal connection exists
between the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting
injury. However, the Eriksen test contains certain language which poses a direct challenge to the
conclusion that Claimant's injury was one arising out of his employment. After describing the
circumstances which support a finding that an accident does indeed arise out of employment, the
Eriksen Court set forth a number of factors which augur against a finding that a particular

accident arises out of employment.
.... But it excludes an injury which cannot fairly be traced to the employment as
a contributing proximate cause and which comes from a hazard to which the
workmen would have been equally exposed apart from the employment. The
causative danger must be peculiar to the work and not common to the
neighborhood. It must be incidental to the character of the business and not
independent of the relation of master and servant. It need not to have been
foreseen or expected, but after the event it must appear to have had its origin in
the risk connected with the employment, and to have flowed from that source as a
rational consequence.
19.

It has been observed that as respects an injured worker's employment, risks of

injury come in three flavors. See 1-4 Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 4.00; Mayo v.
Safeway Stores, Inc., 93 Idaho 161, 457 P.2d 400 (1969). The first group comprises those risks

clearly associated with the workplace. Included in this category of risk are injuries caused by
things peculiar to the worksite in question, such as equipment, elevated heights, noxious fumes
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or chemicals, assaults occurring as a result of a dispute arising out of the performance of a
work-related task, etc. Injuries occurring as a result of this type of risk can almost universally be
said to arise out of the injured worker's employment.
20.

The second category of risk represents those risks entirely personal to the injured

worker, and unconnected to his employment.

Questions about compensability of accidents

occurring as a result of such risks arise mainly because the risk is imported to the workplace. An
injured worker who happens to die at work as the result of a disease or other internal process is
not entitled to workers' compensation benefits where it is shown that it was entirely fortuitous
that the injured worker's death occurred at work. Similarly, a worker who is assaulted at his
place of work by a lifelong sworn enemy who finds him there, does not suffer injury because of a
work-created risk. Again, the fact that the assault occurred at work is entirely fortuitous since it
would also have occurred at any other location where the assailant found the injured worker.
Injuries occurring as a result of this type of risk are almost uniformly deemed to be injuries
which do not arise out of employment.
21.

This brings us to the third category of risk, a category that has particular

significance to the facts of this case. This category comprises so-called "neutral" risks. A risk of
injury may be deemed "neutral" where, because of the peculiar facts of the case, it is impossible
to say whether the risk of injury is personal to the claimant, or, instead, connected to the
employment. A classic neutral risk scenario of this type is illustrated by the facts of Mayo v.
Safeway Stores, supra. In Mayo, decedent, a grocery store employee, was killed at his workplace

by a co-worker. Before the co-worker could be apprehended, he committed suicide. Because the
players were both deceased, there was no way to ascertain whether the employee's death was the
end result of a work-related dispute, or, instead, a dispute personal to the decedent and his
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assailant, having nothing whatsoever to do with the workplace. Because there was no evidence
that could explain the origin of the assault, it was deemed neutral.
The other type of neutral risk case is one where the evidence affirmatively establishes
that the risk of injury to which the worker is exposed is neither connected to his employment, nor
personal to the worker. Examples of this type of case include injuries caused by stray bullets,
tornadoes, acts of God, etc. In such cases, it can be said with some confidence that the risk of
injury is neither personal to the injured worker, nor connected to the employment. Therefore, the
risk of injury is neutral.
22.

In Mayo v. Safeway Stores, supra, after having determined that the risk of injury

to which claimant was exposed must be considered to be a neutral risk, the court addressed the
question of whether or not the decedent's death was nevertheless compensable as an accident
arising out of his employment. The court noted that as respects neutral risks, Idaho has joined a
growing minority of states that have adopted a positional risk rule which awards compensation
for injuries resulting from accidents that are of neutral origin. The rationale for the rule is that
when the cause of injury is truly neutral, there is no more reason to assign the loss to the
employee than to the employer. Under such circumstances, with the scales evenly balanced, all
that is required to tip them in claimant's favor is the recognition that it was the claimant's
employment that brought him to the place of injury. As noted, Mayo involved an inexplicable
assault, as did Louie v. Bamboo Gardens, 67 Idaho 469, 185 P.2d 712 (1947), the case in which
the rule was first announced. It is unclear whether the Mayo court intended the positional risk
rule to apply to all neutral risk cases, or merely those involving assaults. However, the decision
does contain the following language which appears to paint with a fairly broad brush:
We do not hold that the positional risk rule is the exclusive test of compensability,
but only that when injury results from a neutral cause, a rebuttable presumption
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER- 13

arises that the injury arose out of employment. The burden is thus shifted to the
employer to prove that the injury was caused by a factor personal to the
employee.
23.

On the other hand, the proposition that the positional risk rule announced Mayo

was only intended to apply to cases of inexplicable assault finds support in the court's continued
adherence to the Eriksen language, most recently cited with approval in Jensen v. City of
Pocatello, supra, in which it was noted:

[A]n injury which cannot be traced to the worker's employment as a contributing
proximate cause and which comes from a hazard to which the worker would have been
equally exposed outside of the workplace is not compensable under our workers'
compensation system."
24.

If the Mayo Court intended to apply the positional risk rule to all neutral risk

injuries, then it is difficult to explain the Jensen Court's support for the Eriksen rule which
clearly anticipates that neutral risk injuries do not arise out of employment.
25.

As respects the instant matter, the first question that might be asked is whether the

risk of injury to which Claimant was exposed can fairly be characterized as a neutral risk of the
type described in Mayo, supra. In answer, it seems clear that the risk to which Claimant was
exposed is qualitatively different than the type of neutral risk discussed by Professor Larson and
by the Court in Mayo.

Here, it cannot be said that the risk in question is unconnected to

Claimant's employment in the same sense that a tornado would be. Here, the risk of injury in
question is connected to the employment because it was encountered by Claimant as result of the
Claimant's performance of a task that was either part of his work, or reasonably incidental
thereto. To conclude, as we do, that the risk of bending over to tie one's shoe preparatory to
beginning the workday is a work-connected risk, is entirely consistent with the proposition that
an accident does not arise out of employment unless there is proof of a causal connection
between the conditions under which the work must be performed and the resulting injury.
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26.

Claimant has demonstrated, and no rational person would disagree, that anyone

whose job includes the requirement of carrying boxes all day, frequently in a way that obscures
his view of the ground immediately in front of him, would do well to keep his shoes tied.
It strains credulity to suggest that the action Claimant took preparatory to the start of his shift

did not confer a benefit upon Employer by reducing the chances that Claimant would suffer a trip
and fall. It strains credulity to suggest that the risk of injury associated with the tying of the
shoelaces was not therefore one which followed as a natural incident of the work. Claimant
needed to have his shoes tied to perform his work, and the injury that he suffered as a result of
performing this task is assuredly connected to his employment. This is not a case where the
evidence establishes an absence of a work connection, or where the evidence is such that it
cannot be ascertained whether Claimant's injury was occasioned as a result of a risk personal to
him versus an employment connected risk.
27.

Defendants argue that the risk to which Claimant was exposed is a common risk

at best, because he is required to tie his shoes both for work-related purposes and for reasons
personal to him.

Everyone who wears shoes (except those who wear slip-ons), ties their

shoelaces while bending over in some fashion. However true this may be, the fact of the matter
is that Claimant suffered this particular injury as the result of his attempts to accommodate the
requirements of his job. Because Ciaimant was necessarily required to tie his shoelaces before
starting work, his job clearly created an actual risk which ultimately resulted in Claimant's
injury. Suppose, however, that Claimant had suffered the identical injury while tying his shoes
at home before leaving for work, as Defendants evidently contend Claimant was required to do.
Certainly, to suggest that such an injury is one arising out of and in the course of employment
does not pass the smell test, but the reason is not that such an injury does not arise out of an
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employment created risk: It does. Rather, such a claim would be non-compensable due to the
fact that such an accident is well outside the course of employment. Getting out of the shower,
dressing for work, and fixing breakfast, are not activities Employer pays Claimant to perform.
Dressing for work is not part of Claimant's job, just as going to and coming from work are
typically not treated as part of a worker's job.
28.

Although the risk of injury to which Claimant was exposed is not a "neutral" risk

in the sense that term is used in Mayo v. Safeway Stores, supra, it is a neutral risk in another
sense: As Defendants have noted, the risks associated with tying one's shoelaces are trivial.
People in all walks of life, including Claimant, are exposed to the same risk every day, quite
apart from their employment. Even though we have found that Claimant's employment did,
indeed, subject him to an actual risk of injury due to workplace demands which required of him
that his shoelaces be tied, the "arising" test explained in Eriksen v. Nez Perce County, supra,
may still present an obstacle to the claim.
29.

As noted, Eriksen provides a good deal of guidance on the type of risk that does

not arise out of employment. Excluded, are risks which come from a hazard to which the injured
worker would have been equally exposed apart from employment. Excluded, are risks which are
common to the neighborhood. Excluded, are risks which are independent of the relation of
master and servant. See, Eriksen v. Nez Perce County, supra. In short, the excluded risks are
those described by Professor Larson and by the Mayo court as "neutral" risks, as well as risks of
the type at issue here, i.e. a demonstrated risk of the injured worker's employment, but a risk to
which he is equally exposed apart from his employment. Therefore, under the rule explained in
Eriksen v. Nez Perce County, supra, neither a "neutral" risk, in the sense described by the court
in Mayo, supra, nor an "equal" (for lack of a better term) risk in the sense of the facts of the
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instant matter, arise out of employment. However, as set forth above, the Mayo Court carved out
an exception to this rule for neutral risks, specifying that injuries caused by such risks are
compensable. A review of the Court's ruling in Spivey v. Novartis Seed, Inc., supra, reveals that
the Court has extended the holding in Mayo, supra, to also embrace what we have distinguished
here as actual risks created by the employment, albeit risks to which an injured worker might be

equally exposed to apart from the employment.
30.

In Spivey, the claimant was employed as a seed sorter in a bean warehouse. Her

job entailed standing before a moving belt and picking the small (pea-size) bits of rock and tare
from the line. ·while so engaged, she felt an abrupt pop and burning in the top of her right
shoulder. She was later diagnosed as having suffered a rotator cuff tear caused, or aggravated,
by the accident she described. Defendants denied the claim, arguing that the physical activity in
which claimant was engaged at the time of her injury was trivial, and that she could just as easily
have sustained her injury in performing any number of activities of daily living unassociated

with her employment. In essence, defendants argued that claimant's employment did not subject
her to any greater risk of injury than she enjoyed apart from her employment. In this regard,
defendants relied on the case of Wells v. Robinson Construction Company, 52 Idaho 562, 16 P.2d
1059 (1932), which involved the claim of an outdoor construction worker who had the
misfortune to be struck by a bolt of lightning. The rule employed by the court in that case to
deny benefits to claimant is but a variation of the rule explained in Eriksen:
The facts differ in each case, but the general principle runs through them all that
in order for the injury to be compensable there must be a causal connection
between the employment and the injury. It must be shown that the workman was
more exposed to injury by lightning by reason of his employment than were
others, not so engaged, in the same vicinity. That is, if the workman, in pursuit of
his duties under his employment, is exposed to a special or peculiar danger from
lightning, or the elements-a greater danger than other persons in the same
locality are exposed to--and an unexpected death or injury is sustained by
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lightning or the elements, such injury constitutes an accident "arising out of and in
the course of' the employment. Conversely, if it is not shown that the workman
was exposed by reason of his employment to a danger greater than, or not
common to, other in that locality, his accident death or injury by lightning stroke
or the elements is not compensable.
Wells v. Robinson Construction Company, 52 Idaho at 566-567.

Application of the rule explained in Eriksen would yield the same outcome.
31.

In Spivey, defendants urged the Court to apply the rule explained in Eriksen, and

to rule that claimant could not prevail where it was shown that her employment subjected her to
the same risk of injury to which she as exposed apart from her employment. Defendants urged
the Court to rule that in order to prevail claimant must demonstrate that her employment exposed
her to a risk of injury that was greater than the risk to which she was exposed apart from her
employment. Without much fanfare, the Court rejected defendant's argument, relying on Mayo,
supra, to conclude that Idaho law no longer supports the proposition that claimant must

demonstrate that her employment subjects her to a "greater risk" before she can recover benefits.
Implicit in the Court's decision is its rejection of the long established rule that where the risk of
injury is neutral, or equal, an injured worker vvill not be able to satisfy the "arising" component
of the rule. Therefore, after Spivey, it seems clear that where the risk of injury is one to which
claimant is equally exposed both in, and without, his employment, the resulting injury is one
which will be deemed to arise out of employment. This rule embraces coverage for both neutral
and equal risks. However, it is clear that before benefits are payable, it must be demonstrated
that claimant actually was exposed to the risk in question in the course of his employment, and
that exposure to that risk led to the injury.
32.

In summary, we find that the risk of injury at issue in the instant matter is likely

not a neutral risk, but, instead, a risk of injury that bears a causal connection to the work that
Claimant was hired to perform. However, like a true "neutral" risk, it is a risk of injury to which
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER- 18

Claimant was equally exposed apart from his employment. Spivey v. Novartis Seed, Inc., supra,
makes it clear that injuries resulting from both types of risks so characterized should be deemed
to arise out of the employment. To the extent that the longstanding rule explained in Eriksen v.
Nez Perce County, supra, is to the contrary, we perceive that rule is overruled by Spivey. Quite

apart from the question of whether or not Claimant is entitled to a presumption favoring the
compensability of this claim, the evidence establishes that Claimant has satisfied his burden of
proving the occurrence of an accident both arising out and in the course of employment.
TTD benefits

Idaho Code § 72-408 provides for income benefits for total and partial disability during
an injured worker's period of recovery.
33.

Claimant contends that he is entitled to an award of TTD benefits from

December 28, 2009 until he was declared medically stable on December 6, 2010 following his
second surgery. There being no evidence to the contrary, the Commission finds that Claimant is
entitled to TTD benefits from December 28, 2009 through December 6, 2010.
Medical benefits

Idaho Code§ 72-432(1) obligates an employer to provide an injured employee reasonable
medical care as may be required by his or her physician immediately following an injury and for
a reasonable time thereafter. If the employer fails to provide the same, the injured worker may
do so at the expense of employer.
34.

Claimant has incurred medical expenses totaling $149,033.68. See, Claimant's

Exhibit 7. Neel v. Western Construction, 147 Idaho 146, 206 P.3d 852 (2009), is premised on
the assumption that an injured worker who contracts for medical care outside the workers'
compensation system has, or may have, exposure to pay the full invoiced amount of medical bills
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incurred in connection with his treatment. Here, there is no evidence that Claimant is obligated
to pay anything other than the full invoiced amount. Therefore, as in Neel, we find Claimant is
entitled to payment of the full invoiced amount of $149,033.68.
Attorney fees

Idaho Code § 72-804 provides for an award of attorney fees in the event an employer or
its surety unreasonably denies a claim or neglect or refused to pay an injured employee
compensation within a reasonable time.
35.

Claimant contends he is entitled to an award of attorney fees because the factual

evidence in this case establishes a clear causal connection between the safe work environment
and safety policies Claimant was required to follow and his act of tying his boots. Likewise,
Claimant asserts there is no legal basis for Defendants' denial because the evidence is
overwhelming that Claimant's injury occurred on Employer's satellite work premises, and
Defendants have produced no evidence to overcome the Foust presumption. Further, within
days of the denial, Claimant's counsel wrote Surety a five-page letter setting out Claimant's view
of the presumption raised, the absence of evidence necessary to rebut the presumption and the
liberal construction afforded to claimants in like cases. Surety did not even respond.
36.

Defendants argue that Idaho case law is conflicting regarding "arising out of'

cases and that there are no Idaho cases regarding shoe tying. Further, Surety asserts that it
should not be found liable for attorney fees because it conducted an investigation and secured a
legal opinion prior to denying the claim.
37.

This is a close case. Because shoe tying is such a commonplace occurrence, at

first blush it would seem that such an act could not be related to employment unless changing or
selling shoes was one's occupation. There is no bright line in Idaho case law regarding when an
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accident arises out of employment and there are no cases involving boot lace tying. More
importantly, the scope and reach of the court's decision in Spivey v. Novartis Seed Inc., is a
subject of legitimate debate.

38.

The Commission finds that Claimant is not entitled to an award of attorney fees

for Surety's unreasonably denying his claim.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

Based on the foregoing analysis, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED That:
1.

Claimant suffered an accident arising in the course of and out of his employment

causing an injury on December 18, 2009.

2.

Claimant is awarded TTD benefits from December 28, 2009 through December 6,

3.

Claimant is awarded medical benefits in the amount of $149,033.68.

4.

Claimant is not entitled to an award of attorney fees.

5.

Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72- 718, this decision is final and conclusive as to

2010.

all matters adjudicated.
DATEDthis

\lK

~--++----'2011.

dayof _ _

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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I hereby certify that on the
day of
/
, 2011, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND
RECOMMENDATION was served by regular United States Mail upon each of the following:
RICK D KALLAS
1031 EPARKBLVD
BOISE ID 83712
SUSAN R VELTMAN
PO BOX2528
BOISE ID 83701

db
Assistant Commission Secretary
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Rick D. Kallas
Ellsworth, Kallas & Defranco, P.L.L.C.
1031 E. Park Blvd.
Boise, Idaho 83712
Telephone:
(208) 336-1843
Facsimile:
(208) 345-8945
Idaho State Bar No. 3872
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Attorney for Claimant

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
MICHAEL P. VAWTER,
Claimant,
vs.
UNITED PARCEL SERVICES, INC.,
Employer,
and
LIBERTY INSURANCE CORP.,
Surety,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

l.C. No. 2010-000114
CLAIMANT'S REQUEST FOR
CALENDARING

COMES NOW Claimant, Michael P. Vawter, and, pursuant to J.R.P. 8 (C), hereby requests that
the Industrial Commission calendar this claim Hearing on the following grounds:
The requesting party hereby states:
I)

Readiness For Hearing
The Claimant is ready for Hearing.

2)

Disputed Issues To Be Heard and Decided
The following issues are before the Commission to be heard and decided:
(a)

What is the extent of the Claimant's permanent physical impairment (PPI) caused by the
subject 12.18.09 industrial accident I injury?

(b)

What is the extent of the Claimant's permanent disability in excess of his physical

Vawter I Claimant's 5.19.11 Request for Calendaring
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impairment (PPD >PPI) caused by the subject 12.18.09 industrial accident I injury,
including whether the Claimant is totally and pennanently disabled under the 100%
method and I or the odd-lot doctrine?
3)

Location of Hearing
The desired location of the Hearing is Boise, Idaho.

4)

Claimant's Counsel's Unavailable Dates
At the present time, the Claimant's attorney is not available for Hearing on the following dates:
5.20.11; 5.23.11 - 5.24.11; 5.27.11; 5.30.11; 6.7.11 - 6.17.11; 6.23.11; 6.24.11; 6.27.11; 7.1.11 7.20.11; 8.12.11; 9.2.11 - 9.5.11.

5)

Length of Hearing
The estimated length of time to present the Claimant's case in chief is one Yi day.

6)

Full Commission Participation
This case does not present any unique, unusual or bizarre factual, legal or medical issues that
need to be heard by the full Commission.

7)

Translation Services
The Claimant does not require translation services.

DATED this 19th day of May, 2011.

ELLSWORTH, KALLAS & DEFRANCO, PLLC

By

15~,~

RICKUALLAS
Attorney for Claimant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 19th day of May, 2011, I served the Claimant's Request For
Calendaring on the Defendants by the method indicated below and addressed to the following:
Susan R. Veltman, Esq.
GARDNER & BREEN
1410 West Washington
Boise, Idaho 83702
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[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile
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ORf Gf
SUSAN R. VELTMAN (ISB No. 7850)
GARDNER & BREEN
1410 W. Washington- 83702
Post Office Box 2528
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 387-0881
Facsimile: (208) 387-3501
Attorney for Defendants
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
MICHAEL P. VA WIER,
Claimant,
V.

UNITED PARCEL SERVICE,
Employer,
and
LIBERTY INSURANCE CORP.
Surety,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

LC. Case No. 2010-000114
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR
HEARING

-J

<fl
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I.
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w
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Statement of readiness for hearing: Defendants object to Claimant's Request for

Calendaring of May 19, 2011 as premature. The Commission's decision regarding compensability
was recently issued and Defendants are evaluating whether or not an appeal will be filed with the
Idaho Supreme Court. Pursuant to IAR 14(b), Defendants have until June 28, 2011 to file their
Notice of Appeal. If a timely appeal is filed, such action will potentially stay the Commission's prior
Order on this case pursuant to IAR 13(d). As such, determination of PPI and PPD is premature.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR HEARING, P. 1

In the event that Defendants do not appeal the underlying decision on compensability, the
issue of PPD is not yet ripe. If and when there is a final determination of compensability,
Defendants intend to obtain an IME to address permanent work restrictions; refer Claimant to ICRD;
and will likely retain a vocational expert. Defendants raised the possibility of proceeding with an
IME during pendency of the underlying compensability decision, but Claimant's counsel indicated a
preference to wait until the compensability decision was issued.
IL

Issues:

In addition to the issues identified by Claimant, Defendants assert that the issue of
apportionment should be included once the case is ready for hearing .
III.

Location of hearing: Boise, Idaho

IV.

Desired dates of hearing:

Defendants respectfully request that the case not be set for

hearing at this time. In the event that Defendants opt not to appeal the compensability decision,
Defendants would anticipate being ready for hearing after October 2011.
IV.

Unavailable dates of counsel:

August 9, 10
September 2, 21
October 18

V.

Estimated length of hearing: One day.

VI.

Settlement Negotiations: Dismal.

VIL

Full Commission Participation: Not required.

VIII.

Special Services: None requested.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR HEARING, P. 2

DATED this 31st day of May, 2010.

Susan R. Veltman - of the firm
GARDNER & BREEN
Attorney for Defendants
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 31st day of May, 2010, I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing to be served upon:
Rick Kallas
Ellsworth, Kallas, Talboy & Defranco
1031 E. Park Blvd.
Boise, ID 83712
by depositing the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the above-named,
the last known address as set forth above.

SUSANR. VELTMAN

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR HEARING, P. 3

Rick D. Kallas
Ellsworth, Kallas & Defranco, P.L.L.C.
1031 E. Park Blvd.
Boise, Idaho 83712
Telephone:
(208) 336-1843
Facsimile:
(208) 345-8945
Idaho State Bar No. 3872
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Attorney for Claimant
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
MICHAEL P. VAWTER,
Claimant,
vs.
UNITED PARCEL SERVICES, INC.,
Employer,
and
LIBERTY INSURANCE CORP.,
Surety,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

LC. No. 2010-000114
CLAIMANT'S REPLY TO DEFENDANTS'
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR
CALENDARING

COMES NOW Claimant, Michael P. Vawter, and, pursuant to J.R.P. 8 (C) and I.A.R. 13(d)
hereby replies to the Defendants' Response to Claimant's Request For Calendaring as follows:
(A)

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION SHOULD EXERCISE ITS DISCRETION UNDER
I.A.R. 13(d) AND SET A HEARING TO RESOLVE THE REMAINING DISPUTED
ISSUES IN THIS CLAIM
The Industrial Commission's 5.17.11 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order only

decided the following issues:
1.
2.

3.
4.

Did the Claimant's 12.18.09 accident arise out of his employment?
Are the Defendants liable for the payment of total temporary disability (TTD) benefits during
the Claimant's period of recovery?
Are the Defendants liable for 100% of the invoiced amount of past denied medical benefits?
and,
Are the Defendants liable for the payment of attorney's fees under Idaho Code §72-432?
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(See Industrial Commission's 5.17.11 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order).

On 5.19 .11, the Claimant filed a Request For Calendaring on the following disputed issues that
were not decided by the Industrial Commission in its 5.17 .11 decision:
1.

What is the extent of the Claimant's permanent physical impairment (PPI) caused by the
subject 12.18.09 industrial accident I injury?

2.

What is the extent of the Claimant's permanent disability in excess of his physical
impairment (PPD >PPI) caused by the subject 12.18.09 industrial accident I injury, including
whether the Claimant is totally and permanently disabled under the 100% method and I or the
odd-lot doctrine? (See Claimant's 5.19.11 Request For Calendaring).
The Defendants have objected to the Claimant's 5.19.11 Request For Calendaring based on the

following grounds:
1.

The Defendants might file an appeal of the Industrial Commission's 5.17 .11 decision at some
time prior to June 28, 2011;

2.

If the Defendants file an appeal of the Industrial Commission's 5.17.11 decision, that appeal
could potentially stay the Industrial Commission's 5.17.11 decision; and,

3.

The PPI I PPD issue is not yet ripe for determination.
The Industrial Commission should not refuse to calendar the disability issue for Hearing based on

speculation over whether the Defendants will decide to exercise their right to file an appeal of the
Industrial Commission's 5.17.11 decision. Even if the Defendants were to exercise their statutory right to
file an appeal, that limited appeal of the "arising out of employment issue" would not bar the Industrial
Commission from exercising continuing jurisdiction over the remaining disputed issues in this case which
have not yet been decided.
The Defendants cite I.A.R. 13(d) to support their position that all issues in this case are
automatically stayed pending the outcome of an appeal. I.A.R. 13(d) only applies to the disputed issues
that were decided in the final and appealable Order. Even with respect to those issues that were merged
into the final and appealable Order, the Industrial Commission retains the right to exercise continuing
jurisdiction over those issues upon entry of an appropriate Order:
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In administrative appeals from the Industrial Commission the order or award
shall be stayed as provided by statute during the pendency of the appeal, unless
otherwise ordered by the Industrial Commission or the Supreme Court. (See
I.A.R. 13( d) (emphasis supplied).
I.A.R. 13(d) does not bar the Industrial Commission from retaining continuing jurisdiction over
those disputed issues which were not merged into a final Order.

The Claimant has only asked the

Commission to set a Hearing on the ultimate issues regarding the extent of the Claimant's PPI and PPD >
PPL If the Commission were to adopt the Defendants' position and refuse to set the PPI and PPD > PPI
issues for Hearing, the Claimant would have to wait 2 years for the Defendants' appeal of the "arising out
of employment" issue to be decided by the Idaho Supreme Court. After the Supreme Court affirms the
Industrial Commission's 5.17.11 Order, the Claimant would then be required to file a new Request For
Calendaring on the PPI and PPD > PPI issues. The Claimant's new Request For Calendaring could not be
filed until approximately June of2013. Based on the Industrial Commission's calendaring timetables, the
new Hearing on the PPI and PPD > PPI issues would not be set for at least 6 months until December of
2013.
After the December 2013 Hearing, the parties would then take post-Hearing depositions of
physicians and VRE experts for 30 days followed by 120 days of legal briefing. This case would then be
under advisement for 6 months to a year before a final decision on PPI and PPD > PPI would be issued
from the Commission. The Claimant would then have to wait 2.5 years until December of 2014 before he
received a final decision from the Commission. After receiving a final decision, the Defendants could
then file a 2nd appeal with the Idaho Supreme Court. It could take another 2 years after entry of the
Commission's final decision before the Supreme Court affirmed the Industrial Commission's decision on
the PPI and PPD > PPI issues; i.e., December of 2016.
By filing an objection to the Claimant's Request For Calendaring and asking the Commission to
refuse to exercise continuing jurisdiction over the remaining disputed issues which have never been
decided, the Defendants are basically asking the Claimant to wait until December of 2016 before he
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receives a final decision on the PPI and PPD > PPI issues. Such a delay in the determination of the
ultimate issues in this case would not provide the Claimant with fair and equitable relief.
Idaho Code §72-708 and JRP 1 promise the Claimant the just, speedy and economical
determination of every disputed issue. The process and procedure before the Industrial Commission is
supposed to be as summary and simple as possible and in accordance with the rules of equity. Making
the Claimant wait for the Supreme Court to affirm the Commission's holding on the "arising out of
employment" issue before setting the remaining disputed issues for Hearing would not be fair or equitable
to the Claimant. (See LC. §72-708).
The Defendants' final argument is that they need to schedule an IME to challenge Dr. Frizzell' s
medical opinions regarding PPI, apportionment of PPI and permanent restrictions. Although the Claimant
recognizes that the Defendants have a statutory right to compel the Claimant to submit to an IME, the
Industrial Commission should not set Hearing dates based on when the Defendants decide to schedule
IME appointments or when the IME doctor is available to conduct the IME examination or when the IME
doctor completes his IME report and delivers it to the Defendants.
The calendaring of a Hearing date by the Industrial Commission is the event that brings structure
and order to an otherwise haphazard and chaotic litigation process because it is the presence of that
Hearing date hanging over the parties' heads which creates the incentive to complete the IME process and
the Vocational Rehabilitation Expert (VRE) evaluation process in a timely manner so that all of the
expert's reports can be filed with the Industrial Commission at least 10 days before the Hearing as
required by JRP 10( C).
Based on all of the reasons set forth above, the Claimant respectfully requests that the Industrial
Commission exercise its right to retain continuing jurisdiction over all of the remaining disputed issues in
this case that were not decided by the Industrial Commission's 5.17.11 Order and set a Hearing date in the
future which will give the parties sufficient time to complete the IME and disability evaluation processes.
By setting a Hearing date now, the Commission will be creating the structure and predictability that is
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necessary in order to ensure that the Claimant receives the just, speedy and economical determination of
all disputed issues in his case in accordance with Idaho Code §72-708 and JRP l(A).

DATED this 3rd day of June, 2011.

ELLSWORTH, K-'\.LLAS & DEFRANCO, PLLC

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 3rd day of June, 2011, I served the Claimant's Reply to the
Defendants' Response to Claimant's Request For Calendaring on the Defendants by the method indicated
below and addressed to the following:
Susan R. Veltman, Esq.
GARDNER & BREEN
1410 West Washington
Boise, Idaho 83702

[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MICHAEL P. VAWTER,
Claimant,
v.

UNITED PARCEL SERVICES, INC.,
Employer,
and
LIBERTY INSURANCE CORP.,
Surety,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

IC 2010-000114

ORDER DENYING
REQUEST FOR
CALENDARING

On May 19, 2011, Claimant filed a request for calendaring. Claimant seeks to have a
hearing scheduled on the issues of permanent impairment and permanent disability. Defendants
object to the request. They argue that the issue of permanent disability is not yet ripe. Defendants
intend to obtain an independent medical evaluation and retain a vocational expert.
Based on Defendant's objection, we find that this case is not yet ready for hearing.
Therefore, Claimant's request for calendaring is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this _ _ _ day ofJune, 2011.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

ORDER DENYING REQUEST FOR CALENDARING - 1

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
...-!

.-I

I hereby certify that on the :5td- day of June 2011, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing ORDER DENYING REQUEST FOR CALENDARING was served by regular
United States Mail upon each of the following:
RICK D KALLAS
1031 E PARK BLVD
BOISE ID 83712
SUSAN R VELTMAN
PO BOX2528
BOISE ID 83701

eb

ORDER DENYING REQUEST FOR CALENDARING - 2

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MICHAELP. VAWTER,
Claimant,
V.

UNITED PARCEL SERVICES, INC,
Employer,
and
LIBERTY INSURANCE CORP.,
Surety,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

IC 2010-000114

AMENDED
NOTICE OF TELEPHONE
CONFERENCE
AND NOTICE OF HEARING

A telephone conference will be conducted by the Commissioners, pursuant to the Judicial
Rules of Practice and Procedure under the Workers' Compensation Law, on September 7, 2011
at 10:30 a.m. (MDT), to discuss refining and/or adding additional issues for hearing.
Rick D. Kallas may be reached at (208) 336-1843
Susan R. Veltman may be reached at (208) 921-1385
If there are any changes to these numbers, please contact us immediately. You may do

this by calling the Industrial Commission at (208) 334-6023.
All parties shall be ready to proceed at the scheduled time for conference. Sanctions may
be imposed against any party not prepared or not participating.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that a hearing will be held in the above-entitled matter
on Tuesday, October 25, 2011 at 9:00 a.m., for a full-day, in the Industrial Commission
hearing room, 700 South Clearwater Lane, City of Boise, County of Ada, State of Idaho, on the

AMENDED NOTICE OF TELEPHONE CONFERENCE
AND NOTICE OF HEARING - 1

following issues:
1. The extent and degree of Claimant's entitlement to permanent partial impairment
(PPI);
2. The extent and degree of Claimant's entitlement to permanent partial disability (PPD)
in excess of PPI, including whether or not Claimant is a totally and permanently
disabled under the odd-lot doctrine.
3. Whether apportionment under Idaho Code § 72-406, is appropriate.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 7th day of June, 2011.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

Tufhvc~
omas . as m, omm1ss10ner

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 7th day of June, 2011 a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Notice of Telephone Conference was served by Facsimile Processing Machine upon each of
the following:
RICK D KALLAS

FAX # (208) 345-8945

SUSAN P VELTMAN

FAX# (208) 387-3501

amw
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SUSAN R. VELTMAN (ISB No. 7850)
GARDNER & BREEN
1410 W. Washington- 83702
Post Office Box 2528
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 387-0881
Facsimile: (208) 387-3501
sve 1tman((Vgardnerlaw .net
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LUMMISSlON

Attorney for Appellants
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE,
Employer,
v.
LIBERTY INSURANCE CORP.,
Surety,
Defendants/
Appellants
and
MICHAEL VAWTER
Claimant/
Respondent

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

LC. Case No. 2010-000114
NOTICE OF APPEAL

TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, MICHAEL P. VAWTER, THROUGH HIS
ATTORNEY,RICKKALLAS, 1031E.PARKBLVD.,BOISE,IDAHO83712,ANDTHE IDAHO
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.
The above named appellants, United Parcel Service and Liberty Insurance Corp.,
appeal against the above-named respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order entered in the above-entitled proceeding on the 1ih day of May
2011, by Chairman Thomas E. Limbaugh, Commissioner Thomas P. Baskin, and Commissioner
R.D. Maynard.

NOTICE OF APPEAL, PG. I

2.
That the parties have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court and the order
described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable order under and pursuant to Rule 11 (d) LA.R.
Appellants represent that the appealed order did not adjudicate all of the issues or potential
issues involved in Respondent's workers' compensation claim. However, the above described order
appears to meet the criteria for a "final order" within the meaning of Rule 11 (d) LA.R. as interpreted
by Jensen v. Pillsbury Co., 121 Idaho 127; 823 P.2d 161 (1992) and Hartman v. Double L. Mfg.,
141Idaho456; 111P.3d141 (2005). The appealed order does not address retention of jurisdiction
and the order purports to be final as to all matters adjudicated. Therefore, there is no "explicit"
retention ofjurisdiction. Additionally, the appealed order provides a specific award of compensation
with regard to the matters litigated.
3.

Preliminary statement of the issues on appeal:

(a)
Whether the Idaho Industrial Commission erred in determining that Claimant suffered
an accident arising in the course of and out of his employment causing an injury on December 18
2009;
(b) Whether the Idaho Industrial Commission erred in determining that Claimant is awarded
temporary total disability benefits from December 28, 2009 through December 6, 201 O; and
(c)
Whether the Idaho Industrial Commission erred in determining that Claimant is
awarded medical benefits in the amount of $149,033.68.
4.

There is no order sealing any portion of the record.

5.
The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the Industrial
Commission's record regardless of whether such documents would automatically be included under
Rule 28, LA.R.:
(a)
Notice of Hearing filed July 20, 2010
(b)
The Industrial Commission's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order filed
May 17, 2011;
(c)
The hearing transcript of September 28, 2010;
(d)
Claimant's Exhibits 1-20, admitted at hearing;
(e)
Defendants' Exhibits 1-8, admitted at hearing;
(f)
Deposition of Mike McGuire taken September 16, 2010;
(g)
Claimant's Opening Brief filed November 19, 2010
(h)
Defendants' Response Brief filed December 17, 2010
(i)
Claimant's Reply Brief field December 28, 2010
6.

I certify:

(a)
That there is no transcript fee because the Industrial Commission provides a copy of
the transcript upon written request, without a fee, to all parties and the transcript has already been
prepared;
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(b)

That the estimated fee for preparation of the Industrial Commission's record has been

(c)
(d)

That the appellate filing fee has been paid; and
That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20

paid;

I.A.R.

DATED THIS 20th day of June, 2011.

SUSAN R. VELTMAN (ISB No. 7850)
GARDNER & BREEN
Post Office Box 2528
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 387-0881
Facsimile: (208) 387-3501
sve 1tman(a),gardnerlaw. net
Attorney for Appellants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 20th day of June, 2011, I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing to be served upon:
Rick Kallas
Ellsworth, Kallas, Talboy & Defranco
1031 E. Park Blvd.
Boise, ID 83 712
by depositing the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the above-named,
the last known address as set forth above.

SUSAN R. VELTMAN

NOTICE OF APPEAL, PG. 3
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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

II

22

Claimant/Respondent,
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SUPREME COURT NO.
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)
)
)

v.
UNITED PARCEL SERVICES, INC.,
Employer,
and
LIBERTY INSURANCE CORP.,
Surety,
Defendants/Appellants.

Appeal From:

)

)
)
)

CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL

)
)
)

)
)
)

Industrial Commission,
Thomas E. Limbaugh, Chairman presidin_g
,>"

Case Number:

IC 2010-000114

Order Appealed from:

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Caw,
and Order, filed May 17, 2011

Attorney for Appellant:

Susan R. Veltman
PO Box 2528
Boise, ID 83702

Attorney for Respondent:

Rick D. Kallas
1031 E Park Blvd.
Boise, ID 83 712

Appealed By:

Employer/Surety, Defendants/Appellants

Appealed Against:

Claimant/Respondent

Notice of Appeal Filed:

June 20, 2011

CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL FOR MICHAEL P. VAWTER - 1

FILED- ORIG!NAL
JUN 2 2 2011
Supreme Court_Court
Entered on ATS b

als-

Appellate Fee Paid:

$86.00 to Supreme Court and
$100.00 to Industrial Commission
Checks were received.

Name of Reporter:

M.D. Willis
PO Box 1241
Eagle, ID 883616

Transcript Requested:

Standard transcript has been requested. Transcript
has been prepared and filed with the Commission.

Dated:

June 21, 2011
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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho

MICHAEL P. VAWTER,
Claimant-Respondent,
v.
UNITED PARCEL SERVICES, INC.,
Employer, LIBERTY INSURANCE
CORPORATION, Surety,
Respondents-Appellants,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL
Supreme Court Docket No. 38914-2011
Industrial' Commission No. 2010-114
%
Ref. No. 11-338

1. A MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE NOTICE OF CROSS:JAPPEAL, an
AFFIDAVIT OF RICK D. KALLAS IN SUPPORT OF CLAIMANT/RESPONDENT'S
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL, and a
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE NOTICE
OF CROSS-APPEAL were filed by counsel for Respondent on June 27, 2011.
2. Additionally, CLAIMANT/RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR INVOLUNTARY
DISMISSAL OF APPEAL, an AFFIDAVIT OF RICK D. KALLAS IN SUPPORT OF
CLAIMANT/RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF
APPEAL, with attachments, and CLAIMANT/RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION FOR INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF APPEAL were filed by counsel
for Respondent on June 27, 2011.
3. DEFENDANTS'/APPELLANTS' RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT/RESPONDENT'S
MOTION FOR INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF APPEAL, an AFFIDAVIT OF
SUSAN R. VELTMAN IN SUPPORT OF DEENDANTS'/APPELLANTS' RESPONSE
TO CLAIMANT/RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF
APPEAL and DEFENDANTS'/APPELLANTS' BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANTS'/APPELLANTS' RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT/RESPONDENT'S
MOTION FOR INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF APPEAL were filed by counsel for
Appellant on July 8, 2011.
The Court is fully advised; therefore, good cause appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that CLAIMANT/RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR
INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF APPEAL be, and hereby is, GRANTED and this appeal is
DISMISSED.

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL-Docket No. 38914-2011

Il

11-

111

DATED this

111

J Jt-day of July, 2011.

'1

.'1·I

By Order of the Supreme Court

·I

II

I

Ste~rxyon~far
cc:

Counsel of Record
Industrial Commission Secretary

i
I
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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho
MICHAEL P. VAWTER,
· Claimant-Respondent~

v.
UNITED PARCEL SERVICES, INC.,
Employer, LIBERTY INSURANCE
CORPORATION, Surety,

)
)
.... ·r···-·oRDERDENYING MOTION FOR)
CLARIFICATION
)
)
Supreme Court Docket No. 38914-2011
)
Industri<tl Commission No. 2010-114
)
)
Ref. No. 11-380
)
)

An ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL was issued by this Court on July 27, 2011.
Thereafter, a MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION and AFFIDAVIT OF SUSAN R. VELTMAN IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION were filed by counsel for Appellants on August
1, 2011. Therefore, good cause appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Appellants' MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION be, and
hereby is, DENIED and counsel shall be referred to Jensen v. Pillsbury Co., 121 Idaho 127, 823
P.2d 161 (1992) and the Amended Notice of Telephone Conference and Notice of Hearing in
Industrial Commission No. 2010-000114, which was filed on June 7, 2011.
,,-:::.IL
DATED this / ,:) - day of August, 2011.
By Order of Jibe Supreme Court
I

1/

J

/t:l~~~
'Stephen W. Kenyon) Clerk,

cc:

Counsel of Record
Industrial Commission Secretary

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION -Docket No. 38914-2011

II

NOTICE OF INTENT TO FILE
A WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMPLAINT
AGAINST THE INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND

Claimant's Name and Address

Claimant's Attorney's Name and Address
Rick Kallas
Ellsworth, Kallas, Talboy & Defranco
1031 E. Park Blvd.
Boise, ID 83712

Michael Vawter
Donnelly, ID 83615

Employer's Name and Address
United Parcel Service, 270 S. 7th, Payette, ID 83661

Employer's Attorney's Name and Adrress
::>usan R. Veltman
Gardner & Breen
P.O. Box 2528
Boise, ID 83701

Claimant's Social Security Number
Claimant's Date of Birth
IC Number of Current Claim
12010-000114

Surety's Name and Address (Not Adjuster's)
Liberty Insurance Corp
C/O Gallagher Bassett
720 E. Park Blvd., Ste. 125
Boise ID 83712
Claimant's Weekly Wage
,$1,170.60

Date of the Most Recent Injury
12/18/2009
Claimant's Occupation
UPS Package Driver

Nature and cause of pre-existing impairment or condition. Submit documentation.
See attached

What factors render the Claimant totally and permanently disabled? Submit documentation.
Claimant alleges total permanent disability and has applied for SSDI benefits. Defendants do not concede
total permanent disability but acknowledge significant restrictions assigned by the treating doctor for the
current injury, Dr. Frizzell, based on recent FCE. Defendants are in the process of obtaining expert vocational
opinions from Nancy Collins, PhD.
What impairment ratings has the Claimant received and from whom? Submit documentation.
With regard to the current back injury, Dr. Frizzell assigned 12% PPL Total rating for the back is 19% PPI with
7% PPI apportioned to Claimant's pre-existing lumbar condition based on CT scan findings following
Claimant's 1990 back injury. Prior impairment ratings are reflected on attached page.

Certificate of Service

I certify that on August 18, 2011
of Intent upon:
Industrial Special Indemnity Fund
Department of Administration
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-7901

, I served a true and correct copy of the Notice
Claimant's Name and Address
Michael Vawter c/o Rick Kallas
1031 E. Park Blvd.
Boise, ID 83712

{(

Employer's Name and Address

Surety's Name and Address

United Parcel Service

Liberty Ins. Corp. c/o Gallagher BassE

270 S. 7th

720 E. Park Blvd, Ste. 125

Payette, ID 83661

Boise, ID 83712

Medical Release
I hereby authorize any defendant and defendants' legal counsel, at their sole expense to
examine, inspect, receive or take copies of any medical reports, records, x-rays, or test
results of hospitals, physicians or any other person, or to receive information from any
person having examined me and their diagnosis, relative to my past, present, and future
physical and mental condition.
I also authorize and direct that a duplicate set of all documents or written records
provided to said law firm, or any individual member thereof, also be provided to me or
my attorney,
. The defendant requesting my records shall bear
the expense incurred in production of such duplicate set.
I further authorize that copies of this authorization may be used in lieu of the original.
THIS AUTHORIZATION IS VALID ONL YFOR THE DURATION OF THE
PENDING LITIGATION. It is further understood that all information obtained under
this authorization shall be regarded as confidential and maintained as such.
Dated OBTAIN FROM CLAIMANT
Claimant's signature

This form is to notify the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund that you intend to file a
formal Workers' Compensation Complaint Against the ISIF after a period of 60 days.
This time period allows the ISIF to adjudicate the claim on a more informal basis and to
avoid or limit necessary litigation costs. If you wish to file a Complaint Against the ISIF
after 60 days, you may do so by the standard service process. You do not need to file a
copy of this form with the Industrial Commission.

Michael Vawter:
Nature and cause of pre-existing impairment or condition:

Previous Industrial Injuries with pennanent partial impairment ratings include:
March 1998- crush injury to right thumb with fracture. 17% hand (9% WP) by William
Lenzi, M.D.
September 1990- left shoulder arthroscopic surgery. 7% WP by Steven Rudd, MD.
October 1990- back injuries. 7% WP as forensically appo1iioned by Tyler Frizzell, MD.
July 2004- right shoulder arthroscopic surgery. 10% WP by Ro be1i Walker, MD.

Other pre-existing conditions that have not yet been rated:
Type II diabetes; osteoa1ilu·itis of multiple joints, including knees; hyperlipidemia;
hypertension; bilateral knee pain; tobacco abuse.

Description of current injurv:

Claimant bent over to tie his boot and felt "pop" in his back.
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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho

MICHAEL P. VAWTER,
Claimant-Respondent,
v.

UNITED PARCEL SERVICES, INC.,
Employer, LIBERTY INSURANCE
CORPORATION, surety,
Respondents-Appellants.

TO:

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

REMITTITUR
Supreme Court Docket 38914
Industrial Commission 2010-114

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, STATE OF IDAHO.

The Court having entered an Order dismissing this appeal July 27, 2011;
therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appeal herein be, and hereby is,
DISMISSED.
C1 '\.}'

DATED this _ _\ _ day of August, 2011.

Clerk of -che Sup ,me Court
STATE OF IDAHO
cc:

Counsel of Record
Secretary, Industrial Commission

i

I
SUSAN R. VELTMAN (ISB No. 7850)
GARDNER & BREEN
1410 W. Washington - 83702
Post Office Box 2528
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 387-0881
Facsimile: (208) 387-3501

!, ~ r:- I
! 1

'

"--'I.

Attorney for Defendants
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MICHAEL P. VAWTER,
Claimant,
V.

UNITED PARCEL SERVICE,
Employer,
and
LIBERTY INSURANCE CORP.
Surety,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

LC. Case No. 2010-000114
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL ISSUES
AT HEARING

The Industrial Commission's hearing notice of June 7, 2011, was generated following a
teleconference with the parties and reflects issues of permanent impairment, permanent disability and
apportionment are to be addressed at hearing on October 25, 2011. The Commission previously
issued a decision of May 17, 2011 on issues of compensability, medical benefits, temporary
disability benefits and attorney fees.

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL ISSUES AT HEARING, P. 1

vr

Defendants filed a Notice of Appeal of the May 17, 2011 decision on June 20, 2011, and the
Idaho Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on July 27, 2011. The Order Dismissing Appeal did not
reflect the basis of dismissal or whether the dismissal was with or without prejudice. Defendants
filed a Motion of Clarification of that order on August 1, 2011. The Court denied the Motion for
clarification but referred the parties to the case of Jensen v. Pillsbury Co., 120 Idaho 127, 127, 823
P.2d 161, 161 (1992), in which the Court dismissed the claimant's appeal because the Commission
expressly reserved jurisdiction on the issues of impairment and disability.
The Court did not agree with Defendants' arguments that the present case is distinguishable
from the Jensen case and that the May 17, 2011 decision should be considered a final decision
pursuant to IAR 11 (d) which states an appeal as a matter of right may be taken to the Supreme
Court, from any final decision or order of the Industrial Commission. The Court's reference to the
Jensen case implies the Court does not consider the May 17, 2011 decision to constitute a final order

of the Commission.
Defendants believe that a discrepancy exists between the Idaho Supreme Court and Industrial
Commission as to what constitutes a final order and that such discrepancy complicates both
Defendants' payment obligations and Claimant's ability to enforce the Commission's May 17, 2011
award.
Defendants respectfully request that the Commission include the following issues at hearing
which Defendants believe are issues of first impression:
1.

Whether the Commission's May 17, 2011 Order in this case trigger Defendants'

payment obligations in spite of the Idaho Supreme Court's implied ruling that the Order is not a final

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL ISSUES AT HEARING, P. 2

for purposes ofIAR 1 l(d).
2.

If so, whether Defendants are entitled to reimbursement from Claimant and/or his

attorney ifthe Commissions' May 17, 2011 award is reversed on appeal by the Idaho Supreme Court.
Additionally, Defendants seek to include the following issues regarding ISIF liability:
3.

Whether the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund is liable under Idaho Code§ 72-332.

4.

Apportionment under the Carey formula.

Defendants are aware that inclusion ofISIF issues may require postponement of the October
25, 2011 hearing. Defendants served its Notice oflntent to file a Complaint against ISIF on August
18, 2011. Defendants believe ISIF is a necessary party to this claim based on recent expert
consultation reflecting the possibility that Claimant's permanent restrictions render him totally
permanently disabled based on a combination of impairment from his previous conditions and the
current injury.
During the June 2011 teleconference, the Commission questioned Claimant's counsel as to
whether this might be an ISIF case and he felt it was not. Since the conference, the treating doctor
clarified permanent restrictions on June 27, 2011 and Claimant's social security records were
obtained. Defendants retained Nancy Collins, PhD, as a vocational expert and forwarded documents
for her to review on July 14, 2011. Dr. Collins is scheduled to meet with Claimant for an interview
on August 31, 2011, after which it is anticipated that she will prepare a report reflecting her
op1mons.

Although Claimant has alleged total permanent disability since the early stages of this claim

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL ISSUES AT HEARING, P. 3

Although Claimant has alleged total permanent disability since the early stages of this claim
and Claimant's multiple previous injuries and related impairments have been known to Defendants,
evidence regarding Claimant's vocational abilities and the impact of his permanent restrictions did
not previously cause Defendants to conclude that ISIF is a necessary party.
For the above stated reasons, Defendants request inclusion of the four additional issues
described above.

DATED this 19th day of August, 2011.

Susan R. Veltman - of the firm
GARDNER & BREEN
Attorney for Defendants
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 19th day of August, 2011, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing to be served upon:
Rick Kallas
Ellsworth, Kallas, Talboy & Defranco
1031 E. Park Blvd.
Boise, ID 83712
by depositing the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the above-named,
the last known address as set forth above.

SUSAN R. VELTMAN

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL ISSUES AT HEARING, P. 4

"'"'

,, j i
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Rick D. Kallas
Ellsworth, Kallas & Defranco, P.L.L.C.
1031 E. Park Blvd.
Boise, Idaho 83712
Telephone:
(208) 336-1843
Facsimile:
(208) 345-8945
Idaho State Bar No. 3872
Attorney for Claimant
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
MICHAEL P. VAWTER,
Claimant,
vs.
UPS,
Employer,
and
LIBERTY INSURANCE CORP.,
Surety,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

LC. No. 2010-000114
CLAIMANT'S OBJECTION TO
DEFENDANTS' MOTION [REQUEST]
TO ADD ISSUES AT HEARING

COMES NOW Claimant, Michael Vawter, and, pursuant to J.R.P. 8 (C)(2), hereby
objects to adding the reimbursement issue for determination at the 10.25.2011 Hearing on the
following grounds:
1.

The reimbursement issue is not ripe for determination. The Industrial Commission does
not have jurisdiction to determine whether a right to reimbursement exists until two (2)
predicate events occur:

(1) The Defendants pay to Claimant all benefits that were

ordered to be paid in the Industrial Commission's 05 .17.2011 decision; and (2) The
Vawter I Claimant's 8.31.11 Objection to Defendants' Motion [Request] to Add Issues at Hearing

Page I

Idaho Supreme Court reverses the Industrial Commission's 05 .17.2011 decision and
holds that this claim is not compensable.

After both of these events occurred, the

reimbursement issue would then be ripe for determination.
2.

The Claimant also objects to the Defendants' attempt to hold the Claimant's attorney
personally liable. The Claimant's attorney is not a party to a worker's compensation
claim and does not have any legal right to receive worker's compensation benefits under
the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act. The Idaho Workers' Compensation Act places
an obligation on employer I surety to provide "sure and certain relief for injured workmen
and their families and dependents". (See LC. §72-201). Any relief available under the
Act is only available to the injured worker and I or his dependents.

3.

The income benefits that employer I surety are obligated to pay under the Act must be
paid "to the injured employee disabled by an injury or occupational disease, or his
dependents in case of death" (See LC. §72-102(16)).

4.

The medical benefits that employer I surety are obligated to pay under Idaho Code §72432 must be paid to the injured worker:
The provider asserts that it is entitled to direct payment from the surety of
the medical expenses. We disagree.
The workers' compensation law contains the following provision:
The employer shall provide for an injured employee such reasonable
medical, surgical or other attendance or treatment, nurse and hospital
service, medicines, crutches and apparatus, as may be required by the
employee's physician or needed immediately after an injury or disability
from an occupational disease, and for a reasonable time thereafter. If the
employer fails to provide the same, the injured employee may do so at the
expense of the employer. I.C. § 72-432(1).
By this statute, the employer is mandatorily required to provide its injured
employees with medical care when they qualify for workers'
compensation. Paulson v. Idaho Forest Industries, Inc., 99 Idaho 896, 902,
591 P.2d 143, 149 (1979). St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center v.
Edmondson, 130 Idaho 108, 937 P.2d 420 (1997).

Vawter I Claimant's 8.31.11 Objection to Defendants' Motion [Request] to Add Issues at Hearing
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***
Accordingly, Surety is obligated to pay Mr. Neel the full invoiced amount
for all medical bills he incurred for his industrial accident prior to June 8,
2007, the date that his claim was deemed compensable by the
Commission. Neel v. Western Construction, Inc., 147 Idaho 146 206 P. 3d
852 (2009).

5.

The injured worker is the only party to a workers' compensation proceeding who has the
legal right to collect income benefits and medical benefits from employer I surety. If the
Defendants are ultimately entitled to assert a reimbursement claim because the Idaho
Supreme Court reversed the Industrial Commission's 05.17.2011 decision and found this
claim to be not compensable, the Defendants' right to demand reimbursement would only
apply against the Claimant who is a party to these proceedings.

Based on the foregoing, the Claimant respectfully requests that the Industrial
Commission deny the Defendants' request to add the reimbursement issue to these proceedings.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

31st

day of August, 2011.

Ellsworth, Kallas & Defranco, P.L.L.C.

Vawter I Claimant's 8.3 l.l l Objection to Defendants' Motion [Request] to Add Issues at Hearing
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 31 51 day of August, 2011, I served the Claimant's Objection To
Defendants' Motion [Request] To Add Issues At Hearing on the Defendants by the method indicated
below and addressed to the following:
Susan R. Veltman, Esq.
GARDNER & BREEN
1410 West Washington
Boise, Idaho 83702

[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile

Vawter I Claimant's 8.31.11 Objection to Defendants' Motion [Request] to Add Issues at Hearing

Page 4

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MICHAELP. VAWTER,
Claimant,

v.
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE,
Employer,
And

LIBERTY INSURANCE CORP.,
Surety,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

IC 2010-000114
ORDER VACATING HEARING
AND ESTABLISHING
BRIEFING SCHEDULE

Based on a telephone conference held with the parties on September 7, 2011, the Industrial
Commission of the State ofldaho hereby ORDERS that the hearing set for October 25, 2011 at 9:00
a.m., (Mountain Time) in the above-entitled matter is VACATED.
The Commission hereby establishes the following briefing schedule, as stipulated to by the
parties through their respective attorneys, on the issue of whether there is authority to stay payment
of the March 17, 2011 Commission order as follows:
1.

Defendants shall have ten days (10), after the date of this order to submit a brief;
and,

2.

Claimant shall have twenty days (20) after the date of this order to submit his
responsive brief.

ORDER VACATING HEARING AND
ESTABLISHING BRIEFING SCHEDULE -1

Pursuant to a directive from the Commissioners, three copies of all briefs shall be filed
along with the original to facilitate review of cases.
DATED this

1fl{ day of September, 2011.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

Thomas P. Baskin, Commissioner

Assistant Commission Secretari::.#&
4:~#.j'#~
£;lfifgH

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

J!!

I hereby certify that on the
day of September, 2011 a true and correct copy of Order
Vacating Hearing and Establishing Briefing Schedule was sent byfacsimile processing machine
upon each of the following:
RICK KALLAS

Fax # (208) 345-8945

SUSAN VELTMAN

Fax# (208) 387-3501

And by email to:
Dean Willis
(208) 855-9151
Mdwillis l@msn.com

cs-m/amw

ORDER VACATING HEARING AND
ESTABLISHING BRIEFING SCHEDULE - 2
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SUSAN R. VELTMAN (ISB No. 7850)
GARDNER & BREEN
1410 W. Washington - 83702
Post Office Box 2528
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 387-0881
Facsimile: (208) 387-3501
Attorney for Defendants

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
MICHAEL P. VAWTER,
Claimant,
v.
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE,
Employer,
and
LIBERTY INSURANCE CORP.
Surety,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

LC. Case No. 2010-000114

DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM
REGARDING THE ISSUE OF
PAYMENT OBLIGATIONS

On September 7, 2011, the Commission conducted a telephone conference to discuss the
issues for hearing.

In response to a request from the Commission, Defendants submit this

memorandum regarding the issue of payment obligations.

BACKGROUND
A hearing on bifurcated issues took place on September 27, 2010, and on May 17, 2011, the

DEFENDANTS'MEMORANDUM REGARDING THE ISSUE OF PAYMENT OBLIGATIONS, P. 1

Industrial Commission issued its Order. In accordance with Idaho Code § 72-718, the Order states
that the decision is final as to all matters adjudicated. The matters adjudicated at hearing were 1)
whether Claimant suffered an injury arising out of his employment, 2) whether Claimant is entitled
to total temporary disability (TTD benefits and the extent thereof, 3) whether Claimant is entitled to
medical benefits and the extent thereof, and 4) whether Claimant is entitled to an award of attorney
fees.
In reliance on the language in the Order that it was final as to all matters adjudicated,
Defendants appealed the case to the Supreme Court pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule ll(d).
Although I.A.R. 12 also provides for an appeal, it is permissive, applies to non-final interlocutory
orders that are not otherwise appealable, and does not guarantee a remedy. Permissive appeals are
not valid or effective until and unless the Supreme Court enters an order accepting the interlocutory
order as appealable and grants the requesting party leave to file a notice of appeal within the
specified time period. Accordingly, Defendants appealed pursuant to I.A.R.11 (d).
On appeal, Defendants' articulated the reasons the Commission's decision was
distinguishable from previous cases that were dismissed and remanded back as non-final and
premature. Defendants did not assert that all Commission decisions should be considered final in
every situation, but given the facts of this particular case, the Order was final as to the matters
adjudicated. (Exhibit 1: Defendants' I Appellants' Brief in Support of Defendants' I Appellants'
Response to Claimant I Respondent's Motion for Involuntary Dismissal of Appeal dated July 8,
2011). The Court rejected Defendants' argument, but did not state the grounds for its decision.
(Exhibit 2: The Idaho Supreme Court's Order Dismissing Appeal dated July 27, 2011). Upon

DEFENDANTS'MEMORANDUM REGARDING THE ISSUE OF PAYMENT OBLIGATIONS, P. 2

q

Defendants' Motion for Clarification, the Court denied the Motion, citing Jensen v. Pillsbury. In

Jensen, the Court held that "a decision of the Commission which does not finally dispose of all of the
claimant's claims would not be a fmal decision subject to appeal pursuant to IA.R. ll(d) ... ."

Jensen v. Pillsbury, 121Idaho127, 127, 823P.2d161, 161 (1992) (emphasis added) (citingKindred
v.Amalgamated Sugar Co, 118 Idaho 147, 149, 795 P.2d 309, 311 (1990)). (Exhibit 3: Defendants'
I Appellants' Motion for Clarification dated August 1, 2011, Exhibit 4: The Idaho Supreme Court's
Order Denying Motion for Clarification dated August 15, 2011).

ISSUES
The issues to be addressed are:

1.

Whether the Commission's May 17, 2011, Order is final pursuant to LC.§ 72-718
and as stated in the decision, or whether it is not final as implied by the Idaho
Supreme Court?

2.

Whether and in what manner Defendants' payment obligations are triggered by
the Commission's May 17, 2011, Order.

FINALITY AND APPELLATE RIGHTS
Pursuant to LC. § 72-718, a decision of the Industrial Commission shall be final as to all
matters adjudicated 20 days from the date of filing with the Commission, absent fraud or the filing of
a motion for reconsideration. Section 72-718 further provides that final decisions may be appealed
to the Idaho Supreme Court. Additionally, I.A.R. 11 (d) provides for appeal as a matter of right of
"any final decision or order of the Industrial Commission." Consequently, finality of an Industrial

DEFENDANTS'MEMORANDUM REGARDING THE ISSUE OF PAYMENT OBLIGATIONS, P. 3

Commission decision goes hand in hand with the ability to appeal such decision as a matter of right.
Once a party appeals a final decision, payment obligations are stayed pursuant to LC. § 72-731 and

I.AR. 13(d).

DEFENDANTS' PAYMENT RESPONSIBLITY

If indeed the Commission's decision in this case is not final as to the matters adjudicated,
Defendants' responsibility to pay benefits should be deferred pending a final, appealable order. To
hold otherwise creates an irreconcilable situation in which the decision is final as to one purpose
(Defendants' payment responsibility), but not final as to another (their right to appeal). This
situation would violate Defendants' due process rights and qualifies as a manifest injustice.
Other than the general provisions that workers' compensation claimants shall be afforded
sure and certain relief, there is a lack of guidance in the relevant statutes, rules, and regulations
regarding the time frame for payments ordered by an Industrial Commission award. In effect, the
Industrial Commission has no statutory authority to enforce its own awards. Though LC. § 72-735
provides for enforcement in district court, there must be a decision from which no appeal has been
taken within the time allowed. Similarly, while Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 69 discusses
execution on a judgment, it requires an appealable final judgment.
In the present case, until the Industrial Commission resolves all pending issues on Claimant's
claim, the parties remain in the time period allowed to appeal the May 17, 2011, decision. This
premise is consistent with the Supreme Court's Order Denying Clarification, where it indicated the
Commission's Order is not yet an appealable final judgment. Of note, though Claimant agrees with
the Supreme Court that the Order is not final for purposes of an appeal, at the same time, he asserts it

DEFENDANTS'MEMORANDUM REGARDING THE ISSUE OF PAYMENT OBLIGATIONS, P. 4

is final for purposes of Defendants paying him medical benefits. In considering the issue of
"[w]hether Claimant is entitled to medical benefits and the extent thereof," the Commission awarded
Claimant $149,033.68 in medical benefits. Claimant, however, apparently does not consider the
issue final because he recently demanded Defendants pay him $24,627.85 in additional medical
benefits beyond those awarded in the decision. (Exhibit 5: Claimant's demand for payment to
Defendants' dated August 9, 2011). Thus, Claimant alleges a final decision for purposes of
Defendants' payment obligations, but not final for purposes of Defendants' appealing it to the
Supreme Court or to increase his award of medical benefits.
Certainly there are circumstances in which it is reasonable for the Commission to expect
payment pursuant to a bifurcated issue that is potentially non-final for appellate purposes. This is
particularly true with regard to medical or sustenance benefits ordered as a result of an emergency
hearing pursuant to Judicial Rule of Procedure 8(D). However, in the present case, no such exigent
circumstances exist. Claimant has received medical treatment billed in the amount of$ l 73,661.53,
which was paid in significant part by his health insurance through the Oregon Teamster Employers
Trust. (Exhibit 5: Claimant's demand for payment to Defendants' dated August 9, 2011 ). Similarly,
Claimant has received at least some amount of time-loss benefits through short-term disability
benefits. (Exhibit 6: Claimant's May 3, 2010, answer to Interrogatory No. 16). It also appears
Claimant has received additional disability benefits, though the precise amount is unknown because
he has not supplemented his discovery responses to reflect payments received since March 16, 2010.
Accordingly, Claimant has significant liens to satisfy out of any award received and any funds paid
to him would not be immediately available to relieve hardship. Significantly, Claimant's satisfaction

DEFENDANTS'MEMORANDUM REGARDING THE ISSUE OF PAYMENT OBLIGATIONS, P. 5

of any lien will likely prevent or complicate Defendants' right to reimbursement in the event the
compensability determination is reversed on appeal.
THE RATIONALE FOR BIFURCATION
The circumstances surrounding the bifurcation of issues are relevant to the discussion of
Defendants' payment responsibility. Claimant previously argued that Defendants intentionally
bifurcated issues because they preferred multiple hearings. (Exhibit 7: Claimant I Respondent's
Brief in Support of Motion for Involuntary Dismissal of Appeal dated June 27, 2011 ). Such a claim
is unreasonable and far from accurate. Claimant filed a hearing request in May 2010 and sought to
have all issues addressed at hearing as soon as possible. (Exhibit 8: Claimant's Request for
Calendaring dated May 3, 2010). Defendants asserted calendaring was premature because Claimant
had not been certified at maximum medical improvement (MMI), assigned an impairment (PPI)
rating, or given permanent restrictions. Accordingly, Defendants proposed bifurcation of the issues
that were ripe for adjudication. (Exhibit 9: Defendants' Response to Request for Hearing I Motion to
Bifurcate dated May 11, 2010). Claimant objected to bifurcation and a phone conference took place
with the Referee in June 2010 to discuss the parties' options. (Exhibit 10: Notice of Telephone
Conference dated May 20, 2010). At the time of the second telephone conference in July, Claimant
had still not been certified at MMI. (Exhibit 11: Notice of Telephone Conference dated July 15,
2010). Claimant's MMI date was once again deferred, but Claimant did not want to postpone the
hearing any longer so the case was scheduled for hearing September 28, 2010, on bifurcated issues,
at the agreement of the parties. (Exhibit 12: Notice of Hearing dated July 20, 2010). Claimant was
not certified at MMI until two months after the hearing, on November 23, 2010. (Exhibit 13: Dr.
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Frizzell' s November 23, 2010, letter to Dr. Harris). Defendants originally suggested the case would
be ready for hearing in November 2010, but Claimant declined to wait and opted to go forward on
the bifurcated issues. Both parties expressed a desire for prompt resolution of the disputed issues.
RELIEF SOUGHT

Based on the above arguments and unique facts of this case, Defendants request the
Commission exercise its limited authority afforded by LC.§ 72-719 and modify its May 17, 2011,
award to reflect the lack of finality of its decision consistent with the Supreme Court's
determination. Section 72-719(3) states:
The commission, on its own motion at any time within five (5) years
of the date of the accident causing the injury or date of first
manifestation of an occupational disease, may review a case in order
to correct a manifest injustice.
IDAHO CODE§

72-719 (2006).

To treat the May the award as "final" with regard to payment obligations when it is not
considered final for appellate purposes results in payment obligations not contemplated by LC. § 72718 and creates a manifest injustice. As part of the requested modification, Defendants ask that
payment obligations be deferred until such time as the Commission files a final decision in this
matter. Such action will afford Claimant the opportunity to present additional evidence regarding
medical benefits not awarded in the initial decision, should he choose to do so, and will allow both
parties to meaningfully exercise appellate rights as contemplated by LC. § 72-718 and I.A.R. 11 (d).
In the alternative, Defendants request the Industrial Commission order any payments made pursuant
to the May 17, 2011, award be deposited in a trust account for distribution to occur upon final

DEFENDANTS'MEMORANDUM REGARDING THE ISSUE OF PAYMENT OBLIGATIONS, P. 7

resolution of the disputed issues, following the parties' exercise of their appellate rights. This
resolution was proposed as an alternative by the Commission, but Claimant declined to voluntarily
resolve the issue in this manner. (Exhibit 14: Claimant's demand for payment to Defendants' dated
September 7, 2011).

DATED this 16th day of September, 2011.

Susan R. Vel~an ~ of the firm
GARDNER & BREEN
Attorney for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 16th day of September, 2011, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing to be served upon:
Rick Kallas
Ellsworth, Kallas, Talboy & DeFranco
1031 E. Park Blvd.
Boise, ID 83712
by depositing the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the above-named,
the last known address as set forth above.

SUSAN R. VELTMAN
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SUSAN R. VELTMAN (ISB No. 7850)
GARDNER & BREEN
1410 W. Washington - 83702
Post Office Box 2528
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 387-0881
Facsimile: (208) 387-3501
sveltman@gardnerlaw.net
Attorney for Appellants
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
MICHAEL VAWTER,
Claimant/Respondent,
v.

UNITED PARCEL SERVICES, INC.,
Employer,
and
LIBERTY INSURANCE CORP.
Surety,
Defendants/ Appellants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Supreme Court No. 38914

DEFENDANTS'/APPELLANTS'
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANTS'/APPELLANTS'
RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT/
RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR
INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF
APPEAL

1. The Industrial Commission's May 17, 2011, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order is a final Order as to the matters adjudicated. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled
to file an appeal as a matter of right pursuant to I.A.R. 11 (d).

The right to appeal a decision from the Idaho Industrial Commission is set forth by the Idaho
Appellate Rules (I.A.R.). Rule 1l(d) states an appeal as a matter of right may be taken to the
Supreme Court,
From any f'mal decision or order of the Industrial Commission
or from any final decision or order upon rehearing or
reconsideration by the administrative agency.

EXHIBIT
DEFENDANTS'/APPELLANTS' BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDA.!~TS'/APPELLANTS' RESPONSE TO
CLAJMANT/RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF APPEAL, PG. 1
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I.A.R 11 (d)(emphasis added).

Idaho Code § 72-718 outlines when a Commission decision is final. It states,

A decision of the commission shall be final and conclusive as to
all matters adjudicated by the commission upon filing the
decision in the office of the commission; provided, within twenty
(20) days from the date of filing the decision any party may move
for reconsideration or rehearing of the decision, or the commission
may rehear or reconsider its decision on its own initiative, and in
any such events the decision shall be final upon denial of a motion
for rehearing or reconsideration or the filing of the decision on
rehearing or reconsideration. Final decisions may be appealed to
the Supreme Court as provided by section 72-724, Idaho Code.
I. C. § 72-718 (2006)(emphasis added).

It follows that when certain matters are adjudicated by the Commission and it issues a
decision or order on those matters, the decision or order is "final" pursuant to I. C. § 72-718 and
appealable to the Idaho Supreme Court as a matter of right.

An exception exists when the

Commission expressly retains jurisdiction. See Jensen v. Pillsbury Co., 120 Idaho 127, 127, 823
P.2d 161, 161 (1992) (the Court dismissed the claimant's appeal because the Commission expressly
reserved jurisdiction on the issues of impairment and disability), Kindred v. Amalgamated Sugar

Co., 118 Idaho 147, 149, 795 P.2d 309, 311 (1990) (stating "Had the Commission not retained
jurisdiction its original decision would have been final ...), Reynolds v. Browning Ferris Industries,
113 Idaho 965, 969, 751 P.2d 113, 117 (1988) ("The very fact that the Commission had retained
jurisdiction in its initial decision reveals that its determination was not intended to be final ... ").
Another exception to theruleoffinalityis found inLawv. Omarkindustries, 121Idaho128,
823 P .2d 162 (1992). In that case, the claimant raised the issue of apportionment ofimpairment and
disability on appeal after the hearing concluded. Law, 1990 IIC 0321 at *1. The issue was not
argued at the original hearing, nor was it presented in the claimant's original Application for
Hearing. Law, 121 Idaho at 128, 823 P.2d at 162. Consequently, the Referee found that the matter
was "not properly before the Commission" because it had not been adjudicated.

Id.

The

Commission confirmed and adopted the Referee's Finding of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and

DEFENDANTS'/APPELLAJ'l"TS' BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS'/APPELLANTS' RESPONSE TO
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proposed award, which found inter alia, the claimant was entitled to reasonable medical benefits
related to his industrial accident. Id. at *8. Notably, the Commission did not enter a specific order
awarding any type of benefits. Id. The claimant appealed the decision to the Supreme Court and
argued that the issue of apportionment had in fact been before the Commission. Id. The Supreme
Court disagreed, and held that similar to its decision in Jensen, supra, which was issued the same
day, the Commission's order was not final. Law, 1990 IIC 0321 at *I. Tnus, while the Commission
did not expressly retain jurisdiction, the Court found its decision was not final because the matter at
issue on appeal-apportionment-had not been adjudicated, and the Commission had not entered a
specific order on the matter. It follows that pursuant to LC. § 72-718, the Commission's decision
could not be final as to that issue.
Our case is distinguishable from Law, Jensen, Kindred, and Reynolds in several respects.
First, unlike Jensen, Kindred, and Reynolds, the Commission did not expressly retain jurisdiction.
Not only does this infer the decision is final as to the matters adjudicated, but the decision expressly
declares it is final. The Order states,
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-718, this decision is final and
conclusive as to all matters adjudicated.
(Claimant I Respondent's Exhibit 7).
This is patently different than the cases cited above, where the decisions did not contain simil.ar
language of finality.
Also, our case is distinguishable in that the Commission entered a specific order awarding
Claimant I Respondent medical benefits in the amount of$149,033.68 and temporary total disability
(TTD) benefits for a specified time period. (Claimant I Respondent's Exhibit 7). This was not the
situation in Jensen, Kindred, or Law. Claimant I Respondent cites Law for the proposition that any
order from the Commission is interlocutory unless it disposes of each and every issue related to a
worker's claim for workers' compensation benefits. (Claimant I Respondent's Brief in Support of
Motion for Involuntary Dismissal, p. 6). Were this accurate, it is dubious whether many of the
Commission's orders would be enforceable because they rarely dispose of all of a worker's claims
(both litigated and potential, non-litigated issues). The Commission routinely allows claims to be
bifurcated in order to summarily resolve matters and provide workers with speedy recovery of
DEFENDAlWS'/APPELLANTS' BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDAl'!TS'/APPELLANTS' RESPONSE TO
CLAHvfAl'JT/RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF APPEAL, PG. 3
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compensation. This saves the Commission and all parties the time and expense of adjudicating
issues that may be subsequently deemed moot. For example, there is no reason to put on evidence
regarding the extent of a worker's disability if the accident is deemed not to arise out of and in the
course of his employment (not compensable). If Claimant's I Respondent's proposition were valid
and the Commission's Order in this case is not final, it is arguable whether Defendants I Appellants
can be required to pay the medical benefits set forth in the Order before the remaining issues are
disposed of In this scenario, Claimant I Respondent would have to wait until after all others were
adjudicated before he could receive compensation. This type of outcome is contrary to Idaho Code §
72-708, which requires process and procedure under the workers' compensation law to be as
summary and simple as reasonably may be. LC. § 72-708 (2006).
Claimant I Respondent asserts that because Defendants I Appellants conceded the
Commission's May 17, 2011, Order did not dispose of all of the issues or potential issues regarding
Claimant's I Respondent's claim, it is not final. (Claimant I Respondent's Brief in Support of
Motion for Involuntary Dismissal, p. 7). Claimant's I Respondent's position is seemingly consistent
with this Court's decision in Kindred that Commission decisions are not final until all matters are
adjudicated. However, this Court has only applied this standard in cases where jurisdiction was
expressly retained, where the Commission's decision does not include language that it is final as to
the issues adjudicated, and/or the decision failed to provide a specific award of benefits. None of
these situations are present in this case. As discussed above, the Order in this case expressly states it
is final as to the matters adjudicated. In contrast to Law, the Commission in this case bifurcated the
issues to be adjudicated. Accordingly, in the event Claimant's I Respondent's injury was found not
compensable, there would be no need for a second hearing regarding the reserved issues.

2. The doctrine of judicial estoppel does not apply because 1) Defendants' I
Appellants' position on appeal is consistent with the position they took in the
bifurcated hearing before the Commission; and 2) Claimant's I Respondent's
position on this matter is speculative and lacks authority.
Defendants' I Appellants' position on appeal is consistent with the position they took in the
bifurcated hearing before the Commission. Defendants' I Appellants' Response to Request for
Calendaring and Motion for Bifurcation specifically requests bifurcation only because Claimant's I

DEFENDANTS'/APPELLANTS' BRJEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS'/APPELLANTS' RESPONSE TO
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Respondent's Request for Calendaring was premature as to the issues of permanent partial
impairment (PPI) and permanent partial disability (PPD). (Claimant I Respondent's Exhibit 4).
Claimant I Respondent had not yet reached medical stability or received an impairment rating, and
thus any attempt to litigate these issues would be untimely. Defendants' I Appellants' Response
expressly contemplates that a hearing on these issues may not be necessary. Accordingly, Claimant's

I Respondent's assumption that Defendants I Appellants knew there would be multiple hearings is
speculative and incorrect.
The purpose of bifurcating a case with numerous issues, some of which may ultimately be
deemed moot, is to avoid the time and expense of unnecessary litigation. As indicated above, the
Commission routinely allows bifurcation of claims in the interest of promoting sure and certain relief
for injured workers as contemplated LC. §72-201. A prompt appeal as a matter of right from
outcome determinative findings denoted as "final" by the Idaho Industrial Commission is consistent
with the statutory intent of the Idaho Workers' Compensation Law; specifically, LC.§§ 72-201 and
72-708.
Claimant I Respondent seeks dismissal, in part, to avoid unnecessary delay associated with
the potential for piecemeal litigation. Claimant's I Respondent's estimated time line, which he
describes as a "reasonable" appellate scenario is possible, but unlikely. Dismissal and remand of
Defendants' I Appellants' Appeal is more likely to extend litigation than shorten it because a
determination regarding compensability of the industrial injury is the threshold issue necessary to
trigger liability for all applicable benefits.

3. Defendants I Appellants did not seek a permissive appeal pursuant to I.A.R.
12(b) because the Industrial Commission's May 17, 2011, Order is final as to
the matters adjudicated. Defendants I Appellants therefore filed a timely
Notice of Appeal pursuant to I.A.R. ll(d).
Claimant's I Respondent's Motion for Involuntary Dismissal of Appeal pursuant to I.A.R.
32(a) is not appropriate given the facts of this case. Rule 32(a) contemplates involuntary dismissal
of an appeal with prejudice for failure to comply with the appellate rules. Defendants' I Appellants'
Notice of Appeal reflects it was made pursuant to I.A.R. 11 (d) and was therefore timely filed.
(Claimant I Respondent's Exhibit 12). In the event this Court agrees with Claimant's I Respondent's
assertion that the Commission's May 17, 2011, Order is not final as to the matters adjudicated, the
DEFENDANTS'/APPELLANTS' BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS'/APPELLANTS' RESPONSE TO
CLAL.\1Ai'ff!RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF APPEAL, PG. 5
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remedy is to remand this case to the Idaho Industrial Commission and not to dismiss the case with
prejudice. Idaho v. Maynard, 139 Idaho 876, 879, 88 P.3d 695, 698 (2004) (discussing how the
Supreme Court has the discretion to disregard an appellant's noncompliance with the appellate
rules); see also Jensen, 120 Idaho at 127, 823 P.2d at 161 (the Court dismissed the appeal without
prejudice and remanded to the Commission), Law, 121 Idaho at 128, 823 P.2d at 162 (the Court
dismissed the case without prejudice and remanded to the Commission), Kindred, 118 Idaho at 150,
795 P.2d at 312 (the Court remanded the case to the Commission for clarification of the award),

Reynolds, 113 Idaho at 970, 751 P.2d at 118 (the Court remanded to the Commission for further
proceedings consistent with its decision).

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 8th day of July, 2011.

SUSAN R. VELTMAN (ISB No. 7850)
GARDNER & BREEN
Post Office Box 2528
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 387-0881
Facsimile: (208) 387-3501
svel tman@gardnerlaw.net
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 8th day of July, 2011, I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing to be served upon:
Rick Kallas
Ellsworth, Kallas, Talboy & Defranco
1031 E. Park Blvd.
Boise, ID 83712
by depositing the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the above-named,
the last known address as set forth above.

SUSAN R. VELTMAN
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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho
RECEIVED

AUG O1 2011
MICHAELP. VAWTER,
Claimant-Respondent,

v.
UNITED PARCEL SERVICES, INC.,
Employer, LIBERTY INSURANCE
CORPORATION, Surety,
Respondents-Appellants,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

GARDNER 8t BREEN
ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL
Supreme CourtDocketNo. 38914-2011
IndustriaJ Commission No. 2010-114
Ref. No. 11-338

1. A MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL, an
AFFIDAVIT OF RICK D. KALLAS IN SUPPORT OF CLAIMANT/RESPONDENT'S
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL, and a
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE NOTICE
OF CROSS-APPEAL were filed by counsel for Respondent on June 27, 201 L
2. Additionally, CLAIMANT/RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR INVOLUNTARY
DISMISSAL OF APPEAL, an AFFIDAVIT OF RICK D. KALLAS IN SUPPORT OF
CLAIMANT/RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF
APPEAL, with attachments, and CLAIMANT/RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION FOR INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF APPEAL were filed by counsel
for Respondent on June 27, 2011 .
3. DEFENDANTS'/APPELLANTS' RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT/RESPONDENT'S
MOTION FOR INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF APPEAL, an AFFIDAVIT OF
SUSAN R. VELTMAN IN SUPPORT OF DEENDANTS'/APPELLANTS' RESPONSE
TO CLAIMANT/RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF
APPEAL and DEFENDANTS'/APPELLANTS' BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANTS' IAPPELLANTS' RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT/RESPONDENT'S
MOTION FOR INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF APPEAL were filed by counsel for
Appellant on July 8, 2011.
The Court is fully advised; ~erefore, good cause appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that CLAIMANT/RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR
INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF APPEAL be, and hereby is, GRANTED and this appeal is
DISMISSED.

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL-Docket No. 38914-2011

~=================================================================-
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DATED this

J 7t"day of July, 2011.
By Order of the Supreme Court

cc:

Counsel of Record
Industrial Commission Secretary

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL - Docket No. 38914-2011
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SUSAN R. VELTMAN (ISB No. 7850)
GARDNER & BREEN
1410 W. Washington - 83702
Post Office Box 2528
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 387-0881
Facsimile: (208) 387-3501
sveltman@gardnerlaw.net
Attorney for Appellants
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
MICHAEL VAWTER,
Claimant'Respondent,
v.
UNITED PARCEL SERVICES, INC.,
Employer,
and
LIBERTY INSURANCE CORP.
Surety,
Defendants/ Appellants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Supreme Court No. 38914
DEFENDANTS'/APPELLANTS'
MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION

Come now, Defendants I Appellants, and each of them, by and through their attorney of
record, Susan R. Veltman, pursuant to I.A.R. 32(c), and respectfully submit this Motion for
Clarification ("Motion") regarding the Court's July 27, 2011, Order.
1. On June 20, 2011, Defendants I Appellants filed a Notice of Appeal with the Idaho
Industrial Commission regarding its May 17, 2011, Findings of Pact, Conclusions of Law,
and Order entered in LC. Case No. 2010-000114.

DEFENDANTS'/APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION, PG. I
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2. On June 27, 2011, Claimant I Respondent filed a Motion for Involuntary Dismissal of
Appeal on multiple grounds.
3. On July 27, 2011, this Court granted Claimant's I Respondent's Motion for Involuntary
Dismissal and issued an Order Dismissing Appeal ("Order").
4. Defendants I Appellants seek clarification of the Court's July 27, 2011, Order because it
does not specify whether the dismissal is with or without prejudice, nor does it articulate
the grounds on which the case is dismissed.
5. Therefore, Defendants respectfully move this Court to clarify whether its Order is with or
without prejudice.
6. Additionally, in the event the Court dismissed the appeal on the ground that the Industrial
Commission's May 17, 2011, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order is not a
final decision, Defendants I Appellants request the Court's Order state such.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1st day of August, 2011.

SUSAN R. VELTMAN (ISB No. 7850)
GARDNER & BREEN
Post Office Box 2528
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 387-0881
Facsimile: (208) 387-3501
sveltman@gardnerlaw.net
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1st day of August, 2011, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing to be served upon:
Rick Kallas

DEFENDANTS'/APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION, PG. 2

Ellsworth, Kallas, Talboy & DeFranco
1031 E. Park Blvd.
Boise, ID 83712
by depositing the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the above-named,
the last known address as set forth above.

SUSAN R. VELTMAN
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In the Supreme Court of _the State of Idaho
MICHAELP. VAWTER, .
·· -c1aimant-Responaent~·

)
)
J-0-R:DER-DENYIMu ·MOTioo-FO~·

)

v.
UNITED PARCEL SERVICES, INC.,
Employer, LIBERTY INSURANCE
CORPORATION, Surety,

)
)
)
)

)

CLARJFICATION
Supreme Court Docket No. 38914-2011
Commission No. 2010-114

Industri~l

Ref. No. 11-380

)

- ---wRespondents-7\ppeHanrRtsc---.- An ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL was issued by this Court on July 27, 2011.
Thereafter, a MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION and AFFIDAVIT OF SUSAN R. VELTMAN IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION were filed by counsel for Appellants on August
1, 2011. Therefore, good cause appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Appellants' MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION be, and
hereby is, DENIED and counsel shall be referred to Jensen v. Pillsbury Co., 121 Idah9 127, 823
P.2d 161 (1992) and the Amended Notice of Telephone Conference and Notice of Hearing 1n
Industrial Commission No. 2010-000114, which was filed on June 7, 2011.

,c:,·1t

DATED this / ~ -- day of August, 2011.

cc:

Counsel of Record
Industrial Commission Secretary

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION -Docket No. 38914-2011
===F============================================~==================~
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ELLSWORTH, KALLAS & DEFRANCO, P.L.L.C.

Joseph L. Ellsworth
Rick D. Kallas *
John C. Defranco

ATTORNEYS AT LAW
1031 E. Park Blvd.
Boise, Idaho 83712

Phone: (208) 336-1843
Fax: (208) 345-8945

Licensed in Idaho and Oregon

August 9, 2011
Via Facsimile & U.S. Mail

AUG 10 2011

(208) 387-3501

Susan Veltman
Gardner & Breen Law Offices
P.O. Box 2528
Boise, Idaho 83701
Re:

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

Claimant's Request For Reimbursement of Mileage Expenses
Claimant's Request For Reimbursement of Per Diem Expenses
Claimant's Request For Reimbursement of Lodging Expenses
Claimant's Request For Payment of Past Denied Medical Benefits
Claimant's Request For Payment of PPI Benefits

Vawter v. UPS and Liberty Ins. Co1p.
I.C. No. 2010-000114

Dear Ms. Veltman:
(A)

Employer I Surety's Obligation To Reimburse Claimant For Medical Care Travel
Expenses

Idaho Code §72-432(13) requires employer I surety to reimburse the injured worker for travel expenses that are
incurred in order to obtain accident I injury related medical care at the mileage rate allowed by the state board of
examiners for state employees. Since 10.1.09, the mileage reimbursement rate has been 45.5 cents per mile (See
http://www.sco. idaho .gov/web/sbe/sbeweb. nsf/pages/trv 1po [icy .htm#Appendix%20%22A %22 ).
Submitted herewith as Exhibit A is a spreadsheet which itemizes all of Mr. Vawter's medical care related travel
expenses. Based on the total mileage reflected in Exhibit A, employer I surety have a duty to reimburse Mr.
Vawter $1,526.71 in medical care travel expenses. Please request a check from UPS in that amount and send it
directly to me on Mr. Vawter's behalf.
(B)

Employer I Surety's Obligation To Reimburse Claimant For Per Diem and Lodging Expenses

The Industrial Commission has broadly construed Idaho Code §72-432(13) to require employer I surety to
reimburse the i1~ured worker and his medically necessary driver for meals (per diem) in those cases where it is

Vawter/ 8.9.11 Request For Reimbursement of Mileage I Per Diem I Lodging Expenses and Request For Payment of
Supplemental Medical Expenses and PPI Benefits
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medically necessary for the injured worker to have a driver transport him to his medical appointments. The
Industrial Commission has also required employer I surety to reimburse the injured worker for lodging where an
overnight stay is required to attend medical appointments:
To the contrary, where travel expenses have been awarded under Idaho Code § 72432(12), the Commission has consistently held that subsistence, as well as
transportation costs, are included. See, Anderson v. Idaho State Senate, 98 IWCD
11029 (June, 1998); Hoye v. Daw Forest Products, Inc., 92 IWCD 5311 (September
1992) ....
The Referee finds that necessary travel expenses include transportation at the allowed
rate, together with lodging and per diem, and are medical services governed by Idaho
Code § 72-432. In this case, those necessary travel expenses also include the lodging
and per diem for Claimant's wife who must transport Claimant to and from Boise, and
who is entitled to food and lodging during such travel and while Claimant is in the
hospital. Cal 2004, IC 97-006770 and 98-018735 (Filed: January 16, 2004).
Reimbursement for meals and lodging is governed by the allowable rates set by the
state board of examiners for state employee travel. Only the injured worker is entitled
to reimbursement for per diem, unless the record establishes that the worker requires a
driver. In the case at bar, there is no evidence that Claimant required a driver. Hibbert
v. Patrica D. Reynolds/Reyson Custom Stone and Tile, LC. 2008-019040 (Filed:
8.24.10).
Based on my review of the receipts submitted herewith as Exhibit B, the per diem expenses listed below are
compensable and must be reimbursed by UPS. Therefore, please ask UPS to issue a per diem reimbursement
check in the amount of $264.75 and send it directly to me on Mr. Vawter's behalf. (Note: those receipts which
contain an "X" through them are not compensable and need not be reimbursed by UPS).

Date

Medical I Legal Purpose

Per Diem Amount

1.11.10
1.19.10
1.22.10
5.27.10
6.3.10
6.10.10
7.14.10
7.24.10
8.19.10
10.14.10
11.23.10

MRI
Surgery
Surgery
Dr. Frizzell
Dr. Binegar
Deposition
Dr. Montalbano
Surgery No. 2
Dr. Frizzell
Dr. Frizzell
Dr. Frizzell

$30.00 (*)
$30.00 (*)
$10.97
$30.00 (*)
$30.00 (*)
$22.24
$30.00 (*)
$6.54
$30.00 (*)
$15.00
$30.00 (*)

Subtotal

$264.75
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When Mr. Vawter had to undergo his lumbar fusion surgery in July of 2010, his wife was required to stay in a
hotel and then drive him home from the hospital. Therefore, we must request the following lodging
reimbursement from UPS.

7.21.10- 7.23.10

Purpose of Lodf?:ing

Amount

Surgery No. 2

$200.01

The total amount of compensable mileage ($1,526.71), per diem ($264.75) and lodging ($200.01) expenses that
the Defendants are liable to reimburse Mr. Vawter for= $1,991.47. If would be more convenient for UPS to
issue a single check, please request a check in the amount of $1,991.47 and send it directly to me on Mr.
Vawter's behalf.

(C)

Request For Payment of Past Denied Medical Benefits Incurred by Claimant In Connection With
his 12.18.09 Industrial Accident But Not Included in 5.17.11 Decision

Based on Idaho Code §72-432 and the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Neel v. Western Construction, 147
Idaho 146, 206 P.3d 852 (2009), the Defendants are liable for the direct payment to Claimant of 100% of the
invoiced amount of all past medical benefits incurred by Claimant in connection with his 12.18.09 industrial
accident I injury from the date of the Claimant's 12.18.09 industrial accident to the date when the Industrial
Commission deemed this claim compensable on 5.17.11.
Submitted herewith as Exhibit C please fmd $24,627.85 in accident related medical expenses that were incurred
by Claimant in connection with his 12.18.09 industrial accident but not covered by the Industrial Commission's
5.17.11 Order. Based on the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Neel, the Defendants are liable for 100% of the
invoiced amount of these accident related medical expenses. Please send me a check in the amount of
$24,627.85 to pay Claimant 100% of the invoiced amount of these medical expenses as required by the Idaho
Supreme Cou1i's holding in Neel.
(Note: These expenses were extracted from a Subrogation Ledger that we received from the Oregon Teamster
Employers Trust; i.e., the health insurance entity that paid Mr. Vawter's denied past medical bills).
(D)

Request For Payment of Retroactive and Continuing PPI Benefits

Mr. Vawter's attending neurological surgeon, R. Tyler Frizzell, M.D., is the only physician in this case who has
issued PPI ratings for Mr. Vawter's 12.18.09 industrial low back injury. On 12.6.10, Dr. Frizzell issued Mr.
Vawter a 20% whole person PPI rating. On 3.10.11, Dr. Frizzell reduced Mr. Vawter's 20% PPI rating to 19%
and then appo1iioned 7% of that rating to a preexisting lumbar spine condition and 12% to Mr. Vawter's
12.18.09 industrial accident.
On 6.27.11, Dr. Frizzell reiterated his 19% whole person PPI rating and reiterated his apportionment opinion
that 7% should be appo1iioned to Mr. Vawter's preexisting lumbar spine condition and 12% should be
apportioned to Mr. Vawter's 12.18.09 industrial accident. A 12% whole person PPI rating has a monetary value
of$20,988.00, calculated as follows:
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12% X 500 weeks= 60 weeks X 2009 PPI rate of$349.80 = $20,988.00
Since Dr. Frizzell issued his original 20% PPI rating in December of 2010, 8 regular PPI checks should have
been paid to Mr. Vawter. Therefore, please request that UPS issue a retroactive PPI check in the amount of
$11,193 .60 (i.e., $349.80 per week X 4 weeks= $1,399.20 per month X 8 months= $11,193.60).
After UPS brings Mr. Vawter's PPI benefits current by issuing a retroactive check for 8 months in the amount of
$11,193.60, please ask them to continue making regular PPI payments each month until Mr. Vawter's PPI rating
has been paid in full.
Summary of Benefits Requested

I.
2.
3.
4.

5.

Mileage Reimbursement
Per Diem
Lodging
Accident Related Medical Expenses
8 months of PPI Benefits

$1,526.71
$264.75
$200.01
$24,627.85
$11.193.60

Total Benefits Requested:

$37,812.92

Please pay these benefits directly to me on Mr. Vawter's behalf within 7 days from the date hereon. If UPS will
not pay these accident related benefits, please send me a letter within 7 days confirming that UPS will not pay
these benefits. Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.

Very truly yours,

lt_~,'1,~
Rick D. Kallas

Enclosures I Attachments
CC:

Mike Vawter

Vawter I 8.9 .I I Request F01· Reimbursement of Mileage I Per Diem /Lodging Expenses and Request For Payment of
Supplemental Medical Expenses and PPI Benefits

Page 4

Exhibit A
lf&

REIMBURSEMENT FOR HEALTH CARE TRAVEL EXPENSES
Claimant:
Address:

GB Claim#:

Michael P. Vawter
13005 Leland Drive
Donnelly, Idaho 83615
011645-211828-WC-01

Name of Medical Provider

Date of Service

Total Mileage

(a4 45.5 cents f!er mile

1.

McCall Memorial Hospital
1000 State Street
McCall, Idaho 83638

12.28.09

36.18 -15 = 21.18 miles

$9.64

2.

IMl
927 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702

01.11.10

188.74-15=173.74 miles

$79.05

07.01.10

188.74-15=173.74 miles

$79.05

06.17.10

188.62 - 15 = 173.62 miles

$79.00

02.01.11

188.62-15==173.62 miles

$79.00

04.21.11

188.62 - 15 = 173.62 miles

$79.00

07.21.11

188.62 - 15 = 173.62 miles

$79.00

01.19.10

188.92-15=173.92 miles

$79.13

02.23.10

188.92-15=173.92 miles

$79.13

07.21.l 0

188.92-15=173.92 miles

$79.13

08.19.10

188.92-15=173.92 miles

$79.13

10.14.10

188.92-15=173.92 miles

$79.13

1I.23.10

188.92 - 15 = 173.92 miles

$79.13

3.

4.

R. Tyler Frizzell, MD.
222 N. 2nd Street, Ste. 307
Boise, Idaho 83702

St. Luke's R.i\1C
190 E. Bannock St.
Boise, Idaho 83702

5.

ID Physical Medicine &
Rehab
600 N. Robbins Rd.
Boise, Idaho 83702

03.03.10

188.52- 15 = 173.52 miles

$78.95

6.

McCall Physical Therapy
305 E. Park Street, Ste. 2
McCall, Idaho 83638

03.08.10

34.8 - 15 = 19.8 miles

$9.01

03.11.10

34.8 - 15 = 19.8 miles

$9.01

03.16.10

34.8 - 15 = 19.8 miles

$9.01

Vawter I Reimbursement for Health Care Travel Expenses
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03.18.10

34.8-15=19.8 miles

$9.01

03.23.10

34.8 - 15 = 19.8 miles

$9.01

03.25.10

34.8 - 15=19.8 miles

$9.01

03.29.10

34.8 - 15 = 19.8 miles

$9.01

04.01.10

34.8 - 15 = 19.8 miles

$9.01

08.23.10

34.8 - 15 = 19.8 miles

$9.01

08.25.10

34.8 - 15 = 19.8 miles

$9.01

08.30.10

34.8 - 15 = 19.8 miles

$9.01

09.01.10

34.8 - 15 = 19.8 miles

$9.01

09.14.10

34.8 - 15 = 19.8 miles

$9.01

09.20.10

34.8 - 15 = 19.8 miles

$9.01

09.22.l 0

34.8 - 15 = 19.8 miles

$9.01

09.27.10

34.8 -15

= 19.8 miles

$9.01

09.29.10

34.8 - 15 = 19.8 miles

$9.01

10.07.10

34.8 - 15 = 19.8 miles

$9.01

10.18.10

34.8 -15 = 19.8 miles

$9.01

10.20.10

34.8 - 15 = 19.8 miles

$9.01

10.25.10

34.8 - 15 = 19.8 miles

$9.01

10.28.10

34.8

15 = 19.8 miles

$9.01

11.01.10

34.8 -15 = 19.8 miles

$9.01

11.03.10

34.8 -15 = 19.8 miles

$9.01

11.04.l 0

34.8-15=19.8 miles

$9.01

11.08.10

34.8 - 15 = 19.8 miles

$9.01

11.10.10

34.8 - 15 = 19.8 miles

$9.01

11.22.10

34.8 - 15 = 19.8 miles

$9.01
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Page2

7.

8.

William Binegar, M.D.
301 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Paul J. Montalbano, M.D.
6140 W. Curtisian, Ste. 400
Boise, Idaho 83704

05.27.I 0

189.72-15=174.72 miles

$79.50

06.03.10

189.72-15=174.72 miles

$79.50

07.14.10

186.34 - 15 = 171.34 miles

$77.96

Total Mileage
Reimbursement:

$1,526.71
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Exhibit 8
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COURTYARD'

..\\amott

21Jul10
21Jul10
22Jul10
22Jul10
23Jul10
23Jul10
24Jul10

222 S. Broadway Ave
Boise, Id 83702
T 208.331.2700

Courtyard by Marriott
Boise Downtown

Room Charge
Room Tax
Room Charge
Room Tax
Room Charge
Room Tax
Visa
Card#: VIXXXXXXXXXXXX2118!X',()()(
Amount: 200.01 Auth: 025211 Signature on File
This card was electronically swiped on 21Ju/10

59.00
7.67
59.00
7.67
59.00
7.67

Balance:

0.00

200.01

Marriott Rewards Account # XXXXX9072. Your Marriott Rewards points/miles earned on your room rate will be
credited to your account. For account activity: 801-468-4000 or MarrlottRewards.com.
Thank you for slaying with us at the Courtyard by Marriott Boise Downtown.
Get all your hotel bills by email by updating your Marriott Rewards Preferences. Or, ask the Front Desk to email your
· bill for this stay. See "Internet Privacy Statement" on Marriott.com.
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Exhibit C

Summar~ of Michael P. Vawter's Denied Past Medical ExQenses
Vawter v. UPS & Liberty Insurance Corp.

I.C. No.
Medical Provider

1)

2)

3)

2010~00114

Dates of Service Total Amt. of Bill

R. Tyler Frizzell, M.D.
R. Tyler Frizzell, M.D.

11/23/10
04/21/11

St. Luke's RMC
St. Luke's RMC

10/14/10
11/23/10

~96.05

$192.10
$93.00
~93.00

$186.00

, Boise Radiology Group
Boise Radiology Group

Physical
Physical
Physical
Physical
Physical
Physical
Physical
Physical
Physical
Physical
Physical
Physical
Physical
Physical
Physical

$96.05

Therapy
Therapy
Therapy
Therapy
Therapy
Therapy
Therapy
Therapy
Therapy
Therapy
Therapy
Therapy
Therapy
Therapy
Therapy

10/14/10
11/23/10

$52.00
~52.00

$104.00
09/20/10
09/22/10
09/27/10
09/29/10
10/07/10
10/18/10
10/20/10
10/25/10
10/28/10
11/01/10
11/03/10
11/04/10
11/08/10
11/10/10
11/22/10

4)

McCall
McCall
McCall
McCall
McCall
McCall
McCall
McCall
McCall
McCall
McCall
McCall
McCall
McCall
McCall

5)

Michael Tullis, M.D.

07/21/10

6)

Orthofix, inc.

07/30/10

7)

David Hall, M.D.

07/30/10

$99.00
$99.00
$99.00
$132.00
$132.00
$132.00
$132.00
$132.00
$132.00
$99.00
$165.00
$165.00
$132.00
$99.00
$99.00
$1,848.00
~171232.75

$17,232.75
~4(995.00

$4,995.00
~70.00

$70.00

TOTAL:

$24,627.85

hourly, weekly or monthly rate of pay.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 15: The Claimant is still employed by UPS but is cumntly in a

period ofrecovery from his 12.18.09 industrial accident /injury and I or his 1.20.10 lumbar spine surgery and
not receiving a paycheck from UPS. The Claimant has earned less than $1 ,000.00 from 2 snow removaljobs
up Ulltil 1.18.10.
INTERROGATORY NO. 16: If you have applied for unemployment insurance compensation, social

secmity disability or any other type of disability payment since the date of injury, identify the name and
address of each business or governmental agency from whom benefits have been sought, the dates when you
filed application for benefits and the status of your application (approved, denied, under appeal, pending,

etc.). If benefits have been received, indicate the dates and amounts paid.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY N0.16: On or about 1.11.10, the Claimant filed a Statement of

Disability Claim with The Oregon Teamster Employers Trust Clo William C. Earhatt Co., Inc. located at P.O.
Box 4148 Portland, OR 97208. As of 3.16.10, the Claimant had received 10 weeks of disability income
benefits in the total amount of $2,770.52. The Claimant is no longer receiving these short-terms disability
benefits.
INTERROGATORY NO. 17: What"is the basis for your contention that the location where your injury

occurred constituted the premises of Employer and/or should be deemed as such?
ANSWER TO INTER R 0 GATORY NO. 17: The Claimant has been staiting and ending each work day at

the premises of Arnold Aviation, located at the airport in Cascade, Idaho for over 12 years. The Claimant
parks his UPS Package Car on the premises and keeps his Diad inside the building at Arnold Aviation. The
Claimant has been using the Arnold Aviation premises off and on for over 12 years. The Claimant lias filed
prior worker's compensation claims that were accepted by employer and described the locations of his work

Vawter/ Claimant's Answers & Objections to Dfts. First Set ofinterrogatorics

Page8

I

l 3I

Rick D. Kallas
ISB # 3872
Ellsworth, Kallas & Defranco, P.L.L.C.
1031 E. Park Blvd.
Boise, Idaho 83712
Telephone: (208) 336-1843
Fax: (208) 345-8945
E-Mail: rdk@greyhawklaw.com

Attorneys for Claimant I Respondent

BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MICHAELP. VAWTER,
Claimant I Respondent ,

vs.
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE,

)
)
)

Supreme Court No. 38914

)
)
)
)
)
)

CLAIMANT I RESPONDENT'S
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR INVOLUNTARY
DISMISSAL OF APPEAL

and,

)

LIBERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION,

)
)
)

)

Defendants I Appellants.

(A)

INTRODUCTION

The Claimant I Respondent (i.e., Claimant) is asking the Idaho Supreme Court to dismiss
the Defendants I Appellants (i.e., Defendants) Interlocutory Appeal because:

Claimant I Respondent's Briefin Support of Motion For Involuntary Dismissal of Appeal
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(1)

The Industrial Commission's May 17, 2011 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order was not a final Order that fully and finally disposed of all of the Claimant's claims
against the Defendants. Therefore, the Defendants I Appellants are not entitled to file an
appeal as a matter of right pursuant to LA.R. 11(d);

(2)

The Defendants I Appellants filed a Motion To Bifurcate with the Industrial Commission on
05.12.2010 and specifically requested that the Indushial Commission bifurcate the issues in
this case so that they would have to be heard and decided at 2 separate hearings. Therefore,
the doctrine of judicial estoppel should be applied to prevent the Defendants I Appellants
from taking an Interlocutory Appeal of the Industrial Commission's 05.17.2011 Order; and,

(3)

Defendants I Appellants have waived their right to file a permissive appeal by failing to file
a Motion For Permission To Appeal with the Industrial Commission within 14 days after the
Industrial Commission entered its May 17, 2011 interlocutory Order as required by I.A.R.
12(b).

(B)-

BACKGROUND FACTS

The Claimant filed his Complaint with the Industrial Commission on 3. 5.2010 and listed the
following disputed issues to be heard and decided by the Industrial Commission:
(1)
(2)
(3)

(4)

(5)
(6)
(7)

(8)

Did the Claimant's 12.18.09 bending over to tie his work I snow boots accident arise out
of and in the course of his employment with UPS?
Did the Claimant's 12.18.09 industrial accident cause a new injury to his low back?
Did the Claimant's 12.18.09 industrial accident aggravate, accelerate, light-up, combine
with or contribute to a pre-existing back condition and result in the need for medical
treatment?
Are the Defendants liable for medical benefits as required by the Claimant's attending
physician or needed immediately after the Claimant's 12.18.09 industrial accident I injury
and a reasonable time thereafter pursuant to Idaho Code§ 72-432?
Are the Defendants liable for the payment of total temporary disability (TTD) and I or
temporary paiiial disability (TPD) benefits to the Claimant during his period ofrecovery?
Did the Claimant's 12.18.09 industrial accident cause the Claimant to suffer any
permanent physical impairment (PPI) and, if so, to what extent?
Did Claimant suffer any disability in excess of his physical impairment (PPD >PPI) as
the result of his 12.18.09 industrial accident I injury, including whether the Claimant is
totally and permanently disabled under the 100% method or the odd-lot doctrine?
Are the Defendants liable for the payment of attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code §72804? (See Exhibit 1 to Affidavit of Rick D. Kallas).

Claimant/ Respondent's Brief In Support ofMotion For Involuntary Dismissal of Appeal
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. The Claimanfs 05.03.2010 Request For Calendaring listed the following disputed issues to
be heard and decided by the Industrial Commission:
(1)
(2)

(3)

(4)
(5)
(6)

(7)

Did the Claimanfs 12.18.09 bending over to tie his work I snow boots accident arise out
of and in the course of his employment with UPS?
Did the Claimant's 12.18.09 industrial accident either cause a new injury or aggravate,
accelerate, light-up, coml;>ine with or contribute to a pre-existing back condition and
result in the need for medical treatment?
Are the Defendants liable for medical benefits as required by the Claimant's attending
physician or needed immediately after the Claimant's 12.18.09 industrial accident I injury
and a reasonable time thereafter pursuant to Idaho Code§ 72-432?
Are the Defendants liable for the payment of total temporary disability (TTD) and I or
temporary partial disability (TPD) benefits to the Claimant during his period of recovery?
Did the Claimant's 12.18.09 industrial accident cause the Claimant to suffer any
permanent physical impairment (PPI) and, if so, to what extent?
Did the Claimant suffer any disability in excess of his physical impairment (PPD >PPI)
as the result of his 12.18.09 industrial accident I injury, including whether the Claimant is
totally and permanently disabled under the 100% method or the odd-lot doctrine?
Are the Defendants liable for the payment of attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code §72804? (See Exhibit 3 to Affidavit ofRickD. Kallas).
On 05.12.10, the Defendants filed a Motion To Bifurcate the issues and listed the following

issues to be heard and decided at the 09.28.2010 Hearing:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Whether Claimant's injury was the result of an accident arising out of and in the course of
employment;
Whether Claimant's condition is due in whole or in part to a pre-existing injury or disease
or cause not work-related;
Whether Claimant is entitled to reasonable and necessary medical care as provided for by
Idaho Code§ 72-432, and the extent thereof;
Whether Claimant is entitled to temporary partial and/or temporary total disability
(TPD/TTD) benefits, and the extent thereof; and
Whether Claimant is entitled to attorney fees due to Employer/Surety's unreasonable
denial of compensation as provided for by Idaho Code § 72-804 (See Exhibit 4 to
Affidavit of Rick D. Kallas).
In response to the Defendants' Motion to Bifurcate, the Industrial Commission entered a

NOTICE OF HEARING on 07.20.2010 which bifurcated the issues and listed the following
Claimant I Respondent's Brief In Support of Motion For Involuntary Dismissal of Appeal
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disputed issues to be heard and decided at the 09.28.2010 Hearing:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Whether Claimant suffered a personal injury arising out of and in the course of
employment;
Whether Claimant1s injury was the result of an accident arising out of and in the course of
employment;
Whether Claimant is entitled to reasonable and necessary medical care as provided for by
Idaho Code § 72-432, and the extent thereof;
Whether Claimant is entitled to temporary partial and I or temporary total disability
(TPD/TTD) benefits, and the extent thereof;
Whether Claimant is entitled to attorney fees due to Employer I Surety's unreasonable
denial of compensation as provided for by Idaho Code § 72-804 (See Exhibit 6 to
Affidavit of Rick D. Kallas).
The bifurcated hearing was held on 09.28.2010. After the Hearing, the Industrial

Commission entered its 05.17.2011 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order which only
decided the following issues:

1.
2.

3.
4.
5.

. Claimant suffered an accident arising in the course of and out of his employment causing
an injury on December 18,2009.
Claimant is awarded TTD benefits from December 28, 2009 through December 6, 2010
(Note: The Industrial Commission's Order did not state the amount of the Defendants'
liability for the payment of total temporary disability benefits).
Claimant is awarded medical benefits in the amount of $149,033.68.
Claimant is not entitled to an award of attorney fees.
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-718, this decision is final and conclusive as to all matters
adjudicated. (See Exhibit 7 to Affidavit of Rick D. Kallas).
Since the Industrial Commission's 05.17.2011 decision did not decide all of the disputed

issues or resolve all of the Claimant's claims against the Defendants,, the Claimant filed a
Request For Calendaring with the Commission on 05.19.2011. In his

2nd

2nd

Request For Calendaring,

the Claimant listed the following remaining issues which still need to be heard and decided by the
Industrial Commission:
(1)

What is the extent of the Claimant's permanent physical impairment (PPI) caused by the

Claimant I Respondent's Brief In Support of Motion For Involuntary Dismissal of Appeal
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subject 12.18 .09 industrial accident I injury?
(2)

What is the extent of the Claimant's permanent disability in excess of his physical
impairment (PPD >PPI) caused by the subject 12.18.09 industrial accident I injury,
including whether the Claimant is totally and pennanently disabled under the 100%
method and I or the odd-lot doctrine? (See Exhibit 8 to Affidavit of Rick D. Kallas)
The Industrial Commission retained jurisdiction over the unresolved issues in this case and

issued its 06.07.2011 AMENDED NOTICE OF TELEPHONE CONFERENCE AND NOTICE OF
HEARING which listed the following unresolved issues to be heard and decided at the final hearing
which is set for 10.25.2011:
1.

The extent and degree of Claimant's entitlement to pennanent partial impairment (PPI);

2.

The extent and degree of Claimant's entitlement to permanent partial disability (PPD) in
excess of PPI, including whether or not Claimant is a totally and permanently disabled
under the odd-lot doctrine;

3.

Whether apportionment under Idaho Code § 72-406, is appropriate (See Exhibit 11 to
Affidavit of Rick D. Kallas).
(C)

(1)

ARGUMENT

THE DEFENDANTS INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED
BECAUSE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S 5.17.2011 ORDER WAS NOT A
FINAL AND APPEALABLE ORDER THAT DISPOSED OF ALL OF THE
CLAIMANT'S CLAIMS AS REQUIRED BY I.A.R. ll(d)
The Industrial Commission's 5.17.2011 Interlocutory Order only decided the following

issues:
1.

The arise out of employment issue;

2.

The Defendants' liability for past denied medical benefits issue;

3.

The Defondants' liability for past denied temporary disability benefits issue; and,

Claimant J Respondent's Brief In Support of Motion For Involuntary Dismissal of Appeal
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4.

The Defendants' liability for attorney's fees issue. (See Exhibit 7 to Affidavit of Rick D.
Kallas).
.
By entering its 06.07.2011 AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARlNG, the Industrial

Commission has explicitly retained jurisdiction over the remaining undecided issues and has
scheduled a final Hearing on October 25, 2011 to decide the following unresolved issues:
1.

The extent and degree of Claimant's entitlement to permanent partial impairment (PPI);

2.

The extent and degree of Claimant's entitlement to permanent partial disability (PPD) in
excess of PPI, including whether or not Claimant is a totally and permanently disabled
under the odd-lot doctrine; and,

3.

Whether apportionment under Idaho Code § 72-406, is appropriate (See Exhibit 11 to
Affidavit of Rick D. Kallas)
The procedural posture of this case is virtually identical to the case of Law v. Omark

Industries, 121 Idaho 128, 832 P.2d 162 (1992). In Law, Employer I Surety denied liability for

the surgery requested by Claimant. The Claimant filed an Application For Hearing before the
Industrial Commission seeking compensation for medical benefits and attorney's fees, but not
for permanent physical impairment and permanent disability benefits. After the Hearing, the
Industrial Commission entered an Order awarding the Claimant medical benefits. Employer I
Surety appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the Employer I Surety's appeal because there
was no final Order by the Industrial Commission which resolved the impairment and disability
issues as required by I.AR. ll(d):
This is a workers' compensation case. The issue we find dispositive is the
lack of a final decision or order of the Industrial Commission. Therefore,
we dismiss the appeal.
Stanley "Tex" Law was injured while working for Omark Industries· in
Claimant I Respondent's Brief In Support of Motion For Involuntary Dismissal of Appeal
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1985. In 1989, Law received surgery for a condition he alleged was the
result of the 1985 injury. Om.ark and its surety denied payment for the
surgery. Law applied for a hearing before the Commission, seeking
compensation for medical treatment and attorney fees, but not for
impairment and disability benefits.
Following a hearing, the Commission found that the question of
impairment and disability benefits was not properly brought before the
Commission at that time because the issue was not presented in the
application for hearing or argued during the hearing, and because Law's
condition had not stabilized. The Commission awarded Law reasonable
medical benefits relating to the 1985 accident, including benefits for the
operation performed in 1989. The Commission did not award attorney
fees. Om.ark and its surety appealed.
As we have ruled in Jensen v. Pillsbury Co., 121 Idaho 127, 823 P.2d 161
(1992) released this same day, there is no final order by the Commission
as is required by I.A.R. ll(d). Therefore, we dismiss the appeal, without
prejudice and without costs, and remand the case to the Commission. Law,
supra, at 121 Idaho 128.
The Defendants I Appellants have already conceded in their Notice of Appeal that "the
appealed order did not adjudicate all of the issues or potential issues involved in Respondent's
workers' [sic] [worker's] compensation claim" (Seep. 2 of Exhibit 12 to Affidavit of Rick D.
Kallas). The Defendants' concession that the Commission's 5.17.2011 Order is an Interlocutory
Order that did not dispose of all of the issues in this case should be dispositive and result in the
immediate dismissal of the Defendants' appeal pursuant to I.AR. 1 l(d).
After conceding that the Commission's 05.17.2011 Interlocutory Order did not resolve all
of the disputed issues in the case, the Defendants cited Jensen v. Pillsbury Co, 121 Idaho 127,
823 P. 2d 161 (1992) for the proposition that Commission's 05.17.2011 Order must be treated as
a fmal and appealable Order because the Commission did not "explicitly state" in its Order that it

Claimant I Respondent's Brief In Support of Motion For Involuntary Dismissal of Appeal
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was retaining jurisdiction to decide the remaining issues in this case.
The Defendants have placed form over substance and misinterpreted this Court's holding
in Jensen. This Court did not hold in Jensen that all Orders issued by the Industrial Commission
must automatically be treated as final Orders that are subject to an appeal as a matter of right
under I.A.R. 11 (d) unless the Industrial Commission "explicitly states" in the Order that it is
retaining jurisdiction to decide the unresolved issues in the case.

As a practical matter, there is no difference between the Commission explicitly stating
that it has retained jurisdiction versus the Commission taking definitive action which confirms
that it has already retained jurisdiction by scheduling the remaining unresolved issues of
impairment and disability for determination at a final Hearing (See Exhibit 11). The legal effect
is the same and proves that an appeal as a matter of right pursuant to I.AR. 11 (d) is premature at
this time because the Commission has retained jurisdiction in this case in order to resolve the
remaining disputed issues which have never been resolved by a final Order.
The Defendants' argument that Jensen requires the Commission to "explicitly state" that

it has retained jurisdiction must be rejected based on this Court's holding in Law. The Law
Court cited Jensen when it dismissed the Employer I Surety's Interlocutory Appeal even though
the Commission in Law did not explicitly state that it was retaining jurisdiction to decide the
remaining unresolved issues. The reason that the Law Court did not require the Commission to
explicitly state that it had retained jurisdiction is because the ultimate issues of impairment and
disability were not listed in the Request For Calendaring (Notice of Hearing) and were not
decided by the Commission at the Hearing. That is exactly the situation in this case.
Claimant I Respondent's Brief In Support of Motion For Involuntary Dismissal of Appeal
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The Defendants in this case filed a Motion To Bifurcate with the Industrial Commission
on 05.12.2010 which specifically asked the Industrial Commission to remove the issues of
impairment and disability from consideration at the 09.28.2010 Hearing.

Since the

Commission's 05.17.2011 Interlocutory Order did not finally dispose of all of the Claimant's
claims, it cannot be considered a final decision subject to appeal as a matter of right under I.AR.
ll(d):
Idaho Appellate Rule 11 (d) provides that an appeal can be taken as a
matter of right 11 [f]rom any final decision or order of the Industrial
Commission or from any final decision or order upon rehearing or
reconsideration by the administrative agency." This Court has held that a
decision or order that does not ":finally dispose of all of the claimant's
claims would not be a final decision subject to appeal pursuant to
I.A.R.ll(d) .... 11 Kindred v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 118 Idaho 147, 149,
795 P.2d 309, 311 (1990). The Commission has not resolved all of the
issues regarding Blachly's liability. Because issues necessary for a "final
order" remain unresolved, this case does not present an appeal as a matter
of right under I.A.R. ll(d). Jensen v. Pillsbury Co., 121 Idaho 127, 823
P.2d 161 (1992). We therefore decline to rule on the issues presented by
the parties and order that this appeal is dismissed, without prejudice and
without costs, and the cause remanded to the Commission. State Dept. of
Employment v. Blachly, 126 Idaho 121, 122, 879 P.2d 29, 30 (1994).
The Claimant in this case respectfully requests that this Court apply its holdings in
Kindred v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 118 Idaho 147, 795 P.2d 309 (1990); Jensen v. Pillsbury
Co., 121 Idaho 127, 823 P. 2d 161 (1992); Law v. Omark Industries, 121 Idaho 128, 832 P.2d

162 (1992) and State Dept. of Employment v. Blachly, 126 Idaho 121, 122, 879 P.2d 29, 30
(1994) and dismiss the Defendants' Interlocutory Appeal because the Commission's 05.17.2011
Interlocutory Order does not finally dispose of all of the Claimant's claims and therefore cannot
be considered a final decision subject to appeal as a matter of right as required by I.AR. 11 (d).
Claimant I Respondent's Brief In Support of Motion For Involuntary Dismissal of Appeal
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(2)

THE DEFENDANTS SHOULD BE JUDICIALY ESTOPPED FROM TAKING AN
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S MAY 17,
2011 ORDER WHICH DECIDED LESS THAN ALL OF THE ISSUES IN THIS
CASE BECAUSE THE DEFENDANTS FILED A MOTION TO BIFURCATE THE
ISSUES AND ASKED THE COMMISSION TO DECIDE LESS THAN ALL OF
THE ISSUES AT THE FIRST HEARJNG
After the Claim.ant filed his Request For Calendaring on 05.03.2010, the Defendants filed

their 05.12.2010 Motion to Bifurcate and asked the Commission to decide less than all of the issues
in this case at the 09.28.2010 Hearing (See Exhibit 4 to Affidavit of Rick D. Kallas). When the
Defendants filed their Motion To Bifurcate, they knew that a subsequent hearing would be required
in order to resolve all of the Claim.ant's remaining claims against the Defendants including, but not
limited to, the extent of his permanent physical impairment and the extent of his permanent
disability in excess of impairment (See pp. 1-2 of Exhibit 4).
The Claimant respectfully requests that the Court apply the doctrine of judicial estoppel to
prevent the Defendants from now taking an Interlocutory Appeal of the Industrial Commission's
May 17, 2011 decision because the Defendants asked the Commission to bifurcate the issues and
hold at least 2 Hearings in this case:
Judicial estoppel precludes a party from gaining an advantage by taking
one position, and then seeking a second advantage by taking an
incompatible position. Sword v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242, 252, 92 P.3d 492,
502 (2004) ....
The Idaho Court of Appeal_s :further explained the doctrine as follows:
Essentially, this doctrine prevents a party from assuming a position in one
proceeding and then taldng an inconsistent position in a subsequent
proceeding. There are very important policies underlying the judicial
estoppel doctrine. One purpose of the doctrine is to protect the integrity of
the judicial system, by protecting the orderly administration of justice and

Claimant I Respondent's Briefin Support of Motion For Involuntary Dismissal of Appeal
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having regard for the dignity of judicial proceedings. The doctrine is also
intended to prevent parties from playing fast and loose with the courts.
Robertson Supply, 131 Idaho at 101, 952 P.2d at 916 (internal citations
omitted). A & J Const. Co., Inc. v. Wood, 141 Idaho 682, 684 - 685, 116
P.3d 12, 14-15 (2005).
By asking the Industrial Commission to bifurcate the issues for Hearing, the Defendants
knew that the Industrial Commission's 05.17.2011 Interlocutory Order would not fmally decide all
of the unresolved issues in this case and that a subsequent Hearing would be required in order to
finally dispose of all of the Claimant's claims. The Court should apply the doctrine of judicial
estoppel to prevent the Defendants from taking inconsistent positions which interfere with the
orderly administration ofjustice.
The Claimant should not be required to wait several years to have the remaining unresolved
issues of impairment and disability decided while the Defendants prosecute their premature
Interlocutory Appeal:
While no argument is presented by the defendant as to why an immediate
appeal would "materially advance the orderly resolution of the litigation,"
it is obvious that if the defendant prevails, it will prevent the necessity of a
trial. At the same time, it is obvious that if the defendant does not prevail
in the appeal, the trial of the action and relief sought by the plaintiff will
be delayed by the pendency of this interlocutory appeal and that there is a
possibility of a second appeal after the trial in t1ie district court.

In accepting or rejecting an appeal by certification under I.AR. 12, this
Court considers a number of factors in addition to the threshold questions
of whether there is a controlling question of law and whether an
immediate appeal would advance the orderly resolution of the litigation. It
was the intent of I.A.R. 12 to provide an immediate appeal from an
interlocutory order if substantial legal issues of great public interest or
legal questions of first impression are involved. The Court also considers
such factors as the impact of an immediate appeal upon the parties, the
effect of the delay of the proceedings in the district court pending the

Claimant I Respondent's Briefln Support of Motion For Involuntary Dismissal of Appeal
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appeal, the likelihood or possibility of a second appeal after judgment is
finally entered by the district court, and the case workload of the appellate
courts. No single factor is controlling in the Court's decision of acceptance
or rejection of an appeal by certification, but the Court intends by Rule 12
to create an appeal in the exceptional case and does not intend by the rule
to broaden the appeals which may be taken as a matter of right under
I.AR. 11. Budellv. Todd, 105 Idaho 2,, 665 P. 2d 701, 703 (1983).
If the Court denies the Claimant's Motion For Involuntary Dismissal of Appeal, the

Claimant may be required to wait 2 years before the Idaho Supreme Court decides the "arising
out of employment" issue. After the Supreme Comt affirms the Industrial Commission;s 5.17.11
Order, the Claimant would then be required to file a new Request For Calendaring with the
Industrial Commission in order to resolve the physical impairment and disability issues. The
Claimant's new Request For Calendaring would not be filed until after the Supreme Court
decided the "arising out of employment" issue in approximately June of 2013.
After the Claimant filed his new Request For Calendaring in June of 2013, the Industrial
Commission would probably not set the new Hearing on the physical impairment and disability
issues for at least 6 months until December of 2013. After the December 2013 Hearing before
the Industrial Commission, the parties will probably be required to take post-Hearing depositions
of physicians and vocational rehabilitation experts for 30 days followed by 120 days of legal
briefing. The Industrial Commission would then take the impairment and disability issues under
advisement for approximately 6 months to a year before the Commission entered a final
decision.
Based on this realistic assessment of the piecemeal litigation time-table that will unfold if
the Defendants are allowed to prosecute their Interlocutory Appeal of the Industrial
Claimant I Respondent's Brief In Support of Motion For Involuntary Dismissal of Appeal
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Commission's 05.17.2011 Order, the Claimant will be required to wait approximately 2.5 years
until December of 2014 before he receives a final decision from the Commission that addresses
the extent of his physical impairment and disability.
After receiving a final decision from the Industrial Commission, the Defendants will
probably file a 2nd appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court which disputes the Commission's decision
on the extent of the Claimant's impairment and disability. It could take another 2 years after
entry of the Commission's final decision before the Supreme Court affirmed the Industrial
Commission's decision on the physical impairment and disability issues.
The Claimant could literally be forced to wait until December of 2016 before receiving
tlie sure and certain relief promised to him by Idaho Code §72-201. During that 7 year time
frame from his date of injury on 12.18.2009 until this case if fully and finally resolved on appeal
in December of 2016, the Claimant will be deprived of medical benefits, temporary disability
benefits, pe1manent physical impairment benefits and permanent disability in excess of impairment
benefits through the Idaho workers' compensation system.

If this Court allows the Defendants to file piecemeal appeals in this case, the Claimant will
be deprived of the summary and simple process promised to him by the rules of equity and Idaho
Code §72-708. Furthermore, the Claimant will be deprived of the just, speedy and economical
determination of all of the unresolved issues in his case in direct violation of JRP 1 of the Judicial
Rules of Practice and Procedure Under the Idaho Workers' Compensation Law.
This Court has adopted a strong policy against piecemeal appeals in order to protect the
orderly administration ofjustice:

Claimant I Respondent's Briefin Support of Motion For Involuntary Dismissal of Appeal
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To require Mortimer to appeal within forty-two days after the denial of his
motion to reconsider would contravene our policy of avoiding piecemeal
litigation. Mortimer v. Riviera Apartments, 122 Idaho 839, 842, 840 P. 2d
383, 386 (1992).
The Claimant respectfully requests that the Court apply the doctrine of judicial estoppel and
grant his Motion For Involuntary Dismissal of Appeal in order to discourage piecemeal appeals and
protect the orderly administration of justice.

(3)

THE DEFENDANTS HAVE WAIVED THEIR RIGHT TO FILE A PERMISSIVE
APPEAL BY FAILING TO FILE A MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL
WITH THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION WITHIN 14 DAYS AFTER THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ENTERED ITS MAY 17, 2011 INTERLOCUTORY
ORDER AS REQUIRED BY I.A.R. 12(B).
Even if the Defendants could meet their burden of proof under LA.R. 12(a) and demonstrate

that the instant appeal involved a controlling question of law as to which there are substantial
grounds for difference of opinion and which an immediate appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court
would materially advance the resolution of the litigation, this appeal should still be dismissed
because the Defendants failed to file a Motion For Permission to Appeal with the Industrial
Commission within 14 days after the Commission entered its 05.17.2011 Order.
Based on the jmisdictional requirements set forth in I.AR. 12(c)(l), the Defendants are not
permitted to file a Motion with the Idaho Supreme Court requesting acceptance of an appeal by
permission until after they have first filed a Motion For Permission To Appeal with the Industrial
Commission and received an Order from the Commission. After the Order has been received from
the Commission, the Defendants could then :file a Motion For Permissive Appeal with the Supreme
Court. Since the Defendants did not file a Motion For Permission To Appeal with the Industrial

Claimant I Respondent's Brief In Support of Motion For Involuntary Dismissal of Appeal
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Commission, the Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction to consider their cunent Notice of
Appeal as a Motion For Acceptance of Appeal By Permission.

(D)

CONCLUSION

The Claimant respectfully requests that the Supreme Court grant his Motion For Involuntary
Dismissal of the Defendants' Appeal for the following reasons:
(1)

The Industrial Commission's May 17, 2011 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order was not a final Order that fully and finally disposed of all of the Claimant's claims
against the Defendants. Therefore, the Defendants are not entitled to file an appeal from that
Order as a matter ofright pursuant to I.AR. 11 (d);

(2)

The Defendants filed a Motion To Bifurcate with the Industrial Commission on 05.12.2010
and specifically requested that the Industrial Commission bifurcate the issues in this case so
that they would have to be heard and decided at 2 separate hearings. Therefore, the doctrine
of judicial estoppel should be applied to prevent the Defendants from taking the inconsistent
position of an Interlocutory Appeal of the Industrial Commission's 05.17.2011 Order;

(3)

The Defendants have waived their right to file a permissive appeal by failing to file a
Motion For Pennission To Appeal with the Industrial Comn1ission within 14 days after the
Industrial Commission entered its May 17, 2011 interlocutory Order as required by I.AR
12(b);

(4)

An immediate interlocutory appeal of less than all of the disputed issues will delay the final
determination of the issues of pennanent physical impairment and permanent disability
because proceedings before the Industrial Commission will be stayed pending resolution of
the Interlocutory Appeal by the Supreme Court;

(5)

There is a substantial likelihood that the Defendants will file a 2nd appeal after the final
Hearing before the Industrial Commission which resolves all of the remaining issues in this
case;

(6)

An Interlocutory Appeal at this stage of the litigation will double the Supreme Court's
workload and waste scarce judicial resources because the Court will have to hear and decide
2 appeals in this case; and,
·
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(7)

Permissive Interlocutory Appeals undermine the effective administration of justice because
they encourage piecemeal litigation and multiple appeals over the course of several years
while the Claimant is being deprived of his substantive legal rights and the worker's
compensation benefits that are promised to him by the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act.

Respectfully submitted this 2ih day of June, 2011.

ELLSWORTH, KALLAS & DeFRANCO, P.L.L.C

Attorney's For Claimant I Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2J1h day of June, 2011, I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Claimant I Respondent's Brief In Support of Motion For Involuntary Dismissal, postage
prepaid, to the following:

Susan R. Veltman:
Gardner & Breen
1410 W. Washington
Boise, Idaho 83702
P.O. Box 2528
Boise, ID 83701

Attorney For Claimant I Respondent
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Rick D. Kallas
Ellsworth, Kallas, Talboy & DeFranco, P.L.L.C.
1031 E. Park Blvd.
Boise, Idaho 83712
(208) 336-1843
Telephone:
Facsimile:
(208) 345-8945
Idaho State Bal' No. 3872
Attorney for Claimant
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
MICHAEL P. VAWTER,

Claimant,

vs.
UPS,
Employer,
and
LIBERTY INSURANCE CORP.,
Sutety,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

J.C. No. 2010-000114
CLAIMANT'S REQUEST FOR
CALENDARING

COMES NOW Claimant, Michael Vawter, and, pursuant to J.R.P. 8 (C), hereby requests
that the Commission calendar this claim for Hearing on the following grounds:
The requesting party hereby states:
(1)

Readiness For Hearing
The Claimant is ready for Hearing.

(2)

Disputed Issues To Be Heard and Decided
The following issues are before the Commission to be heard and decided:

EXHIBIT
Vawter I Claimant's 5.3.10 Request For Calendaring

(a)

Did the Claimant's 12.18.09 bendL.11g over to tie his work/ snow boots accident arise out
of and in the course of his employment with UPS?
·

(b)

Did the Claimant's 12.18.09 industrial accident either cause a new injury or aggravate,
accelerate, light-up, combine with or contribute to a pre-existing back condition and
result in the need for medical treatment?

(c)

Are the Defendants liable for medical benefits as required by the Claimant's attending
physician or needed immediately after the Claimant's 12.18 .09 industrial accident I injury
arid a reasonable time thereafter pursuant to Idaho Code § 72w432?

(d)

Are the Defendants liable for the payment of total temporaiy disability (TTD) and I or
temporary partial disability (TPD) benefits to the Claimant during his period of recovery?

(e)

Did the Claimant's 12.18.09 industrial accident cause the Claimant to suffer any
permanent physical impairment (PPI) and, if so, to what extent?

(:t)

Did the Claimant suffer any disability in excess of his physical impairment (PPD >PPI)
as the result of his 12.18.09 industrial accident I injmy, including whether the Claimant is
totally and permanently disabled under the 100% method or the odd-lot doctrine?

(g)

Are the Defendants liable for the payment of attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code §72804?

(3)

Location of Hearing
The desired location of the Hear'ing is Boise, Idaho.

(4)

Claimant's Counsel's Unavailable Dates
At the present time, the Claimant's attorney is not available fol' Hearing on the following
dates:

5.6.10 - 5.7.10; 5.31.10; 6.11.10; 6.18.10; 7.2.10; 7.5.10; 7.29.10; 7.30.10,

8.12.10; 9.6.10; 11.19.10-11.29.10; 12.24.10-12.31.10.
(5)

Length of Hearing

The estimated length of time to present the Claimant>s case in chief is one (1) full day.
(6)

Full Commission Participation
This case does not present any unique, unusual or bizarre factual, legal or medical issues
that need to be heard by the full Corr_,mission.

(7)

Translation Services

Vawter I Claimant's 5.·3.10 Request For Calendaring
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The Claimant does require translation services.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3rd day of May, 2010.

Ellsworth, Kallas> Talboy & Defiance> P.L.L.C.

Attorneys for Claimant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I BEREBY CERTIFY tliat on the 3rd day of May, 2010, I served the Claimant's Request For
Calendaring on the Defendants by the method indicated below and addressed to the following:

Susan R. Veltman, Esq.
GARDNER & BREEN
1410 West Washington
Boise, Idaho 83702

Vawter I Claimant's 5,3.10 Request For Calendaring

[X] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Overnight Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile

[ J
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SUSAN R. VELTMAN (ISB No. 7850)
GARDNER & BREEN
1410 W. Washington- 83702
Post Office Box 2528
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 387-0881
Facsimile: (208) 387-3501
Attorney for Defendants
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
MICHAEL P. VAWIER,
Claimant,
v. .
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE,
Employer,
and
LIBERTY INSURANCE CORP.
Surety,
Defendant.

I.

)
)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

I.C. Case No. 2010-000114
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR
HEARING/MOTION TO
BIFURCATE

Statement of readiness for h earing and request to bifurcate issue of accident/injury:
Defendants assert that Claimant's request for a hearing on his stated issues, including PPI and

PPD, is premature. Claimant has not yet been certified at MMI and no physician has assigned a PPI
rating. Since Claimant has not yet been certified at MMI, it is premature to evaluate Claimant's
permanent restrictions and otherwise assess PPD. Additionally, once Claimant reaches MMI and

RES PONSE TO REQUEST FOR HEARING/ MOTI ON TO BIFURCATE, P. 1

EXHIBJT

l '1 l

receives a PPI rating, Defendants will likely need to obtain an expert opinion on the issue of
apportionment, based on Claimant's pre-existing back injuries and conditions. A vocational
assessment may also be necessary.
The primary dispute in this case is whether Claimant's bending over to tie his shoe
constitutes an accident arising out of employment as a UPS driver. Defendants are ready to proceed
to hearing on this issue. Defendants agree that issues regarding medical treatment and temporary
disability could also be heard at a bifurcated hearing. At the request of Claimant, the issue of attorney
fees could also be litigated. If the Referee agrees to bifurcation of the issues, Defendants do not
object to scheduling the hearing any time after June 15, 2010. If the Referee concludes that allissues
should be adjudicated at the same time, Defendants object to scheduling the hearing prior to
November 2010, since Claimant's date of MMI is currently uncertain and additional preparation will
be necessary once a certification is issued. In the event that Defendants prevail on the primary
dispute, all other issues will be moot. In the event that Claimant prevails on the primary dispute,
informal resolution of the other issues is possible.

II.
Issues- Defendants request that the issues be bifurcated and that only the following
issues be set for hearing at this time:
1. Whether Claimant's injury was the result of an accident arising out of and in the
course of employment;
2.
Whether Claimant's condition is due in whole or in part to a pre-existing injury
or disease or cause not work-related;
3.
Whether Claimant is entitled to reasonable and necessary medical care as
provided for by Idaho Code § 72-432, and the extent thereof;

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR HEARING/MOTION TO BIFURCATE, P. 2

4. Whether Claimant is entitled to temporary partial and/or temporary total disability
(TPD/TTD) benefits, and the extent thereof; and

5. Whether Claimant is entitled to attorney fees due to Employer/Surety's
unreasonable denial of compensation as provided for by Idaho Code § 72-804.
III.

Location of hearing: Boise, Idaho

IV.

Desired dates of hearing:

Defendants anticipate being ready for hearing by September 1,

2010 and request a hearing on or after that date.

v.

Unavailable dates of counsel:

June 1, 2,3, 11, 14, 16, 17, 18, 29;
July 7, 8, 9, 12;
August 4, 5, 6, 10, 12, 19, 20;
September 3.

VI.

Estimated length of hearing: One-half day.

VII.

Settlement Negotiations: Have not occurred, based on the nature of the primary dispute.

VIII.

Full Commission Participation: Not required.

IX.

Special Services: None requested.

DATED this 11th day of May, 2010.

Susan R. Veltman - of the firm
GARDNER & BREEN
Attorney for Defendants

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR HEARING/MOTION TO BIFURCATE, P. 3

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 11th day of May, 2010, I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing to be served upon:
Rick Kallas
Ellsworth, Kallas, Talboy & DeFranco
1031 E. Park Blvd.
Boise, ID 83712
by depositing the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the above-named,
the last known address as set forth above.

SUSAN R. VELTMAN

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR HEARING/MOTION TO BIFURCATE, P. 4

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
MICHAELP. VAWTER,

)
)
)
)

Claimant,

RECEIVED
MAY Z 12010

)

~

)
)
)
Employer,
)
)
and
)
)
LIBERTY JNSURANCE CORPORATION, )
)
Surety,
)
)
Defendants.
)

IC2010-000114

GARDNER & BREEN

UNITED PARCEL SERVICE,

NOTICE OF
TELEPHONE CONFERENCE

FfLED

MAY 20 2010
INDUSTRfAL COMMISSION

A telephone conference will be conducted by Referee Michael E. Powers, pursuant to the
Revised Rules ofPractice and Procedure under the Workers' Compensation Law, on June 7, 2010,
at 11:00 a.m. All parties shall be prepared to discuss Claimant's Request for Calendaring,
Defendants' Response to Request for Hearing/Motion to Bifurcate, and Claimant's Response to

Defendants' Motion to Bifurcate.
Rick Kallas may be reached at (208) 336-1843.
Susan Veltman may be reached at (208) 387-0881.

If there are any changes to these numbers, please contact us immediately. You may do this
by calling the Industrial Commission at 334-6019.

.

tb

DATED this ~o

day of May, 2010.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

Michael E. Powers, Referee

NOTICE OF TELEPHONE CONFERENCE -1

EXHIBIT

I

10

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

i:!l .

I hereby certify that on the cX) day of May, 2010, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
NOTICE OF TELEPHONE CONFERENCE was served by regular United States mail upon each
of the following persons:

RICK D KALLAS
1031 EPARKBLVD
BOISE ID 83712

SUSAN R VELTMAN
POBOX2528
BOISEID 83701

ge
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01/15/2010 15: 31 FAX
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. BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL CO.MM.ISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MICHAEL P. VAWTER,

C:lairnant,
V.

)
)
)
)
)

)

UNITED PARCEL SERVICE,

)

Employer,

IC 2010-000114

)
)

NOTICE OF
TELEPHONE CONFERENCE

)

and

)
)
)

FILED
rJUL 1.5. 2010

Surety,

)
)

INDUSTAfAL. COMMISSION

Defendants.

)

LIBERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION1 )

Pursuant to Claimanes verbal request, a telephone conference will be conducted by Referee
Mich.a.el E. Powers, pursuant to the Revised Rules of Practice and Procedure under the Workers'

Compensation Law, on July 19, 2010, at 9:30 a.m.
Rick Kallas maybe reached at (208) 336-1843.

Susan Veltman may be reached at (208) 387-0881.
Jf there are any changes to these numbers, please contact us immediateiy. You may do this

by calling the Industrial Commission at 334-6019.
DATED' this 15th day of July, 2010.
INDUSTRIAL CO:MMISSION

NOTICE OF TELEPHONE CONFERENCE -1
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07/15/2010 15:32 FAX

208

Idaho Industrial comm

~0002/0002

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 15th day of July, 2010, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
NOTICE OF TELEPHONE CONFERENCE was served byfacsimile transmission upon each of
the following persons:
RICK D KALLAS

FAX: (208) 345-8945

SUSAN R. VELTMAN

FAX: (208) 387-3501

ge

NOTICE OF TELEPHONE CONFERENCE- 2

••
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
MlCHAELP. VAWTER,

Claimant,
v.
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE,
Employer,

and

)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

RECE\\IEO
JUL 1 ,

imo

GARDNER & aReeN
IC 2010-000114

NOTICE OF HEARING

)

)
LIBERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION, )
)
Sm~ty,

)
)

Defendants.

)

FILED
!JUL 20 2010
INDUSTflAL COMMISSJmJ

Pursuant to the telephone conference conducted by Referee Michael E. Powers with the
parties on September 28, 2010,

NOTICE IS HEREBY GNEN that a hearing will be held in the above-entitled matter on
September 28, 2010, at 9:00 a.m., for one-haif day, in the Industrial Commission hearing room,
700 S. Clearwater Lane, City of Boise, County of Ada, State ofldaho, on the following issues:
1.

Whether Claimant suffered a personal injury arising out of and in the course of

employment;
2.

Whether Claimant's injury was the result of an accident arising out of and in the

course of employment;
. 3.

Whether Claimant is entitled to reasonable and necessary medical care as provided

for by Idaho Code § 72~432, and the extent thereof;

NOTICE OF HEARING - 1

EXHIBIT

-~l_
...I __
1

lt:f9

4.

Whether Claimant is entitled to temporary partial and/or temporary total disability

(TPD/TID) benefits> and the extent thereof;
5.

Whether Claimant is entitled to attorney fees due to Employer/Surety's

unreasonable denial of compensation as provided for by Idaho Code § 72-804.
DATED this ClO-tlJ day of July, 2010.

INDUSTRIAL C011.MJSSION

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the Qo-J±i day of July, 2010 a true and correct copy of the NOTICE
OF HEARING was served by United States Certified Mail upon each of the following:
RICK D KALLAS
1031 EPARKBLVD

BOISE ID 83712
SUSAN R VELTMAN

POBOX2528
BOISE ID 83701

E-mailed to Dean Willis

ge

NOTICE OF HEARING - 2

l [

ROY TYLER FRIZZELL, M.D., Ph.D.
Certified American Board of Neurological Surgery
222 N. 2nd Street, Suite 307
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 344-1000 • Fax: {208) 344-1331

November 23, 2010
Scott Harris, MD
PO Box 1047

McCallI ID 83B38,
7:..::i
..•·.:-

\1\/~wter

Re!
DOB:

Dear Scott,
I had the pleasure of seeing Mr. Vawter back in clinic. This is for follow up of his work injury

December 18, 2009.

~fli

Mr. Vawter had x-rays performed, 1,vfrit h show solid fusion. There is no adjacent level instability.
On examination he has flexion of 48 degrees, extension 19 degrees, right tilt 18 degrees, !eft tilt
18 degrees. He notes continued axial back pain without significant lumbar radiation. Mr. Vawter

has fu! I motor strength and ambulates without an antalgic gait.
At this point Mr. Vawter is medically stable from his Q~cember 18, 2009, work injury. I will
address permanent restrictions and impairment in a sep~'(~te communication . He will see me
back on an as-needed basis.
1T""···
:...-.

Sincere ly;

{}_!}~~
R. Tyle r Frizzell/ MD, PhD

RTF/I m g
Cc:

Rick D. Kallas-Attorney
Susan Veltman-Attorney

EXHIBIT

I
..._

_ .-.1 )ft

I

09/07/2011 WED 18:55

FAX

ldJOOl/004

145 8945 EKTD

ELLSWORTH, KALLAS & DEFRANCO, P.L.L.C.

Joseph L. Ellswo1th
Rick D. Kallas *
John C. DeFranco

ATTORNEYS AT LAW
1031 E. Park Blvd.
Boise, Idaho 83712

Phone: (208) 336-1843
Fax: (208) 345-8945

Licensed in Idaho and Oregon

September 7, 2011
Via Facsimile & U.S. Mail
(208) 387-3501

Susan Veltman
Gardner & Breen Law Offices
P.O. Box 2528
Boise, Idaho 83701
Re:

(1)
(2)
(3)

Claimant's 2nd Request For Payment of Past Denied TTD Benefits
Claimant's 2"d Request For Payment of Past Denied Medical Benefits
Claimant's 2nu Request For Payment of Statutory Interest Per Idaho Code §72-734

Vawter v. UPS and Liberty Ins. Corp.
I.C. No. 2010-000114
Dear Ms. Veltman:
(A)

Updated Procedural History

On August 9, 2011, the Claimant submitted a request to Employer I Surety for the payment of past denied TTD
benefits and past denied medical benefits as Ordered by the Industrial Commission in its May 17, 2011 decision.
Since the date of the Claimant's 8.9.11 request for payment, the Defendants have failed and I or refused to pay
the Claimant his past denied TTD benefits, his past denied medical benefits and applicable statutory interest as
Ordered by the Industrial Commission in its May 17, 2011 decision.
On September 7, 2011, the parties pa1ticipated in a Pre-Hearing Telephone Conference with the Commissioners.
During that telephone conference, the Commissioners made it very clear that the Commission deems its May 17,
2011 Order to be a final Order and they made it very clear that they expected Employer I Surety in this case to
comply with the Industrial Commission's May ! 7, 2011 decision and pay the Claimant his past denied TTD
benefits and past denied medical benefits as ordered by the Commission.
After the 9.7.201 I telephone conference, the Industrial Commission entered an ORDER VACATING
HEARING AND ESTABLISHING BRIEFING SCHEDULE which gave the Defendants 10 days after the date
of the Commission's 9.7.2011 Order to submit a legal brief on the issue of whether the Industrial Commission
should stay the payment of benefits required by the Commission's May 17, 2011 Order. However, the
Commission made it clear that the Commission's preliminary legal research indicated that there was no legal
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authority which justified the granting of a stay which relieved the Defendants of their obligation to make
payment to Claimant in accordance with the Industrial Commission's May 17, 2011 Order.
During the 9.7.201 I telephone conference, I indicated that I would contact tbe Claimant and determine if he
would be willing to waive his right to make demand for the current payment of his past denied TTD benefits and
past denied medical benefits that the Defendants were Ordered to pay the Claimant in the Commission's May
17, 2011 Order.
After careful consideration, the Claimant determined that it would be in his best interest to make a second
request to Employer I Surety for the direct payment (through Claimant's counsel) of past denied TTD benefits,
past denied medical benefits and accrued statutory interest as Ordered by the Industrial Commission in its May
17, 2011 Order. In accordance with those instructions, I hereby make the Claimant's second request for the
payment ofTTD benefits, medical benefits and accrued interest in accordance with the Industrial Commission's
May 17, 2011 Order.
Since the Claimant's original 8.9.2011 request for payment, additional interest has accrued by operation of
Idaho Code §72-734. The amount of money that the Defendants now owe the Claimant pursuant to the
Industrial Commission's May 17, 2011 Order will be calculated below.
(B)

Second Request For The Payment of Past Due TTD Benefits Per 5.17.11 Order

In its 5.17.11 decision, the Industrial Commission Ordered the Defendants to pay the Claimant retroactive TTD
benefits from 12.28.09 - 12.6.10 (See Conclusions of Law and Order No. 2 on pg. 21 of the 5.17.11 decision).
Based on that Order, the Defendants now owe the Claimant $28,025.61 in retroactive TTD benefits calculated as
follows:

2009 TTD Benefits Due
Based on the Claimant's Average Weekly Wage, his TTD Rate would be calculated based on the statutory
maximum benefit of90% of the Average Weekly State Wage (AWSW) for the State offdaho per Idaho Code
§72-408 and §72-409. In 2009, 90% of the A WSW was $572.40 and the daily rate was $81.77. The
Defendants owe Claimant 4 days at $81.77 per day or $327.09 (i.e., 12.28.09-12.31.09 = 4 days).
20 I0 TTD Benefits Due
In 2010, 90% of the AWSW was $578.70 and the daily rate was $82.67. The Defendants owe the Claimant 48
weeks + 3 days.

48 weeks X $578.70
3 days X $82.67

=

Total 2010 Benefits Due:

$27,777.60
$248.01
$28,025.61

Combined Total TTD Benefits Due: $327.09 + $28,025.61 = $28,352.70.
Please ask UPS to send me a check in the amount of$28,352.70 in accordance with the Industrial Commission's
5.17.11 Order within thirty (30) days (i.e., on or before 10.7.2011). ff your calculations indicate that the
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Claimant's TTD award for the time frame 12.28.09 - 12.6.10 is either higher or lower, please provide me with
an explanation of your calculations so that the Claimant can understand how you arrived at a different TTD
benefit calculation.
(C)

Second Request For Direct Payment of Past Denied Medical Benefits Due Per 5.17.11 Order

Based on Idaho Code §72-432 and the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Neel v. Western Construction, 147
Idaho 146, 206 P.3d 852 (2009), the Defendants are liable for the direct payment to Claimant of 100% of the
invoiced amount of all past medical benefits incurred by Claimant in connection with his 12.18.09 industrial
accident I injury from the date of the Claimant's 12.18.09 industrial accident to the date when the Industrial
Commission deemed this claim compensable on 5.17.11, including, but not limited to, the $149,033.68 in past
denied medical benefits that the Industrial Commission Ordered the Defendants to pay Claimant in its 5.17.11
decision (See Order No. 3 on pg. 21 of its 5.17.11 decision).
Please send me a check in the amount of $149,033.68 in accordance with the Industrial Commission's 5.17.11
Order within thirty (30) days (i.e., on or before 10.7.2011)
(D)

Second Request For Payment oflnterest Pursuant to Idaho Code §72-734

The combined amount of past denied benefits that became due and payable on 5.17.11 is $177,356.38 (i.e.,
$28,352.70 + $149,033.68 = $177,356.38). Pursuant to Idaho Code §72-734, interest became due and payable
on the entire amount as of the date of the decision based on the rate set forth in Idaho Code §28-22- I 04(2).
The legal rate of interest from 5.17.11to6.30.l l was 5.375%. Effective 7.1.11, the legal rate of interest changed
to 5.25% (Source: Idaho State Treasurer's Web-Site@ http://sto.idaho.gov/Reports/Lega!Rate011nterest.aspx).

Interest Due from 5.17.11 - 6.30.11 Using 5.35% Interest Rate
Total amount of $177,356.38 X 5.35% = $9,488.57 per annum
May= 14 days X $26.00 =
June = 30 days X $26.00 =

+

365 = $26.00 per day

$364.00
$780.00

Subtotal:

$1,144.00

Interest Due from 7. l .11 - 8.9.11 Using 5.25% Interest Rate
Total amount of $177,356.38 X 5.25% =$9,311.21 per annum+ 365 = $25.51 per day.
July= 31 days X $25.51 =
$790.81
August= 3 ! days X $25.51 = $790.81
September= 7 days X 25.51 = $I 78.57
Subtotal

$1.760.19

Total Interest Accumulated Since 5.17.11
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The Defendants' combined liability for the payment of past denied medical and income benefits plus statutory
interest which is now due and payable as of 9.7.2011 is $180,260.57 calculated as follows: $177,356.38 +
Interest of $2,904.19 = Total Amount Due and Payable of $180,260.67. Based on the current statutory rate of
interest, this amount will continue to increase by $25.51 each day until the amount due has been paid in full.
(E)

Second Request For Payment of Aii Benefits Due Per Industrial Commission's 5.17.11 Order

In order to avoid the payment of unnecessary additional interest charges which continue to accrue and become

due each day at the current rate of $25.51, please request UPS to pay the entire amount of$180,260.67 which is
now due in accordance with the Industrial Commission's 5. 17. 11 decision within the next thirty (30) days (i.e.,
on or before 10.7.2011).
If UPS refuses to pay the Claimant the entire amount which is due at the time payment is made within the next
thirty (30) days (i.e., on or before October 7, 2011), Mr. Vawter has instructed me to take all appropriate
collection action against UPS including, but not limited to, the issuance of District Court judgment against UPS
in accordance with the process and procedure set forth in Idaho Code §72-735 and Idaho Code §72-736.

Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter.

CC:

Michael P. Vawter
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SUSAN R. VELTMAN (ISB No. 7850)
GARDNER & BREEN
1410 W. Washington - 83702
Post Office Box 2528
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 387-0881
Facsimile: (208) 387-3501
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RECEIVED

INDUSTRIAL COMHISSJQH

Attorney for Defendants
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
MICHAEL P. VAWTER,
Claimant,

v.
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE,
Employer,
and
LIBERTY INSURANCE CORP.
Surety,
Defendants.
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LC. Case No. 2010-000114

AFFIDAVIT OF SUSAN R. VELTMAN
IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS'
MEMORANDUM REGARDING
THE ISSUE OF PAYMENT
OBLIGATIONS

Susan R. Veltman, being first duly sworn on oath deposes and states the following:
1. I am an attorney authorized to practice law in the State ofldaho and make this Affidavit

based on personal knowledge.
2. I am the attorney of record for the Defendants in this matter.

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM REGARDING PAYMENT OBLIGATIONS, P. 1

3. A true and correct copy of the following Exhibits are attached hereto and incorporated by
reference as though fully set forth in support of Defendants' Memorandum Regarding the
Issue of Payment Obligations.
Exhibit 1:

Defendants' I Appellants' Brief in Support of Defendants' I
Appellants' Response to Claimant I Respondent's Motion for
Involuntary Dismissal of Appeal dated July 8, 2011.

Exhibit 2:

The Idaho Supreme Court's Order Dismissing Appeal dated July
27, 2011.

Exhibit 3:

Defendants' I Appellants' Motion for Clarification dated August 1,
2011.

Exhibit 4:

The Idaho Supreme Court's Order Denying Motion for
Clarification dated August 15, 2011.

Exhibit 5:

Claimant's demand for payment to Defendants' dated August 9,
2011.

Exhibit 6:

Claimant's May 3, 2010, answer Interrogatory No. 16.

Exhibit 7:

Claimant I Respondent's Brief in Support of Motion for
Involuntary Dismissal of Appeal dated June 27, 2011.

Exhibit 8:

Claimant's Request for Calendaring dated May 3, 2010.

Exhibit 9:

Defendants' Response to Request for Hearing I Motion to
Bifurcate dated May 11, 2010.

Exhibit 10:

Notice of Telephone Conference dated May 20, 2010.

Exhibit 11:

Notice of Telephone Conference dated July 15, 2010.

Exhibit 12:

Notice of Hearing dated July 20, 2010.

Exhibit 13:

Dr. Frizzell's November 23, 2010, letter to Dr. Harris.

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM REGARDING PAYMENT OBLIGATIONS, P. 2
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Exhibit 14:

Claimant's demand for payment to Defendants' dated September 7,
2011.

DATED this 16th day of September, 2011.

Su~ancR. Veltman - of the firm
GARDNER & BREEN
Attorney for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 16th day of September, 2011, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing to be served upon:
Rick Kallas
Ellsworth, Kallas, Talboy & Defranco
1031 E. Park Blvd.
Boise, ID 83712
by depositing the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the above-named,
the last known address as set forth above.
/
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SUSAN R. VELTMAN

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM REGARDING PAYMENT OBLIGATIONS, P. 4

